                              CHAPTER II.
               HOW AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP MAY BE ACQUIRED 
                           A. IN THE NATION
                                   
                               By Birth

   PURSUANT to the provisions of the XIV Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, the Federal statutes provide as follows: "All
persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the United
States." (1)
   This language has been held to include a person born in the United
States of parents of Chinese descent and subjects of the Emperor of
China, they being at the time of his birth domiciled residents, engaged
in business in the United States. It has also been held to embrace the
half-breed children of a white father and an Indian mother living apart
from her tribe, born within the United States, reared and educated as
other children of citizens; (3) and even under the XIII Amendment
colored persons were held to be citizens.(4) But an Indian born a member
of one of the Indian tribes within the United States(5) does not, merely
by reason of his birth in the United States and his separation from his
tribe and residence among white citizens, become a citizen. A negro born
in slavery and afterwards becoming a citizen of the Cherokee Nation has
been held to be not an Indian.(6)
   By special enactment, all persons born in the country formerly known
as the Territory of Oregon and subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States on the 18th day of May, 1872, are declared citizens of the United
States.(7)

                          By Naturalization.

   We have already seen that the power to enact a uniform system of
naturalization laws was among the first bestowed upon Congress by the
Constitution.
   Naturalization is defined to be the act of adopting a foreigner and
clothing him with the privileges of a native citizen.(8) The power of
naturalization is vested exclusively in Congress by the Constitution,
and cannot be exercised by the State.(9) Although  the power to enact
naturalization laws existed from the time the Constitution went into
effect in 1789, the earliest Act of Congress on the subject of
naturalization was passed April 14, 1802, thirteen years after the
Constitution went into effect. Under the last named Act and sundry
amendments, admission to citizenship of three principal classes of
persons was provided for, to wit:
   First, aliens who had resided for a certain time within the limits and
under the jurisdiction of the United States, to be naturalized
individually by proceedings in a court of record.(10)
   Second, the children of persons so naturalized dwelling within the
United States and being under the age of twenty-one at the time of such
naturalization.(11)
   Third, foreign-born children of American citizens coming within the
definitions prescribed by Congress.(12)

                    Length of Residence Necessary.

   As early as 1813 Congress enacted that an alien, to be entitled to
admission as a citizen, must have resided within the United States for
a continuous term of five years.(13) This general provision is modified
by several special enactments, as follows:
   An alien who has enlisted and has been honorably discharged from the
regular volunteer forces of the Army of the United States is not
required to prove more than one year's residence.(14)
   A seaman being a foreigner who declares his intention of becoming a
citizen and then serves three years aboard a merchant vessel of the
United States is entitled to be admitted.(15)
   An alien may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States in
the following manner, and not otherwise:(16)
   First, a preliminary declaration of intention must be made. It must
be made at least two years prior to his admission to citizenship. It
must be made under oath before a circuit or district court of the United
States or a district or supreme court of the Territories, or a court of
record of any of the States having common-law jurisdiction,(17) and a
seal and a clerk.(18) The declaration must state that it is the bona
fide intention of the applicant to become a citizen of the United
states, and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, particularly by name
to the prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of which the alien may
be at the time a citizen or subject.(19) By an amendment enacted
February 1, 1876,(20) the preliminary declaration of intention may be
made before the clerk of any of the courts named above.(21)
   A preliminary declaration, however, is not required in the following
cases:
   1. The widow and children of an alien who has made his preliminary
declaration and died before he was actually naturalized, are declared
to be citizens upon taking the oaths prescribed by law.(22)
   2. By an act passed May 26, 1824, (23) an alien being under twenty-one
years of age who has resided in the United States three years next
preceding his arrival at age, and who has continued to reside therein
to the time he makes application to be admitted a citizen, may, after
he attains the age of twenty-one and after he has resided five years
within the United States, including the three years of his minority, be
admitted without preliminary declaration.(24)
   3. By an Act passed July 17, 1862,(25) an alien of the age of
twenty-one years and upwards, who has enlisted or may enlist in the
armies of the United States, (26)and has been honorably discharged,
shall be admitted to become a citizen of the United states upon his
petition, without any previous declaration of his intention. (27)
   4. By an Act passed July 26, 1894,(28) aliens over twenty-one years
of age, honorably discharged from the navy or marine corps after five
consecutive years' service in the navy, or one enlistment in the marine
corps, may be admitted without any previous declaration.
   Second, he shall, at the time of his application to be admitted,
declare on oath before some one of the courts specified;
     a. That he will support the Constitution of the United States.
     b. That he renounces and abjures all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, etc.
     c. Particularly, by name, the prince or potentate of whom he was
subject.
     d. The proceedings shall be recorded by  the clerk.
   Third, it shall be made to appear to the court:
     a. That he has resided in the United States five years at least.
     b. Within State or Territory one year at least.
     c. That during that time he has behaved as a man of good
character.(29)
     d. That he is attached to the principles of the Constitution of the

   United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of
   the same.(30)
     e. But the oath of the applicant does not prove his residence.(31)
   Fourth, in case the alien applying to be admitted to citizenship has
borne any hereditary title or been of any of the orders of nobility in
the kingdom or state from which he came, he shall, in addition to the
above requisites make an express renunciation of his title or order of
nobility in the Court to which his application is made, and his
renunciation shall be recorded in the court.
   The fifth and sixth clauses of the Naturalization Law may be omitted,
as they simply declared certain persons residing in the United grates
prior to the 29th of January, 1795, and between June 18, 1798, and June
18, 1812, to be citizens, and are no longer of any practical importance.
   The Naturalization Law further provides concerning children, as
follows:
 1. Children under age when their parents were duly naturalized under
any law of the United States; or,
 2. Children whose parents previous to the passing of the United States
naturalization laws became citizens of any State; or,
 3. Children born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United
States, of persons who are or have been citizens of the United States
-
   All the above are declared to be citizens of the United States.

                             b. IN A STATE
                                   
                               By Birth.

   Every State in the Union has enacted, either in its constitution or
in its statutes, that all persons born in the State shall be deemed
citizens of the State. The language is not identical, but it will be
found substantially the same by reference to the constitutions and
statutes of the several States.

                         By State Enactments.

   All the States have, in one form or another, provided that all persons
born in any other State of the Union who may be or become residents of
the State enacting the law, and all aliens naturalized under the laws
of the United States who may be or become residents of the State, shall
be citizens of the State. A particular inspection of the laws of each
State will be necessary to ascertain the precise language in which this
general principle is declared, and the length of residence requisite in
any particular state to require citizenship therein.

                         By Federal Enactments

   The XIV Amendment to the Constitution of United States declares that
all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the State wherein they reside. The
question what residence entitles a native or a naturalized citizen to
all the privileges of citizenship in a particular State is generally
determined by some State enactment prescribing the length of residence
necessary to entitle a person to all the privileges of State
citizenship. Until the enactment of the XIV Amendment, no attempt was
ever made by the Federal government to define or limit the rights of
citizenship in any State.

                   c. OUTSIDE THE NATION OR STATES.

   We have already seen that under certain Federal statutes the widow and
children of an alien who has made his preliminary declaration, and died
without being actually naturalized, have certain inchoate rights of
citizenship which they may make perfect upon taking the oaths prescribed
by law, even though they have not been within the limits of the nation,
or of the State. So, too, children born out of the limits and
jurisdiction of the United States, of persons who are citizens of the
United States, are deemed citizens of the United States; and by the
statutes of many of the States they are also deemed citizens of the
State whereof their parents are citizens. For example, the author of
this volume was born in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1846, of parents who
were citizens of the United States and of the state of Virginia. By the
terms of the Federal statutes he is a citizen of the United States; and
by the terms of the statutes of Virginia, all children, wherever born,
whose fathers or if he be dead whose mother, was a citizen of Virginia
at the time of the birth of such children, were to be deemed citizens
of that State. A notable instance of such foreign birth is George B.
McClellan, the present mayor of New York city, who was born in Dresden,
Saxony. At the time of his birth his parents were citizens of New
Jersey, his father, Capt. George B. McClellan, being in the service of
the United States abroad. He is as much a citizen of the United States
and of the State of New Jersey as if he had been born in Trenton, the
capital of the State of New Jersey. 
   But the citizenship of children whose fathers were citizens is
qualified to this extent: the rights of citizenship of the parent do not
descend to the children if the parents have never resided in the United
States. Thus, if Mayor George B. McClellan had never resided in the
United States, his son, George B. McClellan, third, would not inherit
his father's right of citizenship in the United States.

                d. OF THE PERSONS WHO MAY BE CITIZENS.

   As a matter of course, Men may be citizens, and we will not discuss
that further.
   Women may be citizens as well as men.(32) The statutes of the United
States expressly provide that any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the United States, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen. The naturalization laws
themselves provide (33) that the widow of an alien who has complied with
the first condition of naturalization, and died without being actually
naturalized, shall be considered a citizen. 
   The political status of the wife follows that of the husband, with the
modification that there must be withdrawal from her native country, or
equivalent act expressive of her election to renounce her citizenship
as a consequence of her marriage.(34)
   The citizenship acquired by the wife by marriage to a citizen of the
United States is not a qualified or contingent one, but is as enduring
and unqualified as if she had been naturalized upon her own formal
application.(35) It may therefore happen that an alien may come to this
country and become a citizen, whereby his wife, who might herself be
lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen, although she did not
come to the United States until after his death. His citizenship, in
such case, confers citizenship upon her.(36)  An alien woman whose
husband became a naturalized citizen of the United States, thereby
herself became a citizen, although she may have been living at a
distance from her husband for years and may never have come into the
United States until after his death.(37) And a woman married to a
citizen of the United States is, by reason of her marriage, to  be
deemed a citizen, irrespective of the time or place of marriage, and
although she may never have resided in the United States.(38) An alien
widow of a naturalized citizen of the United States, although she never
resided within the United States during the lifetime of her husband, is
a citizen of the United States and is entitled to dower in his real
estate.(39) A woman born in France, whose father was a citizen of the
United States, and who married a French citizen and continued after the
death of her husband to reside in France, is a citizen of France but not
of the United States.(40)
   Children may be citizens. They are citizens by birth, and, as seen
above, become citizens through the naturalization of their parents. By
the express terms of the statute, however, the children born abroad of
American citizens, whether the parents be citizens by birth or by
naturalization, do not transmit their right of citizenship to their
children unless they have themselves resided in the United States.

     e. NATIONAL AND STATE CITIZENSHIP NOT NECESSARILY COEXISTENT.

   A citizen of the United States does not thereby necessarily become a
citizen of any particular State. This distinction is clearly pointed out
in the Slaughter-house Cases cited above. The XIV Amendment declares
that all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside, but the amendment does not attempt to define
what constitutes residence in the States. It might very well happen, for
example, that a person had been naturalized in one State and lost his
residence in that State by removing from it, without having acquired a
residence in another State to which he had removed. The XIV Amendment
cannot be so read as to make him a resident of any State except on the
terms prescribed generally by the laws of that State for the acquisition
of citizenship therein.(41)
   A curious anomaly resulting from the last-named condition in our
complex system of national and State governments is found in the
following state of facts;
   The Constitution of the United States provides (Art. I, Sec. 2) that
the House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every
second year by the people of the several States, and electors in each
State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most
numerous branch of the State legislature. The naturalization laws give
an alien no political rights as a citizen of the United States until he
has been admitted to citizenship. In many of the States the
qualifications for electors of the most numerous branch of the State
legislature are bestowed upon aliens who have made their preliminary
declarations; consequently, it happens that in many instances  the
persons who vote for members of the Congress of the United States are
not even citizens of the United States. Under this condition, it is
conceivable that in the different States the votes of aliens to the
United States might elect sufficient members of the House of
Representatives of the United States to control action of the Congress
of the United States.

(1) Rev. Stat. U.S., Sec. 1992, 1 Fed. Stat. Annot. 785; The
Slaughter-House Cases, (1872) 83 U.S. 36; In re Rodriguez, (1897) 81
Fed. Rep. 353.
"While this amendment.... was intended primarily for the benefit of the
negro race, It also confers the right of citizenship upon persons of all
other races, white, yellow, or red, born or naturalized in the United
States, and `subject to the jurisdiction thereof.' The language has been
held to embrace even Chinese, to whom the laws of naturalization do not
extend." In re Rodriguez (1897) 81 Fed. Rep. 353.
(2) U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark. (1898) 169 U.S. 649; Citizenship etc., (1884)
21 Fed. Rep. 905; Lee Sing Far 9. U.S., (C.C.A. 1899) 94 Fed. Rep. 834;
In re Yung Sing Hee, (1888) 36 Fed. Rep. 437; In re Giovanna, (1899) 93
Fed. Rep. 659; In re Wy Shing, (1898) 36 Fed. Rep. 553; Ex p. Chin King,
(1888) 35 Fed. Rep. 354.
(3) U.S. v. Hadley, (1900) 99 Fed. Rep. 437; U.S. v. Ward(1890) 42 Fed.
Rep. 320; U.S. v. Higgins, (1901)110 Fed. Rep. 609, distinguishing U.S.
v. Higgins, (1900) 103 Fed. Rep. 348. See also Farrell v. U.S., (C.C.A.
1901) 110 Fed. Rep. 942; Ex. p. Reynolds, (1879) 5 Dill. U.S. 394
(4) Hall v. De Cuir, (1877) 95 U.S. 509. See also U.S. v. Rhodes, (1866)
1 Ab. U.S. 28, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,151.
(5) Elk v. Wilkins, (1884) 112 U.S. 94; U.S. v. Osborne, (1880)6 Sawy.
U.S. 406; U.S. v. Boyd, (C.C.A. 1897) 82 Fed. Rep. 547.
   "Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States.
members of, and owing immediate allegiance to, one of the Indian tribes
(an alien, though dependent, power), although in a geographical sense
born in the United States, are no more , born in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof,, within the meaning of the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment, than the children of subjects of
any foreign government born within the domain of that government, or the
children born within the United States, of ambassadors or other public
ministers of foreign nations.... Such Indians, then, not being citizens
by birth, can only become citizens in the second way mentioned in the
Fourteenth Amendment, by being `naturalized in the United States,' by
or tinder home treaty or statute." Elk v. Wilkins, (1884) 112 U. S. 94.
   By Act of Congress, of Feb. 8, 1887. every Indian born within the
territorial limits of the United States to whom allotments of land shall
have been made under the provisions of the act, or under any law or
treaty, and every indian born within the territorial limits of the
United States who has voluntarily taken up, within said limits. his
residence separate and apart from any tribe of Indians therein, and has
adopted the habits of civilized life. is declared to be a citizen of the
United States and entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities
of such citizens. U. S. v. Kopp, (1901) 110 Fed. Rep. 160; In re
Celestine, (1902) 114 Fed. Rep. 553; State v. Denoyer, (1897) 6 N. Dak.
586. See also U.S. v. Boyd, (C.C.A. 1897) 83 Fed. Rep. 547.
(6) Alberly v. U. S., (1896) 162 U. S. 499.
   The term "Indian" is one descriptive of race, and therefore men of
other races who are adopted into an Indian tribe do not thereby become
Indians. They may by such adoption become entitled to certain privileges
In the tribe, and make themselves amenable to its laws and usages. Yet
they are not Indians. Responsibility to the laws of the United States
cannot thus be thrown off and a right acquired to be treated by the
government and its officers as if they were Indians born. U.S. v.
Rogers, (1846) 4 How. U.S. 567. See also Westmoreland v. U.S., (1895)
155 U.S. 545; Roff v. Burney, (1897) 168 U. S. 218; Raymond v. Raymond,
(C. C. A. 1897) 83 Fed. Rep. 721.
(7) Rev. Stat. U.S., Sec. 1995, 1 Fed. Stat. Annot.788.
(8) Bouvier's Law Dictionary. Osborn v. U.S. Bank, (1824) 9 Wheat. U.S.
827; Boyd v. Thayer, (1892) 143 U.S. 162; Postmaster at New Orleans,
(1858) 9 OP. Atty. Gen., 259; Minneapolis v. Reum, (1893)12 U.S. App.
446; Am. & Engl. Encyc. of Law(2d ed.) Vol. 6, p. 19.
(9) U. S. v. Villato, (1797) 2 Dall. (Pa.) 373; Thurlow v.
Massachusetts, (1847) 5 How. U.S. 504; Smith v. Turner,. (1849) 7 How.
U.S. 283; Chirse v. Chirse, (1817) 2 Wheat. U.S. 269; Collet w. Collet,
(1792) 2 Dall. U.S. 294; U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark. (1898) 169 U.S. 640.
   That the exercise of the power to pass naturalization laws by the
State governments is incompatible with the grant of a power to Congress
to pass uniform laws on that subject, is obvious, from the consideration
that the former would be dissimilar and frequently contradictory;
whereas the system is directed to be uniform, which can only be rendered
so by the exclusive power in one body to form them. Golden v. Prince,
(1814) 3 Wash. cU. S.) 313.
   Our foreign intercourse being exclusively committed to the general
government, it is peculiarly their province to determine who are
entitled to the privileges of American citizens, and the protection of
American government. And the citizens of any one State being entitled
by the Constitution to enjoy tho rights of citizenship in every other
State, that fact creates an interest in this particular in each other's
acts, which does not exist with regard to their bankrupt laws; since
State acts of naturalization would thus be extra-territorial in their
operation, and have an influence on the most vital interests of other
States. Ogden v. Saunders, (1827) 12 Wheat (U.S.) 277.
(10) See U.S. Rev. Stat., Title XXX, Sec. 2165, 5Fed. Stat. Annot.?00.
(11) See U.S. Rev. Stat., Title XXX, Sec. 2172, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 209.
(12) U.S. Rev. Stat., Title XXX, Sec. 1993, 1 Fed. Stat. Annot. 786.
(13) U.S. Rev. Stat., Title XXX, Sec. 2170, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 208.
(14) U.S. Rev. Stat., Sec. 2166,5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 205.
(15) U.S. Rev. Stat., Sec. 2174, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot.210.
(16) U.S. Rev. Stat., Sec. 2165, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 200.
(17) Congress has power to confer and the State courts authority to
accept and exercise the power to nationalize aliens. Levin v. U. S.. (C.
C. A. 1904) 128 Fed. Rep. 826; Croesue Min, etc., Co. v. Colorado Land,
etc., Co.. (1884) 19 Fed. Rep. 78. A State court is the judicial agency
of the Federal Government in such proceedings. People v. Sweetman,
(Supm. Ct. Gen. T. 1857, 3 Park.Crim. N.Y. 374; In the Matter of
Christern. (1978) 43 N. Y. Super. Ct. 523.
   Congress cannot constrain a State court to exercise this jurisdiction,
and the State legislatures may, if they see fit, limit or restrain the
exercise of this jurisdiction by the State courts. Rushworth v. Judges.
(1895) 58 N.J.L. 97. Ex p. Knowles, (1855) 5 Cal. 300; Matter of
Ramsden, (N.Y. Super. Ct. Spec. T.1857) 13 How. Pr. (n.Y.) 429
   Concerning the meaning of "having common-law jurisdiction" see Levin
v. U.S. (C.C.A. 1904) 128 Fed. REp. 826; U.S. v. Power (1877) 14
Blatchf. U.S. 223; Gladhill, Petitioner, (1844) 8 Met. (Mass.) 168;
Citizenship- Levy's Case, (1874) 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 509; Morgan v.
Dudley, (1857) 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 693; U.S. v. Lehman, (1899) 39 Fed.Rep.
49; Ex p. Tweedy, (1884) 22 Fed. Rep. 34 Matter of Conner, (1870) 39
Cal. 98; People v. McGowan. (1875) 77 Ill. 649; People v. Sweetmen,
(Supm. Ct. Gen. T. 1857) ? Park. Crim. (N.Y.) 358; Ex p. McKenzie,
(1897) 51 S. Car. 244.
   "If the court may exercise any part of that jurisdiction it is within
the language of the statute and within its meaning as well." U.S. v.
Power, (1877) 14 Blatchf. U.S. 223.
(18) As to a court without a clerk, see Dean, Petitioner, (1891) ?3 Me.
489; Ex p. Cregg, (1854) 2 Curt. U.S. 98; State v. Whittemore, (1870)
50N.H. 245; State v. Webster, (1878) 7 Web. 471; Gladhill, Petitioner,
(1844) 8 Met. (Mass.) 171.
   The court must have a clerk distinct from the judge; not necessarily
an officer denominated clerk, but a permanent recording officer, charged
with the duty of keeping a true record of the doings of the court and
afterwards of authenticating them. Dean, Petitioner, (1891) 83 Me. 489.
(19) Omission of name not fatal. ex p. Smith. (1647) 8 Blackf. (Ind.)
395.
"An applicant for naturalization is a suitor, who, by his petition,
institutes a proceeding in a court of justice for the judicial
determination of an asserted right. Every such petition must, of course,
allege the existence of all facts, and the fulfillment of all
conditions. upon the existence and fulfillment of which the statutes
which confer the right asserted have made it dependent." In re Bodek,
(1894) 63 Fed. Rep. 813, 3 Pa. Dist. 725.
(20) 19 Stat. L., c. 5. p. 2, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 205.
(21) In re Langtry, (1887) 31 Fed. Rep. 879; Andres v. Arnold (1889) 77
Mich. 87.
   The last named case discusses the location of the place at which the
clerk may take the declaration. See also Butterwortb, Applicant, (1846)
1 Woodb. & M. U.S. 323.
   Proof of declaration Is made by production of the record or by due
certification thereof. In re Fronascone, (1900) 99 Fed. Rep. 48; State
v. Barrett, (1889) 40 Minn. 65; Berry v. Hull, (1892) 6 N. Mex. 643.
(22) Rev. Stat. U. S. Sec. 2168, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 205.
(23) Rev. Stat. U. S. Sec. 2167, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 206.
(24) Contzen v. U.S. (1900) 179 U.S. 195.
   If he has lived in the United States five years when he attains the
age of twenty-one years, he may be admitted to citizenship the next day.
Schutz's Petition, (1886) 64 N.H. 241.
(25) U.S. Stat. L., Vol. 12, p. 597. This is now Sec.2166 of the Revised
Statutes. See 5 Fed. Stat. annot. 205.
(26) In re Bailey, (1872) 2 Sawy. U.S. 200; Berry v. Hull, (1892) 6 N.
Mex. 643.
(27) In re Bailey, (1872) 2 Sawy. U.S. 200; Berry v. Hull, (1892) 6 N.
Mex. 643.
(28) U.S. Stat. L., Vol. 28, p. 124, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 206.
(29) The fact t hat he cannot read or write does not make him
ineligible, if he is shown to be of good moral character. In re
Rodriquez, (1897) 81 Fed. Rep. 355. But a perjurer is ineligible. In re
Spenser, (1878) 5Sawy. U.S. 195; and a Socialist was rejected. Ex p.
Sauer, (1891) 81 Fed. REp. 355, note.
   "Upon general principles it would seem that whatever is forbidden  by
the law of the land ought to be considered, for the time being, immoral,
within the purview of this statute." In re Spenser4, (1878) 5 Sawy. U.S.
195.
(30) But a foreigner ignorant of the English language and who did not
know the name of the President, but thought that Washington was
President, was held ineligible. In re Kanska Nian, (1889) 6 Utah 259.
(31) See 5 Fed. Stat. Annot., p. 202, and the following cases cited: In
re Bodek, (1894) 63 Fed. Rep. 814; Lanz v. Randall, (1876) 4 Dill. U.S.
425; Baird v. Byrne, (1854) 3 Wall. Jr. (C. C.) 1; Johnson v. U.S.,
(1893) 29 Ct. Cl. 1; State v. Barrett, (1889) 40 Minn. 65; Matter of -,
(1845) 7 Hill (N. Y.) 137; In ew Spenser, (1878) 5 Sawy. U.S. 195; Ex
p. Sauer, (1891) 81 Fed. Rep. 355, note; Matter of Clark, (1854) 18
Barb. (N.Y.) 446; Citizenship- -Levy's Case, (1874) 14 Op. Atty. Gen.
509; Matter of Christern, (1878) 43 N. Y. Super. Ct. 623; McCarthy v.
Marsh. (l85l) 5 N.Y. 263; State v. Macdonald, (1877) 24 Minn. 48; Banks
v. Walker, (1848) 3 Barb. Ch. (N.Y.) 438; Sprat v. Spratt, (1830) 4 Pet.
U.S. 406; Green v. Salas (1887) 31 Fed. Rep. 106; Stark 9. Chesapeake
Ins. Co., (1813) 7 Cranch U.S. 420; The Acorn, (1870) 2 Abb.U.S.
434;People v. McGowan, (1875) 77 Ill. 644; Ritchie v. Putnam, (1835) 13
Wend. (N.Y.) 524; Com. v. Towles, (1835) 5 Leigh (Va.) 743; McDaniel v.
Richards, (1821) 1 McCord L. (S. Car.) 187; State v. Hoeflinger, (1874)
35 Wis. 393; Vaux v. Nesbit, (1826) 1 McCord Eq. (S. Car.) 352; In re
McCoppin, (1869) 5 Sawy. U.S. 630; Contzen v. U.S. (1900) 179U.S. 191;
Boyd v. Thayer, (1892) 143 U.S. 178; Blight v. Rochester, (1822) 7
Wheat. U.S. 546; Strickley v. HIll, (1900) 22 Utah 268; Hogan v. Kurtz,
(1876) 94 U.S. 773; Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, (1888) 125 Ill. 141; People 
v. McNally, (Supm. Ct. Spec. T. 1880) ?9 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 500; Sasportas
v. De la Motta, (1858) 10 RichEq. (S. Car.) 38; Nalle v. Fenwick, (1826)
4 Rand. (Va.) 585; Miller v. Reinhart, (1855) 18 Ga. 239; Belcer v.
Farren, (1891) ?9 Cal. 78; Matter of Desty, (N.Y. Super. Ct. Spec. T.
1880) 8 Abb. ". Cas. (N.Y.) 250; Prentice v. MIller, (1890) 82 Cal. 570;
Slade v. Minor, (1817) 2 Cranch (C.C.) 139; Gagnon v. U.S. (1902) ?8 Ct.
Cl. 10; Dryden v. Swinburne, (1882) 20 W. Va. 89; Navigation Laws,
(1883) 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 534; In re An Alien, (1842) 1?ed. Cas. No.
201a; Anonymous, (1846) 4 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 98, 1 "ed. Cas. No. 465; U.S.
v. Norsch, (1890) 42 Fed. REp. 417; U.S. v. Grottkau, (1887) 30 Fed.
REp. 672.
(32) Minor w. Hoppersett, (1874) 21 Wall. U.S. 142; U.S. Stat. L., Sec.
1994, 1 Fed. Stat. Annot. 786; Dorsey v. Brigham, (1898) 177 Ill. 250;
Kane v. McCarthy, (1869) 63 N. Car. 299.
   Since the extension of the naturalization laws to persons of African
descent, this statutory provision is applicable to negro as well as
white women. Broadis v. Broadis, (1898) 66 Fed. Rep. 951.
(33) Rev. Stat. U.S. Sec. 2168, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 207.
(34) Ruckgaber v. Moore, (1900)104 Fed. Rep. 948.
(35) Leonard v. Grant, (1880)5 Fed. REp. 11; U.S. v. Kellar, (1882) 13
Fed. Rep. 82, (1882) 11 Biss. U.S. 314.
   "No law expressly providing for a temporary or contingent citizenship
is known to the legislation of the United States, and so unusual and
singular a purpose ought not to be attributed to Congress without an
explicit provision to that effect." Leonard v. Grant (1880) 5 Fed.
Rep.11.
(36) Kelly v. Owen. (1868) 7 Wall. U.S. 496.
   Notwithstanding the letter of the statute "might herself be lawfully
naturalized," it is only necessary that the woman should be a person of
the class or race permitted to be naturalized by existing laws. It is
not required that she should have the statutory qualifications as to
residence, conduct, and opinions. Being the wife of a citizen, she is
regarded as qualified for citizenship, and therefore is considered a
citizen. Leonard v. Grant, (1880) 5 Fed. Rep. 11.
(37) Headman v. Rose, (1879) 63Ga. 458.
(38) See (1874) 14Op. Atty.-Gen. 402; but see Ruckgaber v. Moore, (1900)
104 Fed. REp. 948.
(39) Burton v. Burton, (1864) 1 Keyes (N.Y.) 359; approved in Kelly v.
Owen, (1868) 7Wall. U.S. 496; Kane v. McCarthy, (1869) 63 N. Car. 299.
(40) Berthemy's Case, (1866) 12 Op. Atty.-Gen. 7.
(41) "Not only may a man be a citizen of the United Sates without being
a citizen of a State,but an important element is necessary to convert
the former into the latter. He must reside within the State to make him
a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should be born or
naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of the Union."
Slaughter-House Cases, (1872) 16 Wall. U.S. 36.
