  
  Based  on  the committee's investigation and two  separate
court  rulings,  it is clear that high level  Department  of
Justice  officials deliberately ignored INSLAW's proprietary
rights in the enhanced version of PROMIS and misappropriated
this  software  for  use  at  locations  not  covered  under
contract  with  the  company.  Justice  then  proceeded   to
challenge INSLAW's claims in court even though it knew  that
these  claims were valid and that the Department would  most
likely lose in court on this issue. After almost 7 years  of
litigation and $1 million in cost, the Department  is  still
denying   its  culpability  in  this  matter.   Instead   of
conducting  an  investigation  into  INSLAW's  claims   that
criminal  wrongdoing by high level Government officials  had
occurred, Attorney Generals Meese and Thornburgh blocked  or
restricted congressional inquiries into the matter,  ignored
the  findings  of  two courts and refused  to  ask  for  the
appointment  of an independent counsel. These  actions  were
taken in the face of a growing body of evidence that serious
wrongdoing had occurred which reached to the highest  levels
of  the  Department. The evidence received by the  committee
during  its  investigation clearly raises  serious  concerns
about  the possibility that a high level conspiracy  against
INSLAW  did exist and that great efforts have been  expended
by  the  Department to block any outside investigation  into
the matter.
  Based  on  the  evidence presented  in  this  report,  the
committee believes that extraordinary steps are required  to
resolve  the INSLAW issue. The Attorney General should  take
immediate  steps  to  remunerate INSLAW  for  the  harm  the
Department  has egregiously caused the company.  The  amount
determined should include all reasonable legal expenses  and
other  costs  to the Hamiltons not directly related  to  the
contract  but caused by the actions taken by the  Department
to  harm  the  company or its employees.  To  avoid  further
retaliation against the company, the Attorney General should
prohibit Department personnel who participated in any way in
the litigation of the INSLAW matter from further involvement
in  this  case. In the event that the Attorney General  does
not  move  expeditiously to remunerate INSLAW, then Congress
should   move  quickly  under  the  congressional  reference
provisions of the Court of Claims Act to initiate  a  review
of this matter by that court.
  Finally,  the  committee believes that the  only  way  the
INSLAW  allegations can be adequately and fully investigated
is  by  the  appointment  of  an  independent  counsel.  The
committee  is  aware  that  on  November  13,  1991,   newly
confirmed  Attorney General Barr finally appointed  Nicholas
Bua,  a  retired Federal judge from Chicago, as his  special
counsel  to  investigate  and  advise  him  on  the   INSLAW
controversy. However, at that time the Attorney General  had
not  empowered  Judge Bua to subpoena witnesses,  convene  a
grand   jury  or  compel  the  Department  to  produce   key
documents.
  INSLAW  officials  have voiced concerns  that  Judge  Bua,
lacking  independent counsel status, would not  be  able  to
entice  Department employees who were knowledgeable  of  the
INSLAW  matter  to  come forward and  assist  Judge  Bua  in
bringing  this  matter  to closure. Consequently,  they  are
concerned     that     Judge     Bua     will     not     be
able  to  get to the bottom of the matter, and they  believe
his  investigation  will  end  up  being  subverted  by  the
Department.
  The  inability to subpoena and/or to convene a grand  jury
was  apparently of concern to Judge Bua and, after a meeting
on  January 28, 1992, the Attorney General granted Judge Bua
broad  investigative authority which included the  power  to
subpoena  witnesses  and to convene  special  grand  juries.
However  because of the actions by the Department  regarding
potential  whistleblowers such as Anthony  Pasciuto,  it  is
very  likely  witnesses will still feel intimidated  by  the
Department.   This  problem  was  present   throughout   the
committee's  investigation and remains a  potential  problem
today.
  Without  independent counsel status, Judge Bua remains  an
employee of the Department of Justice. The image problem  is
illustrated  in  a  recent interview with Roger  M.  Cooper,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Administration. In  an
interview  with  the Government Computer  News,  Mr.  Cooper
stated that:
  
      The  judge (Bua) will do as the attorney  general
     wants  him to do, and that's fine. I think all  of
     us  in  the department would like to get  it  [the
     INSLAW  matter]  behind  us.  It's  sort   of   an
     albatross.
  
  Mr.  Cooper  may  have  meant that Attorney  General  Barr
wants  Judge  Bua  to conduct a thorough investigation.  The
committee has no reason to doubt the commitment of Judge Bua
or  Attorney General Barr to do a thorough investigation  of
this matter-the problem rests with the fact that, as long as
the  investigation of wrongdoing by former and current  high
level  Justice  officials remains under the control  of  the
Department,  there will always be serious  doubt  about  the
objectivity and thoroughness of the work.
  This  matter  has caused great harm to several individuals
involved   and  has  severely  undermined  the  Department's
credibility  and  reputation.  Congress  and  the  executive
branch must take immediate and forceful steps to restore the
public  confidence and faith in our system of justice  which
has  been  severely eroded by this painful  and  unfortunate
affair. As such, the independent counsel should be appointed
with  full  and  broad  powers to  investigate  all  matters
related  to  the  allegations of wrongdoing  in  the  INSLAW
matter, including Mr. Casolaro's death and its possible link
to individuals associated with organized crime.
  
                         X. FINDINGS
  
  1.   The   Department,  in  an  attempt  to  implement   a
standardized  case  management system, ignored  advice  from
vendors-including INSLAW-that PROMIS should not  be  adapted
to  word processing equipment. As predicted, problems  arose
with  adapting  PROMIS  to  word processing  equipment.  The
Department immediately set out to terminate that portion  of
the contract and blamed INSLAW for its failure.
  2.  The  Department exhibited extremely poor  judgment  by
assigning   C.   Madison  Brewer  to   manage   the   PROMIS
implementation contract. Mr. Brewer had been asked to  leave
his  position  as general counsel of INSLAW  under  strained
relations   with  INSLAW's  owner,  Mr.  William   Hamilton.
INSLAW's problems with the Department, which started  almost
immediately      after      the      award      of       the
contract  in  March 1982, were generated in  large  part  by
Mr.  Brewer,  with the support and direction of  high  level
Department officials. The potential conflict of interest  in
the  hiring  of Mr. Brewer was not considered by  Department
officials.  However, Mr. Brewer's past strained relationship
with Mr. Hamilton, and the fact that he lacked experience in
ADP  management  and  understanding of  Federal  procurement
laws, raises serious questions about why he was selected  as
the PROMIS project manager.
  3.  Mr. Brewer's attitude toward INSLAW, combined with Mr.
Videnieks'  harsh  contract philosophy,  led  to  the  rapid
deterioration  of  relations  between  the  Department   and
INSLAW.   Any  semblance  of  fairness  by  key   Department
officials toward INSLAW quickly evaporated when Mr. Hamilton
attempted to protect his companies' proprietary rights to  a
privately funded enhanced version of the PROMIS software. In
a  highly unusual move, Mr. Brewer recommended just 1  month
after the contract was signed that INSLAW be terminated  for
convenience  of  the  Government  even  though  INSLAW   was
performing under the contract. From that point forward there
is  no  indication  that Mr. Brewer or  Mr.  Videnieks  ever
deviated  from their plan to harm INSLAW. The actions  taken
by  Messrs.  Brewer and Videnieks were done  with  the  full
knowledge and support of high level Department officials.
  4.  Peter Videnieks, the Department's contracting officer,
negotiated Modification 12 of the contract which resulted in
INSLAW  agreeing to provide its proprietary Enhanced  PROMIS
software  for  the  Department's use. This  negotiation  was
conducted  in  bad  faith because Justice later  refused  to
recognize  INSLAW's  rights  to  privately  financed  PROMIS
enhancements.  Mr.  Videnieks and Mr. Brewer,  supported  by
Deputy   Attorney  General  Jensen  and  other  high   level
officials,  unilaterally concluded that the  Department  was
not  bound  by  the property laws that applied to  privately
developed and financed software.
  6.   Thereafter,  the  Department  ignored  INSLAW's  data
rights  to  its enhanced version of its PROMIS software  and
misused  its  prosecutorial  and  litigative  resources   to
legitimize  and  coverup  its  misdeeds.  This  resulted  in
extremely  protracted litigation and  an  immense  waste  of
resources both for the Government and INSLAW. These  actions
were taken even though the Department had already determined
that  INSLAW's  claim was probably justified  and  that  the
Department  would  lose in court. In fact,  Deputy  Attorney
General Burns acknowledged this fact to OPR investigators.
  6.  Department  of Justice documents show that  a  "public
domain"  version of the PROMIS software was sent to domestic
and  international  entities  including  Israel.  Given  the
Department's  position  regarding  its  ownership   of   all
versions   of  PROMIS,  questions  remain  whether  INSLAW's
Enhanced  PROMIS was distributed by Department officials  to
numerous  sources outside the Department, including  foreign
governments.
  7.  Several  witnesses, including former Attorney  General
Elliot Richardson, have provided testimony, sworn statements
or  affidavits linking high level Department officials to  a
conspiracy  to steal INSLAW's PROMIS software  and  secretly
transfer  PROMIS to Dr. Brian. According to these witnesses,
the  PROMIS software was subsequently converted for  use  by
domestic          and          foreign          intelligence
services.  This  testimony was provided by  individuals  who
knew  that  the  Justice Department  would  be  inclined  to
prosecute them for perjury if they lied under oath. No  such
prosecutions have occurred.
  8.  Justice  had made little effort to resolve conflicting
and possibly perjurious sworn statements by key departmental
witnesses about the alleged attempt by high level Department
officials to liquidate INSLAW and steal its software. It  is
very  possible  that  Judge  Blackshear  may  have  perjured
himself  and even today his explanations for his recantation
of  his  sworn  statement  provided  to  INSLAW  are  highly
suspicious.  The  investigation  of  this  matter   by   the
Department's  Office  of  Professional  Responsibility   was
superficial.
  9.  The  Department's  response to INSLAW's  requests  for
investigations  by  an independent counsel  and  the  Public
Integrity Section was cursory and incomplete
  10.  The  reviews  of the INSLAW matter by  Congress  were
hampered  by  Department tactics designed  to  conceal  many
significant  documents  and  otherwise  interfere  with   an
independent  review. The Department actions appear  to  have
been  motivated more by an intense desire to  defend  itself
from    INSLAW's   charges   of   misconduct   rather   than
investigating possible violations of the law.
  11.  Justice officials have asserted that, as a result  of
the  recent  ruling by the Appeals Court and the refusal  of
the  Supreme Court to hear INSLAW's appeal, the Findings and
Conclusions  of  Bankruptcy Judge George  Bason  and  senior
Judge  William  Bryant of the District Court are  no  longer
relevant.  The  Appeals Court decision,  in  fact,  did  not
dispute  the  Bankruptcy Court's ruling that the  Department
"stole É through trickery, fraud and deceit" INSLAW's PROMIS
software.  Its  decision was based primarily on  the  narrow
question  of  whether the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction;
the Appeals Court ruled that it did not. This decision in no
way  vindicates  the Department nor should  it  be  used  to
insulate  Justice  from the criticism it deserves  over  the
mishandling of the INSLAW contract.
  12.  The  Justice Department continues to  improperly  use
INSLAW's  proprietary software in blatant disregard  of  the
findings  of  two courts and well established property  law.
This   fact  coupled  with  the  general  lack  of  fairness
exhibited  by  Justice officials throughout this  affair  is
unbefitting  of  the  agency entrusted  with  enforcing  our
Nation's laws.
  13.   Further   investigation   into   the   circumstances
surrounding Daniel Casolaro's death is needed.
  14.   The  following  criminal  statutes  may  have   been
violated by certain high level Justice officials and private
individuals:
  
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 371-Conspiracy to commit an offense.
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 654-Officer or employee of the
      United States converting the property of
      another.
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 1341-Fraud.
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 1343-Wire fraud.
      18 U.S.C. ¤1505-Obstruction of proceedings
      before departments, agencies and committees.
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 1512-Tampering with a witness.
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 1513-Retaliation against a witness.
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 1621-Perjury.
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 1951-Interference with commerce by
      threats or violence (RICO).
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 1961 et seq.-Racketeer Influenced
      and Corrupt Organizations.
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 2314- Transportation of stolen
      goods, securities, moneys.
      18 U..S.C. ¤ 2315-Receiving stolen goods.
  
  15.  Several key documents subpoenaed by the committee  on
July  26,  1991,  were  reported  missing  or  lost  by  the
Department. While Justice officials have indicated that this
involves  only  a  limited  number  of  documents,  it   was
impossible  to  ascertain how many documents or  files  were
missing because the Department did not have a complete index
of the INSLAW materials. The Department failed to conduct  a
formal  investigation  to determine whether  the  subpoenaed
documents were stolen or illegally destroyed.
  
                     XI. RECOMMENDATIONS
  
  1.  The  committee recommends that Attorney  General  Barr
immediately  settle INSLAW's claims in a fair and  equitable
manner.
  These   payments  should  account  for  the   Department's
continued  unauthorized use of INSLAW's Enhanced PROMIS  and
other costs attributed to INSLAW's ongoing attempt to obtain
a  just  settlement  for its struggle with  the  Department,
including all reasonable attorneys' fees. If there  continue
to  be  efforts  to delay a fair and equitable  result,  the
committee  should determine whether legislation is  required
to  authorize  a claim by INSLAW against the United  States,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ¤ 1492.
  2.  The Attorney General should require that any person in
the   Department  that  participated  in  any  way  in   the
litigation  of  the INSLAW matter be excluded  from  further
involvement  in this case, with the exception  of  supplying
information, as needed, to support future investigations  by
a independent counsel or litigation, as appropriate.
  3.  The  committee strongly recommends that the Department
appoint  an  independent counsel to  conduct  a  full,  open
investigation  of the INSLAW allegations  of  a  high  level
conspiracy  within the Department to steal  Enhanced  PROMIS
software  to  benefit  friends  and  associates  of   former
Attorney  General  Meese,  including  Dr.  Earl  Brian,   as
discussed   in   this  report.  Among  other  matters,   the
investigation should also:
      
      Ascertain whether there was a strategy by  former
     Attorneys  General and other Department  officials
     to  obstruct this and other investigations through
     employee  harassment  and  denial  of  access   to
     Department records.
      Investigate Mr. Casolaro's death.
      Determine  whether  current  and  former  Justice
     Department  officials and others involved  in  the
     INSLAW  affair resorted to perjury and obstruction
     in order to coverup their misdeeds.
      Determine  whether  the documents  subpoenaed  by
     the   Committee  and  reported  missing   by   the
     Department were stolen or illegally destroyed.
      Determine    if   private   sector    individuals
     participated  in  (1)  the alleged  conspiracy  to
     steal  INSLAW's PROMIS software and distribute  it
     to  various  locations domestically and  overseas,
       and  (2)  the alleged coverup of this conspiracy
     through perjury and obstruction.
      
  Determine   if   other   criminal   violations    occurred
involving:
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 371-Conspiracy to commit an offense.
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 654-0fficer or employee of the
      United States converting the property of
      another.
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 1341-Fraud.
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 1343-Wire fraud.
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 1505-Obstruction of proceedings
      before departments, agencies and committees.
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 1512-Tampering with a witness.
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 1513-Retaliation against a witness.
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 1621-Perjury. 18 U.S.C.
      ¤1951-Interference with commerce by threats or
      violence (RICO).
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 1951 et seq.-Racketeer Influenced
      and Corrupt Organizations.
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 2314-Transportation of stolen goods,
      securities, moneys.
      18 U.S.C. ¤ 2315-Receiving stolen goods.
  