				 CHAPTER III
				  TAXATION

14. Taxation defined and limited.
15. Taxation by the United States.
16. Restrictions upon federal taxation.
17. Taxation of exports.
18. Direct taxation.
19. Requirement of uniformity.
20. Taxation in the territories.
21. Exemption of state, agencies from taxation by the United States.
22. Charges which are not taxes exempt from constitutional restraints.
23. Taxation by the states.
24. Expressed restraints upon state taxation.
25. Implied restraint upon state taxation restilting from the federal
    supremacy.
26. Taxation of national banks.
27. State taxation as affected by the prohibition of the impairment of
    the obligation of contracts.
28. State taxation as affected by the grant to Congress of the power of
    regulating commerce.

Taxation Defined and Limited.
14. Taxation is the compulsory exaction by a government, in the exercise of its sovereignty of a payment of money or surrender of property by any person, natural or corporate, who, or whose property so taxed, is subject to the sovereign power of that government.(1) Taxation operates upon real property and upon tangible personal property by reason of its situs or presence within the territory of the taxing power.(2) It operates upon choses in action by reason of the subjection of the owner thereof the jurisdiction of t e government imposing the tax(3); Every possible exaction of money or property by a gov ernment from those who are subject to its jurisdiction is not a tax; thus, a duty of so much per passenger, imposed by the United States in the exercise of the power to regulate commerce on owners of vessels bringing passengers from foreign ports into ports of the United States, in order to raise a fund to mitigate the evils incident to immigration, is "not a tax or duty within the meaning of the Constitution;(4) for, as Miller, J., said in the judg-
 ment in that cause,(5) "the money thus raised, though paid into the treasury, is appropriated in advance to the uses of the statute, and does not go to the general support of the government. It constitutes a fund raised from those who are engaged in the transportation of those passengers, and who make profit out of it, for the temporary care of the passengers whom they bring among us and for the protection of the citizens among whom they landed." Nor is a tax levied, in the strict sense of the word, when the cost of executing the banking laws is met by a charge on bank notes, and a bill for that purpose need not originate in the House of Representatives.(6) On the same principle, a charge made by a state for facilities furnished by it, directty or indirectly, for the movement of commnerce, in the form of improved waterways,(7) or wharves,(8) or railways,(9) or a charge on telegraph companies for the use of the streets for their poles, or for the governmental superyision of their poles and wires,(10) or charge on adjoining property for local improyements, (11) or a charge for quarantine or other examination,(12) cannot be said to be a tax. The power of taxation is vested in the legislative department of the government, (13) but it may be delegated by states to political subdivisions, such as counties and municipalities,(14) and a state may determine the bounds of a municipality and prescribe its rate of taxation.(15) By whomsoever exercised, or to whomsoever delegated, the power can only be exercised for public purposes. Taxes, therefore, cannot be imposed in aid of enterprises strictly private, such as the establishment of manufactories (16) or of private grist mills; (17) but when the purpose is public, though not directly connected with the administration of government, taxes may rightfully be laid to aid in its accomplishment, as in the cases of state reform schools; (18) grist mills required by statute to grind for all customers on payment of certain tolls; (19) 
the improvements of water powers of rivers for general purposes; (20) the payment of bounties to volunteer soldiers in time of war; (21) or for the construction of railways.(22) When bonds, though issued in aid of private purposes, on their face appear to have been issued for public purposes, they are valid and enforceable in the hands of bona fide holders for value and without notice.(23)

Taxation by the United States.
15. Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution declares that "the Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." At one period in the history of the country political parties were at issue as to the construction to be given to this section of the Constitution, the Federalists contending that the section granted in express terms three substantive and independent powers, namely, (1) to lay and
 collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, (2) to pay the debts, and (3) to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; and the Democrats asserting that the section granted but one substantive power, that to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, and limited the exercise of that power to the purpose of paying the debts and providing for the common defense and general welfare of the United States. The Federalist view was open to the objection that a power to legislate for the common defense and general welfare of the United States would authorize Congress to do anything and everything, and would render superfluous the delegation of other express powers of legislation in the same section; but the Democratic view, however sound in theory, could never be judicially affirmed, for, as Congress has admittedly some power of taxation, a court, looking, as it is bound to look, not at the question of expediency but solely at the question of power, could never determine an act of Congress imposing a tax to be unconstitutional because it was intended for some purpose other than that of paying the debts and providing for the common defense and general welfare of the United States. That restraint, therefore, upon the congressional power of taxation, if it be a restraint, is of moral, and not of legal, sanction.

Restrictions upon Federal Taxation.
16. "The power of Congress to tax is given in the Constitution with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject and may be exercised at discretion."(24) The constitutional power of taxation vested in the United States is coextensive with the territory "subject to their jurisdiction." It does not operate in a port of one of the United States during a temporary occupation of that port by the armed forces of a public enemy, (25) nor in foreign territory temporarily occupied by the armed forces of the United States, (26) but during such temporary occupation the armed forces in possession of such territory may, under the rules of international law, levy and collect such duties and taxes as the military authorities impose. (27) On the other hand, the constitutional power of taxation does operate upon foreign territory acquired by treaty, but only from and after the ratification of the treaty. Thus, importations into California after the ratification of the treaty which ended the war with Mexico and ceded California to the United States were subject to duties under the then tariff laws of the United States, which took effect immediately upon the ratification of the treaty.(28) Conversely, from and after the ratification of the treaty which ended the war with Spain and ceded Porto Rico and the Philippines to the United States, those islands ceased to be foreign territory, and thereafter, but only until Congress otherwise provided,(29) importations from those islands into other ports of the United States were not subject to duty under the then tariff laws of the United States (30) and, so far as regards the Philippines, that conclusion was not affected by the continuance in insurrection against the United States of those who had previously been in insurrection against Spain. The constitutional power of taxation is, therefore, operative within the states, in the District of Columbia,(31) and also in the territories, but only to the extent of the constitutional grant and subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, with the important exceptions that in Porto Rico and the Philippines its operation is not subject to the constitutional requirement of uniformity, (32) and that articles exported from the states to Porto Rico may be taxed by duties levied upon those articles when "imported from the United States" into Porto Rieo. (33)

Taxation of exports.
17. "No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state." (34) The constitutional language is "no tax or duty," and "the requirement is that exports shall be free from aiay governmental burden.".(35) The word "export," as used in the constitutional prohibition of state imposition of duties, (36) has been held to apply only to foreign, and not to interstate, commerce, (37) and the same construction has been given by a divided court (38) to the prohibition of the imposition by the United States of duties of duties on exports, as affecting goods, to quote the words of the statute, "imported from the United States" in Porto Rico under the Act of 12th April, 1900. (39) Yet the place at which the duty is levied and collected ought  not to be heldto change the character of the duty. As Marshall, C. J., suggested, (40) a duty upon exports would not cease to be such when collected by a revenue cutter cruising off the coast. If so, why does the duty cease to be a duty upon exports when collected for the United States by officers of the United States under an act of Congress at an island in the West Indies ceded to, owned by, and governed by the United States, and when the act in terms imposes the duties upon goods "imported from the United States?" It is obviously the fact that "no article can be imported from one state into another which is not at the same time exported from the former." (41) It would seem to be equally clear that goods "imported from the United States" into Porto Rico are as certainly goods exported from the United States to Porto Rico. It may also be suggested that the constitutional prohibition applies in terms to articles exported from any state without regard to their destination, and that there is nothing in the terms of the provision, or in its context, or in the history of the Constitution, to support a judicial qualification of the provision by adding thereto the words "to foreign countries." In the view of the court, Porto Rico is at one and the same time 'foreign' in order to justify the collection at ports of the United States of duties upon Rico and "domestic" in order to justify the collection at Porto Rico of duties upon exports from the United States.
Internal revenue stamps required to be placed by the manufacturer upon articles made for exportation were held notto fall within the prohibition, when "intended for no other purpose than to separate and identify" that "which the manufacturer desires to export, and thereby instead of taxing it to relieveitfrom the taxation" to which articles intended for domestic use are subjected; (42) and the Constitution does not prohibit the imposition of the same amount of internal revenue taxation upon goods exported as upon similar goods intended for domestic consumption; (43) but, on the other hand, a specific stamp duty imposed "for and in respect of the ...paper... upon which ...shall be written or printed .. a bill of lading," and not graduated in amount according to the quantity or value of the articles covered thereby, has been held, in a recent case (44) by a divided court, four justices dissentiing, to be in effect a tax upon the articles covered by the bill of lading, and, therefore, as applied to foreign and outgoing bills of lading, a tax upon exports.

Direct Taxation.
18. "No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken."(45)  "Ordinarily all taxes paid primarily by persons wbo can shift the burden upon some one else, or who are under no legal compulsion to pay them, are considered indirect taxes," (46) and taxes imposed upon individuals in their personal capacity, or upom individuals in respect of their ownership of their property, are direct taxes.(47) In 1796 the court decided (48) that a tax on carriages for the conveyance of persons under the act of 1794 (49) was an excise, and, therefore, an indirect tax. In the argument Alexander Hamilton said, "the following are presumed to be the only direct taxes: capitation or poll taxes; taxes on lands and buildings; general assessments, whether on the whole property of individuals or on their whole reaI or personal property. All else inust of necessity be eonsidered as indirect taxes." Chase, J.,said that he was inclined to think, but did not give a judicial opinion "that the direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply without regard to property, possession, or any other circumstances; and a tax on land."(50) Paterson, J., said "Whether direct taxes, in the sense of the Constitution, comprehend any other tax than a capitation tax, and tax on land, is a questionable point.(51) Iredell, J., said, "Perhaps a direct tax . . . can mean nothing but a tax on something inseparablly annexed to the soil; something capable of apportionment under all such circumstances." (52) Wilson, J., contented himself with affirming the constitutionality of the tax in question. (53) It was held in later cases that neither taxes on the personal incomes (54) under the Act of 5th August, 1861, (55) and its supplements; nor taxes on distilled spirits; (56) nor taxes on manufactured tobacco; (57) nor taxes on the business of refining sugar, measured by the gross annual receipts of the refiners; (58) nor succession duties on the devolution of title to real or personal estate; (59) nor stamp duties on a memorandum of sale of a certificate of stock, (60) or on an "agreement of sale or agreement to sell any products or merchandise at any exchange, or board of trade, or other similar place, either for present or future delivery;" (61)  nortaxes on the notes of state banks paid out by national banks; (62) nor taxes on the receipts of insurance companies from premiums and assessments, (63) are direct taxes, but that all such taxes are imposts or excises. It has been suggested that the tax under consideration in the Hylton case was in reality a tax upon transportation and as such capable of transference to the person carried, and, therefore, when imposed upon the carrier clearly an indirect, and not a direct, tax; that the tax under consideration in Singer's case was clearly an excise; that the tax under consideration in the Veazie Bank case was in its own nature not a tax at all, but an exercise by Congress of the power to prohibit the issue of circulation by state banks in order to stimulate the formation of national banks; and that the tax under consideration in the Insurance Company's case was an indireet tax because capable of transference to the policy-holders paying premiums and assessments. Springer's case was decided long after the income tax of l861 had been repealed, and when the popular and professional interest in the subject had ended, for no one then believed that this 'country would ever again be ealled upon to pay an income tax under the laws of the United States. It is the consensus of economic authorities that income tax laws, even when wisely framed, should be reserved only for great public emergencies, for the reason that they are necessarily unequal in operation in that they fall most heavily on those who conscientiously make full returns; and that when resorted to they should tax impartially the surplus income of every citizen, over and above that minimum which suffices for the necessities of the life of an individual, and that incomes received from salaries, or from professional compensation, if taxed at all, should, by reason of their terminable character, be less heavily taxed than incomes derived from invested funds. Under the income tax legislation of 1861 and its supplements, when the amount exempted was $600 the tax was paid by only four hundred d sixty thousand persons, and when the amount exempted was $1,000 the tax was paid by less than two hundred and fifty thousand persons. The state of New York paid nearly one-third of that tax, and the states of New York and Pennsylvania paid nearly one-half thereof. The population and the wealth of the country had largely increased in the years preceding 1894, but it is certain that by reason of the larger amount exempted from taxation under the act of that year, the burden of the tax imposed by that law would have been borne by a relatively small number of persons, certainly not more than two per cent of the population of the country. That law was a very objectionable specimen of class legislation. Not Content with exempting the minimum amount which suffices for the necessities of the life of an individual, and  which in 1894 certainly did not exceed $600, it enlarged the exemption to $4,000. It made no distinction between income received from salaries, or as professional compensation, and income derived from invested securities. While purporting to exempt from all taxation the income of charities, it yet taxed so much of their incomes as were derived from investments in corporate shares. It taxed as income the receipt by a widow or an orphan of that amount of insurance upon the life of the husband or father, which might possibly constitute the whole principal fund for the support of the beneficiaries. lt taxed the interest received from investments in state, county, and municipal securities. It made no distinction between the rental received from productive land and moneys received from the sale of minerals, the taking away of which diminishes the principal. In taxing the rental of land, it necessarily taxed the land itself. It taxed profits realized on sales of real estate within two years, and it forbade a deduction for losses on like sal es. It allowed a deduction of $4,000 from the income of an unmarried person and it permitted only one exemption to that amount from the aggregate incomes of a family composed of parents, minor children, or husband and wife. lt taxed without exemption income derived from corporate securities and it permitted the exemption in the case of incomes otherwise derived. It vested oppressive, arbitrary, and uncontrollable power in the tax collectors. It was an example of all that a tax law ought not to be. The constitutionality of that act came before the Supreme Court of the United States in 1895. (64) It was argued that the judgment in Springer v. United States (65) did not establish any rule of property, and was, therefore, open to reconsideration; that that judgment was based solely on the dicta in Hylton v. United States; (66) and that, even if those dicta were binding authorities, capitation taxes were in reality nothing else than taxes imposed upon persons, either per capita, or graded in amount according to the possessions or income of the person; that taxes on the income of real estate were in substance taxes on the real estate from which the income was derived; and that taxes on the income from securities issued by a state, or by any political sub-division thereof, were taxes upon agencies of state government. It was argued in reply that the dicta in Hylton's case had not only been recognized by jurists and commentators as fixing the construction of the Constitution, but had also received the approval of the court in Springer's case; that the term "capitation" taxes as understood by the framers of the Constitution, meant nothing more than poll taxes; and that the income of any person, from whatever source derived, was a legal entity, entirely distinct from its sources, and, therefore, independently taxable; and that with the policy of the legislation the court had nothing to do, and could only concern itself with the grounds of legal objection. At the first hearing it was decided, two justices dissenting, that so much of the act as provided for levying taxes upon incomes derived from real estate was invalid, because such taxes are in legal effect taxes upon real estate, and are, as such, direct taxes, and can only be imposed according to the rule of apportionment, and that so much of that act as taxed income derived from investment in state, county, and municipal securities was invalid becuase taxes on the states and on their instrumentalities of government. The justices who heard the argument were, however, equally divided, and, therefore, expressed no opinion, as to the other questions raised. Upon the re-hearing, the court decided, four justices dissenting,that, in addition to the points decided at the first hearing, a tax on an individual in respect of his income derived from real, or personal, property is a direct tax, and, therefore, can be laid only under the rule of apportionment. The opinion of the profession and the sober second thought of the country have approved the judgement of the court. the requirement that direct taxes must be "laid in proportion to the census or enumeration" is not violated by a statutory imposition of a penalty for non-payment of the tax;(67) and the amount of penalty to be enforced is a matter within legislative discretion. (68)

 Requirement of uniformity.
19. "All duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. " (69) The requirement of uniformity means that there must be geographical uniformity, or, in other words, that "wherever a subject is taxed anywhere, the same must be taxed everywhere! throughout the United States, and at the same rate,"(70) and taxation is uniform, when it operates with the same effect in all places where the subject of taxation is found, though that subject be not equally distributed in all parts of the United States.(71) Subjects of taxation may, in the discretion of Congress, be classified without impairment of uniformity, and, while the theory is that such classification should not be arbitrary, but must be based upon grounds of real distinction, yet, in view of the progressive inheritance tax case,(72) it would be difficult to make a classification sufficiently arbitrary to justify a judicial determination that the classification violates the rule of uniformity. Sales of property at "any exchange, or board of trade, or other similar place " may be taxed, when sales otherwise made are not taxed.(73) Inheritances may be taxed, even though the rate of taxation progressively increase according to the value and amount of the devise, bequest, or distributive share, and though there be discrimination in the rate as between lineals, collaterals, and strangers; and, under the statute,(74) the subject of taxation is not the corpus of the estate, but the amount of each particular devise, bequest, or distributive share.(75) Though free from objection on constitutional grounds, the progressive inheritance tax law is a very objectionable exercise of legislative discretion, for it violates the fundamental American doctrine that all men are equal before the law, and that equality of rights implies equality of obligations, and it is of dangerous import in that it teaches the many to expect that the necessary expenditures of government will be met by taxation to be levied on the few.

Taxation in the territories.
20. Long ago the court said in an unambigmous judgement, (76) pronounced by Marshall, C. J., "Does this term `the United States,' designate the whole, or any particular portion, of the American Empire? Certainly this question can admit of but one answer. lt is the name given to our great republic, which is composed of states and territories. The District of Columbia, or the territory west of the Missouri, is not less within the United States than Maryland or Pennsylvania; and it is not less necessary, on the principles of our Constitution, that uniformity in the imposition of imposts, duties, and excises, should be observed in the one than in the other." This expression of opinion by the greatest of the judicial commentators on the Constitution was not a dictum, obiter or otherwise, but was a statement of the rule of law which was applied to, and which decided, the case before the court. Nevertheless; that case has been, in effect though not in form, overruled, for it has been decided by a divided court, four justices dissenting and the five justices constituting the majority agreeing only in the judgment, and differing widely in the reasoning upon which it rests, that the Act of 12th April, 1900,(77) imposing for a limited period certain duties upon importations into ports of the United States from Porto Rico, and into ports of Porto Rico from the United States, differing from the duties imposed upon importations into the United States from foreign countries, is constitutional, and that, from and after the taking effect of that act, the duties thereby imposed were rightfully collected.(78) thejudgment in that case is, therefore, authority for the proposition that after a territory has been acquired by treaty and has so far become a part of the United States that goods brought from it to ports of the United States are not subject to the duties imposed by the laws of the United States upon importations from foreign countrieS,(79) Congress may, by subsequent legislation, organize it as a territory of the United States, and by the same act impose upon it taxation by tariff which if imposed upon any state or upon any territory on the continent of North America would be confessedly unconstitutional, because a violation of the rule of uniformity. That the justices who concurred in the judgment did not agree in the reasoning upon wbich that judgment is based does not detract from the authority of the case as a binding precedent', for, as Marshall, C. J., said, (80) "The authority of a decision is coextensive with the facts upon which it is founded." Mr. Justice Brown bases the judgment upon the proposition that in the uniformity clause the words "throughout the United States" do not include territories acquired by treaty or conquest, except in so far as Congress shall direct. Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justiee Shiras, and Mr. Justice McKenna base it on the theoryt that while territory may be acquired by treat, and thereby become the property of the United States, it does not become territory of the United States subject to constitutional restraints upon congressional action until it shall have been " incorporated" with the United States by an act of Congress. Mr. Justice Gray, concurring in the judgment of affirmance, and in substance concurring in the opinion of Mr. Justice White. also held that territory acquired by conquest or cession does not become domestic territory in the sense of the revenue laws, and that Congress may establish a temporary goverment therefor, "which is not subject to all the restrictions of the Constitution." Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, Mr.Jusice Brewer, and Mr. Justice Peckham dissented, and held that the powers granted by the Constitution and the restrictions upon the exercise of those powers extend to every part of the territory of the United States. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the dissenting opinion of the chief justice, and held that "Congress has no existenee and can exercise no authority outside of the Constitution," and he agreed with the ehief justice in his opposition to the view that Porto Rico has not been " incorporated" into the United States.

Exemption of State Agencies from Taxation by the United States.
21. The United States cannot tax the agencies of a state, as, for instance, the salary of a judicial officr of a state,"(81) nor the revenue of a municipal corporation derived from its loan of capital to a railway; (82) nor may it tax, in the hands of an individual, the income from municipal bonds. (83) But the federal government may tax a bequest to a municipality for public purposes, although the tax incidentally reduces the amount of the bequest to that municipality. (84)

Charges which are not Taxes exempt from Constitutional Restraints.
22. The duty on the transportation of passengers by sea from foreign countries imposed by the United States in the exercise of the power of regulating commerce, not being in its nature a tax, is not subject to the constitutional restrictions on the exercise of the power of taxation; (85) and the same view has been taken of the tax imposed by the United States on the circulating notes of state banks for the purpose of preventing the circulation of any other than national bank notes.(86)

Taxation by the states.
23. A state may, so far as it is not restrained by the Constitution, tax all persons, natural or corporate, and all property, real or personal, within its territory and subject to its sovereignty, and may regulate, in the exercise of legislative discretion, the manner of levying and collecting its taxes,87 and the United States cannot, either by legislative or judicial action, afford any relief against " state taxation, however unjust, oppressive, or onerous," so long as that taxation "does not entrench upon the legitimate authority of the Union, or violate any right recognized or secured by the Constitution of the United States." (88)
Under the general rule which permits a government to tax all persons and property within its jurisdiction, the states may impose a succession duty on the devolution of title to real estate from their citizens to alien non-residents; (89) they may tax descents and inheritances, and they may classify and vary the rate of taxation with reference to Iineal and collateral relationship, strangers, and the amount of the legacy; (90) they may tax goods and chattels which are actually within the state when assessed for taxation, though owned by a non-resident; (9)1 they may tax mortgages of lands within their limits, and note secured by such mortgages, although held by residents of other states; (92) they may tax the transfer by will of money deposited within the state by a non-resident; (93) and, for purposes of taxation, the situs of a debt being the residence of the creditor, the state may include in the taxable property of a resident so much of the registered public debt of another state as such resident may hold, although the debtor state may either exempt it from taxation or actualIy, tax it.(94) On the same principle, a state may tax her resident citizens, for debts due to them by a non-resident and secured by his bond and also by his deed of resident trust or mortgage of real estate situated in another state.(95) As, until the period of distribution arrives, the law of a decedent's domicile attaches to his personal property, that  property is subject to a state collateral inheritance tax, though bequeathed by his will to non-resident legatees. (96) But the laws of a state can have no extra-territorial effect, and, therefore, a state cannot tax a franchise granted by, and exercised in, another State, (97) nor can it, as a means of taxing corporate bonds held by non-residents, authorize the corporation to retain from the interest due on its bonds the amount of the tax.(98) Nor can a state tax, in the hands of a non-resident holder, corporate bonds issued under a mortgage of a railway formed by the consolidation of corporations, incorporated by the state, and other corporations incorporated by another state, and encumbering by a Consolidated and non-severable lien property which is not within the jurisdiction of the taxing state.(99) Nor can a state compel a foreign corporation to collect its taxes by retaining a portion of the interest due upon scrip or bonds held by citizens of the taxing state, when the payment is made by the foreign corporation in its home state.(100) A state may tax corporate bonds at their face, instead of their market, value. (101)

Expressed Restraints upon State Taxation.
24. Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution declares, that "no state shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any state on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. No state shall, without the consent of the Congress lay, any duty of tonnage." The nature and effect of the restrictions, upon the taxing power of the states imposed by these constitutional provisious are more fully
discussed in Chapter IV, and it is sufficient to say in this connection that a state cannot require importers of foreign by the bale or package and wholesale vendors of such goods to pay a license fee;(102) nor can a state impose, an
ad valorem tax on imported goods remaining in their original cases in the hands of the importer;(103) nor can a state tax an auctioneer's sales of imported goods for account of the importers; (104) but a state may prohibit the exportation of tobacco grown within its territory, save after inspection and on payment of a tax.(105) A state cannot tax ships upon their tonnage.(106)

Implied restraint upon state taxation resulting from the federal supremacy.
 25. The supremacy of the United States under the Constitution impliedly limits to some extent the exercise by the states of the power of taxation. Thus, a state cannot tax the official salary of an officer of the United States, as, for instance, an officer in the revenue marine service; (107) nor can a state tax a telegraph company upon messages sent by officers of the United States on public business; (108) nor can a state authorize municipal taxation of the bonds issued by the government of the United States for money loaned to it; (109) nor can a state tax the notes of the United States; (110) nor can a state tax so much of the capital of a state bank as is invested in the bonds of the United States, that capital being assessed either at its actual value,(111) or at a valuation equal to the amount paid in, or secured to be paid in.(112) But no one will be allowed to evade state taxation of his money on deposit by making a temporary investment of that money in the notes of the United States.(113) A corporation claiming an exemption from state taxation by reason of the investment of its surplus funds in the legal tender notes of the United States has, of course, the burden of proving the fact on which it rests its claim for exemption.(114) A state tax of a certain percentage of the total amount of the deposits on a given day, (115) or of the average amoumt of the deposits for a fixed period,(116) of a saving fund society chartered by the state, a state tax of a certain percentage upon the excess of the market value of the shares of the capital of a corporation chartered by a state over and above the value of its real estate and machinery,(117) and a state tax, measured by dividends, upon a foreign corporation doing business within the state,(118) are, in each case, a tax on the franchise and not on the property of the corporation, and the corporation cannot claim exemption from such taxation by reason of the investment, in the case of the saving funds, of their deposits, and in the case of the other corporations, of their capital and assets, in the bonds of the United States. So also a state, in taxing the shares of stock of a trust company, may include in the valuation of the shares the amount of the capital stock of the company which is invested in the bonds of the United States.(119) A state may tax a legacy consisting of bonds of the United States issued under a statute declaring them to be exempt from taxation in any form,(120) and it may tax bequests to the United States.(121) it cannot tax lands held in severalty by members of an Indian tribe and protected by treaties between the United States and the tribe,(122) and it cannot tax lands held by the United States in trust for members of anIndian tribe, or improvements upon such lands, or property given to the Indians by the United States, when such taxation is prohibited by federal statute.(123) It may, by act of Congress, tax surveyed but unpatented lands of the United States included within a railroad land grant.(124). Lands granted by act of Congress to a state to be held by it to aid in the construction of a railway, though not taxable by the state when held by it as trustee, are taxable by it after their conveyance to the railway,(125) and, of course, in the case of lands ceded by a state to the United States for the construction of a railway, with an express reservation of the state's right of taxation, the state may lawfully exercise that right,(126) but land within a state, which, under laws of Congress for the collection of taxes due to the United States, has been sold for non-payment of such taxes, and at the sale thereof purchased by the United States and afterwards sold by the United States to a third party, or redeemed by the owner, is exempt from state taxation during the period of federal ownership thereof. (127) Although the title to land remain in the United States, ore dug therefrom under a mineral claim is, as the personal property of the claimant, subject to state taxation.(128), The exemption of federal agencies from state taxation is dependent, not on the fact of the agency, nor on the character, of the agents, nor on the mode of their appointment, but on the effect of state interference in depriving the agent of power to serve the government of the United States, or in hindering the agent in the efficient exercise of that power. (129) A state may, therefore, tax the property, real and personal, of a railroad, which has been chartered by act of Congress, is subject to a lien securing its debt to the United States, and is used as a federal agency for the transportation of mails, soldiers, government supplies, and munitions of war;(130) and, it would seem, on the principle of that case, that a state may tax the property of any federal ageney, wherever such taxation does not impair the efficiency of the agency in the performance of its duty to the government of the United States. The federal supremacy forbids a state so to tax the transit of passengers through the state by the ordinary modes of travel, as to impede their approach to the seat of government of the United States, the ports of entry through which commerce is conducted, and the various federal offices in the states.(131) The supremaey of the United States does not involve an exemption from state taxation of property which has been acquired by the exercise of an exclusive privilegeL granted by the United States, when there is no relation of agency between the United States and the grantee; thus letters patent, granted by the United States, do not exempt from state taxation the tangible property in whieh the invention or discovery is embodied.(132) Nor does a license granted, on payment of a license fee, by the United States under its internal revenue statutes to a wholesale liquor dealer in a state exempt the dealer, or his business, or his goods from state control, regulation, or taxation.(133)

Taxation of National Banks.
26. A state cannot tax the operations of banks incorporated by the government of the United States as fiscal agencies. (134) Nor can a state tax the assets of an insolvent national bank in the hands of a receiver appointed under the provisions of the national banking laws.(135) Of course, when Congress licenses state taxation of agencies of the government of the United States, such taxation is permissible within the limits imposed by the terms of the license; (136) thus in the case of national banks, state taxation is by Section 41 of the Act of 3d June 1864,(137) permitted as to the shares in any bank, when "included in the valuation of the personal property of the owner or holder of such shares, in assessing taxes imposed by authority of the state within which the association is located, . . subject only to the restrictions, that the taxation shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state, and that the shares of any national banking association owned by non-residents of any state shall be taxed in the city or town where the bank is located, and not elsewhere." The states may, therefore, tax shareholders in national banks within the limits of this license,(138) without regard to the investment of all or any part of the capital of the banks in United States securities. The National Bank Act of 3d June, 1864,(139) had imposed a further restriction on state taxation of national bank shares, declaring that such tax shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under the authority of the state," but in the re-enactment of this statute in 1868 (140) and in the Revised Statutes,(141) this condition was omitted. Under the Act of 1864 it was held that a state could not tax shares in national banks, when it taxed the capital of state banks, exempting so much thereof as was invested in the bonds of the United States, and failed to tax the shares of state banks.(142) It was also held that the limitation upon disparity of state taxation imposed by the Act of 1864 is not overstepped by a state which, having only two banks of issue and circulation, and having by contract bound itself not to tax these banks beyond a certain limit, but having numerous banks of deposit, which do not issue circulation, taxes generally and equally all shares of stock in ban ks and incorporated companies doing business in the state.(143) The terms of Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes show clearly that Congress did not intend to curtail the taxing power of the states over national bank shares as entities distinct from the capital of the banks, and as the property of persons subject to state jurisdiction, but that it was intended to guard the national banks against unfriendly discrimination by the states in the exercise of that taxing power.(144) The phrase "moneyed capital" includes capital employed in national banks and capital employed by individuals for the making of profit by its use, but it does not include non-competitive capital (145) The exemption from state taxation of some but not all of the moneyed capital in the state is not a discrimination against national bank shares within the terms of the license; as, for instance, in the case of exemption of "all mortgages, judgments, recognizances, and moneys owing upon articles of agreement f or the sale of real estate;"(146) or of deposits in savings banks, shares in trust companies, and shares in other moneyed or stock corporations chartered by the state and deriving an income or profit from the use of their capital or otherwise.(147) Nor is there any inequality of taxation or unfriendly discrimination as against national bank shares, in the exemption by a state of that which it cannot lawfully tax, such as shares owned by its residents in the capital stock of foreign corporations, (148) or in the exemption of that which is not a subject of taxation by the United States, such as the bonds of a municipal corporation created by the state; (149) but where a very material part of the other moneyed capital of a state in the hands of individual citizens within the state is exempted from state taxation, the state cannot tax the shares of national banks.(150) State statutes taxing personal prop-erty, including national bank shares, and permitting the party taxed to deduct his just debts from the valuation of his personal property other than national bank shares, tax such shares at a greater rate than other moneyed capital, and, therefore, are not effective under the terms of the license given by Congress; (151) but in the case of a national bank shareholder who has no just debts to deduct, the taxing law is valid and operative.(152) A state may, under the act of Congress, tax the shares of a bank located within it." jurisdiction without regard to the non-resident or resident ownership of such shares, (153) and the shares may be assessed for purposes of state taxation at their market value, though that exceed their par value.(154) But state taxation of national bank shares must be uniform and equal, and when a system of valuation for taxation purposes intended to operate unequally is adopted by the state authorities whose duty it is to make the assessment, equity may properly interfere, on payment of the proper tax, to enjoin the collection of the illegal excess.(155) Where a state has provided a mode for the correction of error in the assessment of property for purposes of taxation, a party aggrieved by an over-valuation of his property cannot maintain an action at law to recover the alleged illegal excess of taxes paid by him, for the official action of the revising authority is judicial in character, and cannot be collaterally impeached.(156) Only the shares of stock and the real estate of a bank may be taxed.(157) A state may lawfully require a national bank to act as the agent of the state in collecting from the shareholders of the bank the tax imposed by the state within the limits permitted by the act of Congress.(158) A state may also, under a penalty for his non-performance of the duty, require a cashier of a national bank to furnish to the state authorities a list of the names and respective holdings of the shareholders of his bank.(159)

State taxation as affected by the prohibition of the impairment of the obligation of contracts.
27. The constitutional prohibition of the enactment by the states of laws impairing the obligation of contracts affects to some extent the exercise by the states of the power of taxation. While, as a general rule, the states may, in the exercise of legislative discretion, either tax property or exempt it from taxation, yet contracts of exemption from state taxation, not in terms con-travening federal(160) or state (161) constitutional prohibitions, and contained in corporate charters (162) or stipulated by express agreement (163) if supported by an adequate consideration, constitute contracts so binding upon the state, that their obligation is not to be permitted to be impaired by a subsequent legislative repeal of the charter, or by an imposition of a rate of taxation inconsistent with the state's contract.(164) But there cannot be implied from the grant of a charter an exemption of the corporate franchise or property from state taxation,(165) and the imposition in a charter of a specific form or rate of taxation is not, in the absence of an express contract of exemption from other taxation, to be construed as an implied exemption from such other taxation,(166) and contracts of exemption from state taxation, when expressly made, are to be strictly construed.(167) Immunity from taxation is a personal privilege which does not extend beyond the immediate grantee unless it is otherwise so declared in express terms.(168) A municipal corporation cannot, by the exercise of a statutory power of taxation, diminish the interest payable to the holder of a funded obligation of the municipality under the terms of the bond.(169) The subject of exemption by contract from state taxation is more fully discussed in Chapter V.

State taxation as affected by the grant to Congress of the power of regulating commerce.
28. The constitutional grant to Congress of the power of regulating "commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes" also affects to some extent the exercise by the states of the power of taxation, but the states are not prohibited from taxing either the instrumentalities, or the subjects, of foreign or interstate commerce, provided that such taxation be imposed on those instrumentalities and subjects as eomponent parts of the mass of property in the state, or by reason of the citizenship of their owners as subjects of the sovereignty of the state, and provided also, that that which is in form taxation, be not in substance a regulation of, or a restraint upon, foreign or interstate commerce.(170) In accordance with this distinction, a state may tax ships and ferry boats as the personal property of their owners, where either the owner, by reason of his residence, or the property because of its situs is subject to the taxing power of the state; (171) and a state may tax goods brought from another state and mingled with the mass of property in the taxing State,(172) and goods within the state intended for transportation to another state but not actually stated on their voyage; (173) provided, that the taxation is not so imposed as to discriminate against either the natural products of, or goods manufactured in, another state.(174) A state may require a foreign corporation which is engaged in interstate commerce to pay for the privilege of exercising the franchises of a corporation,(175) though not for the right of transporting interstate passengers,(176) within its borders. It may tax it some citizens for the prosecution of any particular business or profession within the state, unless that business be directly concerned with interstate commerce; thus, while a state may not tax drummers of goods made in other states,(177) it may tax persons who sell goods shipped to them from outside points,(178) and it may tax exchange brokers, despite the fact that bills of exchange are instruments of foreign and interstate commerce.(179) It may tax agents engaged in hiring labourers to be employed beyond the limits of the state, even though transportation must eventually take place as the result of such contracts; (180) but an agent employed solely in promoting the use of his line in interstate transportation cannot be taxed, for the business is directly connected with commerce and consists wholly in carrying it on.(181) It has the right to impose a license tax,(182) or a tax on receipts,(183) upon a company engaged in local commerce, although the company be also engaged in interstate business; (184) but it cannot impose such charges upon strictly interstate commerce.(185) It may, however, tax so much of the gross receipts of an interstate railroad company as are earned within the state. (186) If property within a state and otherwise liable to taxation be in money at the date of assessment f or taxation, a subsequent investment thereof in a subject of commerce does not relieve that capital from liability to state taxation.(187) While a state cannot tax the interstate transportation of passengers or goods, it may by its charter of a railway charge a toll payable to the state for the use of the improved facilities of travel furnished by the railway,(188) and it may tax its railway companies upon the cash value of their eapital stock.(189) It may tax an interstate railway car, express, or telegraph company upon its property within the state, finding the value of the whole property, both tangible and intangible, of the corporation, which is used in its business, and then computing the value of the line within the state by its relative length to the whole.(190) On the other hand, a state may not tax sheep which are driven at reasonable speed across its territory, although they are allowed to graze on the way.(191) It may not tax ships and ferryboats which come within the jurisdiction in the prosecution of foreign or interstate commerce, unless the owner is by residence subject to the taxing power of the state.(192) Nor can a state tax the transportation of passengers coming by water into its ports from a foreign Country or from another state;(193) nor can a state tax the interstate transportation of goods by water;(194) nor can a state impose port dues, that is, charges payable by all vessels. entering, remaining in, or leaving a port, without regard to services rendered to, or received by, the Vessel;(195) nor can a state tax a telegraph company upon messages transmitted by it to points outside of the state;(196) nor can a state tax the interstate transportation of Passengers or goods. It, therefore, cannot tax interstate freight by the pound;(197) nor can it tax the total number of sleeping cars brought into the state by a foreign corporation;(198) nor can it tax the entire gross receipt's of corporations engaged in the business of running cars not their own property over a railway line within the state.(199)

(1) The State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 277; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
420; Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U. S. 436; N. Y., L. E. & W. R. v. Pennsylvania,
ibid. 628; D. & H. C. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 156 id. 200; W. U. T. Co. v.
Taggart, 163 id. 1; Savings Society v. Multnonlah County, 169 id. 421;
Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 id. 193.
(2)Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490; Coe v. Errol , 116 U. S. 517; P. P. C. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 141 id. 18; C., C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 id. 439;
Savings Society v. Multnomah Count 169 id.
(3) Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592; Nevada Bank v. Sedgwick, ibid.
111; Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 id. 491; N. Y,, L. E. & W. R. v. Penn-
sylvania, 153 id. 628; D. & H. C. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 156 id. 200.
(4)The Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580.
(5) p. 595.
(6) Twin City Bank v. Nebekeer, 167 U. S. 196.
(7) Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543; Sands v. M. R. I. Co., 123 id. 288;
L. & P. Co. v. Mullen, 176 id. 126. But see Harman v. Chicago, 147 id. 396.
(8) Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80; Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 id. 423;
Vicksburg v. Tobin, ibid. 430; Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 id. 559; Trans-
portation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 id. 691; O. P. Co. v. Aiken, 121 id. 444.
(9) B. & O. R. v.Maryland, 21Wall. 456.
(10) St. Louis v. W. U. T. Co., 148 U. S. 92; P. T. C. Co. v. Baltimore, 156
id. 210; W. U. T. Co. v. New Hope, 187 id. 419. Charges for supervision
in P. T. C. Co. v. New Hope, 192 id. 55; P. T. C. Co. v. Taylor, ibid. 64, were excessive and therefore invalid. See also A. & P. T. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 id. 160.
(11) I. C. R. v. Decatur, 147 U. S. 190; Peake v. New Orleans, 139 id. 342;
Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 id. 112; Ford v. D. & P. L. Co., ibid. 662; cf. Spencer v. Merchant, 125 id. 345. See also Norwood v. Baker, 172 id. 269; Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 id. 193; French v. B. A. P. Co., 181 id. 324; Tonawanda v. Lyon, ibid. 389; Carson v. Brockton S. Com., 182 id. 398; King v. Portland, 184 id. 61; Voigt v. Detroit, ibid. 115; Goodrich v. Detroit, ibid. 432.
(12) Morgan v. Louisiana, 118 U. S. 455; N., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Alabama, 128 id. 96. See also C., C. & A. R. v. Gibbes, 142 id. 386.
(13) Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472.
(14) Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Bl. 510; U. S. v. New Orleans, 98 U. S. 381.
(15) Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78.
(16) Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487; Cole v. La Grange, 113 id. 1.
(17) Osborne v. County of Adams, 106 U. S. 181, 109 id. 1.
(18) County of Livingston v. Darlington, 101 U. S. 407.
(19) Burlington v. Beasley, 94 U. S. 310.
(20) Blair v. Cuming County, ill U. S. 363.
(21) Middleton v. Mullica Township, 112 U. S. 433.
(22) Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654; Queensbury v. Culver, 19 id. 83;
Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 U. S. 60; Olcott v. The Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678;
R. Co. v. County of Otoe, ibid. 667; Young v. Clarendon Township, 132 U. S.
340. See also Wilkes County Comrs. v. Coler, 190 id. 107.
(23 Hackett v. Ottawa, 99 U. S. 86; Ottawa v. National Bank, 105 id. 343;
Ottawa v. Carey, 108 ida. 110, 118.
(24) License Tax Case, 5 Wall. 471. See Me(ray v. U. S., 195 LT. S. 27.
(25) U. S. v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 9146.
(26) Fleming v. Page, 9 How- 603.
(27) Dooley v. U. S., 182 U. S. 222.
(28) Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164.
(29) Downes v. Bi&vell, 1:82 U. S. 244.
(30) De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1; Fourteen Diamond Rings, Pepke, Claimant, v. U. S., 183 id. 176.
(31) Loughborough v. Blalie, 5 Wheat. 317.
(32) Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244.
(33) Dooley v. U.S. (second case), 183 U.S. 151
(34) Article I, Sec. 9 Par. 5.
(35) Per Brewer, J., Fairbank v. U.S., 181 U.S. 283.
(36) Article I, Sec. 10, Par. 2.
(37) Dooley v. U.S. (second case), 183 U.S. 151. Four justices dissented.
(38) 31 Stat. 77,c. 191, secs. 2 and 3.
(40) Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 445.
(41) Per Miller, J.,in Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123.
(42) Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372; Turpin v. Burgess, 117 id. 504.
(43) Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418.
(44) Fairbank v. U. S., 181 U. S. 283.
(45) Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 9, Par. 4.
(46) Per Fuller, C. J., Pollock v. P. L. & T. Co., 157 U. S. 558.
(47) Hon. Geo. P. Edmunds' Argument, ibid. 491.
(48) Hylton v. U. S., 3 DaU. 171.
(49) 1 Stat. 373.
(50) 3 Dall. 175.
(51) ibid. 177.
(52) ibid. 183.
(53) ibid. 184.
(54) Springer v. U. S., 102 U. S. 586.
(55) 12 Stat. 309.
(56) U. S. v. Singer, l0 Wall. 111.
(57) Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 609.
(58) S. S. R. Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S. 397.
(59) Scholey v. Rew, 23 Wall. 331; Knowlton v. Aloore, 178 U. S. 41, 79, 83;
 Murdock v. Ward, ibia. 139.
(60) Thomas v. U. S., lt92 U. S. 363.
(61) Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509. The Union Stock Yards in Chicago are a "similar place" within the meaning of the taxing act.
(62) V. Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533; National Bank v. U. S., 101 U. S. 1.
(63) P. 1. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433.
(64) Pollock v. F.L.& T.Co., 157 U.S. 429, and, on rehearing, 158 id. 60 1.
(65) 102 U. S. 586.
(66) 3 Dall. 175.
(67) De Treville v. smalls, 98 U. S. 517.
(68) W. LT. T. Co. v. Indiana, 165 U. S. 304.
(69) Article I See. 8 Par- 1.
(70) Knowltun v. Muore, 178 U. S. 41, 84, per White, J.
(71) The Head Money Casm, 112 U. S. 580.
(72) Knowlton v. Moore, 179 U. S. 41; Murdock w. Ward, ibid. 139.
(73) Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509.
(74) Act of 13th June, 1898, 30 Stat. 448, c. 448.
(75) Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41.
(76) Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317.
(77) 31 Stat. 77, c. 191.
(78) Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244.
(79) De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.1; Fourteen Diamond Rings, Pepke, Claimant, v. U.S., 183 id. 176.
(80) Ogden v. Saunders, 12Wheat. 333.
(81) The Collector v. Dav, 11 Wall. 113.
(82) U. S. v. B. & 0. R., 17 Wall. 322.
(83) Pollock v. F. L. & T. Co., 158 U. S. 60 1. On taxation of state agencies
in general, see Ambrosini i,. U. S., 187 id. 1.
(84) Snyder v. Bettman, 1-90 tT. S. 249. Three justices dissented.
(85) The Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580.
(86) Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 'Wall. 533. See also Twin City Bk. v. Nebeker,
167 U. S. 196.
(87)Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall. 210; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345; P. P. C. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 id. 18; W. U. T. Co. v. Indiana, 165 id. 304; A. Ex. Co. v. Ohio, 166 id. 185; Savings Society v. Multnomah County, 169 id. 421; Magoun v. I. T. & S. Bank, 170 id. 283; King v. Mullins, 171 id. 404; New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 id. 309; Bristol v. Washington County, 177 id. 133; Orr v. Gilman, 183 id. 278; P. C. & P. R. v. Reynolds, ibid. 471; League v. Texas, 184 id. 156; Blackstone v. Miller, 188 id. 189; Board of Assrs. v. C. N. DIE., 191 id. 388; Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 id. 10. See also opinion of Brown, J., in Eidman v. Martinez, 184 id. 578. A state may tax an interstate railway, car, express, or telegraph company upon its property within the state, finding the value of the whole property, both tangible and intangible, of the corporation, which is used in its business, and then computing the value of the line within the state by its relative length to the whole: P., C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421; C., C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, ibid. 439; P. P. C. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 id. 18; A. R. T. Co. v. Hall, 174 id. 70; U. R. T. Co. v. Lynch, 177 id, 149; A. Ex. Co. v. Ohio, 165 id. 194, 166 id. 185; A. Ex. Co. v. Kentucky, 166 id. 171; W. U. T. Co. v. Massachusetts, 425 id. 530; W. U. T. Co. v. Taggart, 163 id. 1; and see W. U. T. Co. v. Missouri, 190 id. 412.
(88) Providence Bk. v. Billings, 4 Pet. 563; Carpenter v. Pennasylvania, 17 How. 456; St. Louis v. W. F. Co., 11 Wall. 423; The State Tax on Foreign held Bonds, 15 id. 300; Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491, 498; M. G. Co. v. Shelby County, 109 id. 398; Magoun v. I. T. & S. Bank, 170 id. 283; Orr v. Gilman, 183 id. 278; Blackstone v. Miller, 188 id. 189. The Fourteenth Amendment does not compel the states to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation: B. G. R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232; P. Ex. Co. v. Seibert, 142 id. 339; Jennings v. C. R. C. Co., 147 id. 147; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 id. 657; Merchants & Manufacturers' Bk. v. Pennsylvania, 167 id. 461; Magoun v. 1. T. & S. Bank, 170 id. 283; Clark v. Titusville, 184 id. 329; Kidd v. Alabama, 188 id. 730. See also F. C. & P. R. v. Reynolds, 183 id. 471; Connally v. U. S. P. Co., 184 id. 540; Missouri v. Dockery, 191 id. 165.
(89) Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490.
(90) Magoun v. I. T. & S. Bank, 170 U. S. 283. Bee also Billings v. Illinois, 188 id. 97.
(91) Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517.
(92) Savings Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421; New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 id. 309; Bristol v. Washington County, 177 id. 133. See also Board of Assessors v. C. N. DIE., 191 id. 388.
(93) Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189.
(94)Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592.
(95)Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491.
(96) Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456; U. S. v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625.
(97) L. & J. F. Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385.
(98) State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 301; cf. Savings Society iv.
Multnomah County, 169 U. S . 421, 428.
(99) R. Co. v. Jackson 7 W
(100) N. Y., L. E. & W. R. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U. S. 628; D. & H. C. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 156 id. 200.




(101) B. G. R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 222; Jennings v. C. R. C. Co., 147 id. 147.
(102) Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419. Imports, in the constitutional sense, embrace only goods brought from a foreign country: A. S. & W. Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500.
(103) Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. 29; cf. P. & S. C. Co. v. Bates, 156 id. 577.
(104) Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566.
(105)Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38.
(106)State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204; Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 6 id. 31; Peete v. Morgan, 19 id. 581; Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 id. 577; 1. S. S. Co. v. Tinker, 94 U. S. 238.
(107)Dobbins v. Commissioners, 16 Pet. 435.
(108) W. U. T. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460.
(109) Weston v. Charleston, Pet. 449; Banks v. -Mayor, 7 Wall. 16; cf. Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S 115.
(110) Bank v. Supervisors, 7 Wall. 26.
(111) People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 2 Black, 620.
(112) Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200.
(113) Shotwell v. Moore, 129 U. S. 590.
(114) C. & B. Co. v. New Orleans, 99 U. S. 97.
(115) Society for savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594.
(116) Provident Inst. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611.
(117) Hamilton Co. v. Muachusetts, 6 Wall. 632.
(118) Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594.
(119) C. T. Co. v. Lander, 184 U. S. 111.
(120) Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115.
(121) U. S. v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625.
(122) The Kansas Indians, 5Wall. 737; The NewYork Indians, ibid. 761.
(123) U. S. v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432.
(124) Act of 10th July, 1886, 24 Stat. 143, c. 764; (. P. R. v. Nevada, 162
U. S. 512; N. P. R. v. ixlyers, 172 id. 589.
(125)Tucker v. Ferguson, 222 Wall. 527.
(126) F. L. R. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525.
(127) Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151.
(128) Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U. S. 762.
(129) U. P. R. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5; National Bank v. Commonwealth, id. 353; Thomson v. P, R., ibid. 579; C. P. R. i@. Califorina, 162 U. S. 91.
(130) U. P. R. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5.
(131) Crandall v. Nevada, (i Wall. 35.
(132) Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344.
(133) McGuire v. The Commonwealth, 3 Wall. 387; Pervear v. The Cornmonwealth, 5 id. 475. See also Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461.
(134)McCulloch v. The State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Osborn v. The Bank of the U. S., 9 id. 738.
(135) Rosenblatt v. Johnston, 104 U. S. 462.
(136)Van Allen v. The Assessors. 3 Wan. 573; People ti. The Commissioners, 4 id. 244. See also C. T. Co. v. -Lander, 184 U. S. 111.
(137)15 Stat. 34, Rev. Stat., see. 5219.
(138) National Bank v. The Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353; People v. Commissioners, 4 id. 244; Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3 id. 573.
(139) 13 Stat. 111.
(140) 15 Stat. 34.
(141) Section 5219.
(142) Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Wall. 573; Bradley v. The People, 4 id. 459.
(143) Lionberger v. Rouse, 9 Wan. 468.
(144) Adams v. Nashville, 95 U. S. 19; Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 id. 138. Bee the opinion of Miller, J., in Davenport Bank v. Davenport, 123 id. 83.
(145) Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138; Palmer v. McMahon, 133 id. 660; National Bank v. Chapman, 173 id. 205.
(146) Hepburn v. The School Directors, 23 Wall. 480.
(147) Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138; Bank of Redemption v. Boston, 125 id. 60; Palmer v. McMahon, 133 id. 660; First National Bank v. Ayers, 160 id. 660; Aberdeen Bank v. Chehalis County, 166 id. 440; National Bank v. Chapman, 173 id. 205.
(148) Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138, 162.
(149) Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138, 162.
(150) Boyer v. Boyer, 113 U. S. 689; cf. Commerce Bank v. Chambers, 182 id 556.
(151) People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539; Supervisors v. Stanley,, 105 id. 305;
Hills v. Exchange Bank, ib id. 319; Evansville Bank v. Britton, ibid. 322;
Whitbeck v. Mercantile Bank, 127 id. 193; Palmer v. McMahon, 131 id. 660.
(152) Supervisors v. Stanley, 105 U. S. 305.
(153) Tappan v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 19 Wall. 490.
(154) Hepburn v. The School Directors, 23 Wall. 480; People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 94 U. S. 415.
(155) Cummings v. National Bank of Toledo, 101 U. S. 153; Pelton v. National Bank, 101 id. 143; People v. Weaver, 100 id. 539; Whitbeek v. Mercantile Bank 127 id. 193.
(156) Stanley v. Supervisors, 121 U. S. 535.
(157) Owensboro Nat. Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664; First Nat. Bank: at Louisville v. Louisville 174 id. 438
(158) Aberdeen Bank v. Chehalis County, 166 U. S. 440; Merchants & Manufacturers' Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 id. 461.
(159) Waite v. Dowley, 94 U. S. 527.
(160) People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 94 U. S. 415.
(161) R. Cos. v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697; Trask v. Maguire, 18 Wall. 391; Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S. 217; Shields v. Ohio, 95 id. 319; P. I. Go. v. Tennessee, 161 id. 193; Stearns v. Minnesota,, 179 id. 223, 241.
(162)Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Bl. 436; M. & 0. R. v. Tennessee 153 U. S. 486; Citizens' Bk. v. Parker, 192 id. 73.
(163)New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cr. 164; New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S. 104; Wells v. Savannah, 181 id. 531.
(164) Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Bl. 436; W. & R. R. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 264; R. & G. R. v. Reid, ibid. 269; Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 id. 50; P. R. v. Maguire, 20 id. 36; University v. People, 99 U. S. 309; Asylum v. New Orleans 105 id. 362 W. & W. R. v. Alsbrook 146 id. 279 ; M. & 0. R. v. Tennessee, 153 id. 486; New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 id. 371; Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 id. 223.
(165) Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527; M. G. Co. v. Shelby County, 109 U. S. 398.
(166)The Delaware R. Tax, 18 Wall. 206; Erie Ry. v. Penna., 21 id. 492  The License Tax Cases, 5 id. 462; Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta, 93 U. S. 116; S. C. S. Ry. v. Sioux City, 138 id. 98; N. 0. C. & L. R. v. New Orleans, 143 id. 192; W. & W. R. v. Alsbrook, 146 id. 279; Shelby County v. Union & Planters' Bank, 161 id. 149; New Orleams v. Citizens' Bank, 167 id. 371.
(167) Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527; W. F. Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U . S. 365; Ry. Co. v. Philadelphia, 101 id. 528; Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall. 460; R. Cos. v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697; Picard v. E. T., V. & G. R.., 130 id. 637; Y. & M. V. R. v. Thomas, 132 id. 174; N. 0. C. & L. R. v. New Orleans, 143 id. 192; W. & W. R. v. Alsbrook, 146 id. 279; W. & St. P. L. Co. v. Minnesota, 159 id. 526; P. F. & M. I. Co. v. Tennessee, 161 id. 174; C. R. & B. Co. v. Wright, 164 id. 327; C. & L. T. R. Co. v. Sandford, ibid. 578; Ford v. D. & P. L. Co., ibid. 662; Citizens' Savings Bank v. Owensboro, 173 id. 636; Wells v. Savannah, 181 id. 531; Orr v. Gilmam, 183 id. 278; Chicago Theological Seminary v. Illinois, 188 id. 662.
(168) Picard v. E. T., V. & G. R., 130 U. S. 637; People v. Cook, 148 id. 397; K. & W. R. v. Missouri, 152 id. 301; St. L. & S. F. Ry. v. Gill, 156 id. 649; N. & W. R. v. Pendleton, ibid. 667; P. F. & M. I. Co. v. Tennessee, 161 id. 174; Memphis Bank v. Tennessee, ibid. 186; P. I. Co. v. Tennessee, ibid. 193; C. & L. T. Co. v. Sandford, 164 id. 578; G. & S. 1. R. v. Hewes, 183 id. 66; N. C. Ry. v. Maryland, 187 id. 258.
(169) Murray v. Charleston, 96U.s.432.n 4 2.
(170) Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 201; The Passenger Cases, 7 How. 479; Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 280; W. F. Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 id. 374; California v. C. P. R., 127 id. 1; Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 id. 78; Massachusetts v. W. u. T. Co., 141 id. 40; P. T. C. Co. v. Adams,155 id. 688; P. & S. C. Co. v. Louisiana, 156 id. 590; W. U. T. Co. v. Taggart, l63 id. 1; A. Ex. Co. v. Ohio, 165 id. 194, 166 id. 185; New York v. Roberts, 171 id. 658; P., C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Board of Pub. Works, 172 id. 32; K. & H. Bridge Co. v. Illinois, 175 id. 626; U. R T. Co. v. Lynch, 177 id. 149.
(171) W. F. Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365; T. Co. v. Wheeling, 99 id. 273.
(172) Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall 123; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622;
P. & S. C. Co. Bates, 156 id. 577; A. S. & W. Co. v. Speed, 192 id. 500; cf. Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 id. 1.
(173) Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517; D. M. Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 id. 82.
(174) Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 id. 434; Webber v. Virginia, 103 id. 344; Walling v. Michigan, 116 id. 446; Robbins v. Shelby Co., 120 id. 489; Corson v. Maryland, ibid. 502; Asher v. Texas, 128 id. 129; Brennan v. Titusville 153 id. 289; Stockard v. Morgan, 185 id. 27; Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 id. 622; N. & W. Ry. v. Sims, 191 id. 4-41. But see Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148; Downham v. Alexandria Council, 10 id. 173; Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676; Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 id. 123; Ficklen v. Shelby County, 145 id. 1; Emert v. Missouri, 156 id. 296; Rash v. Farley, 159 id. 263; A. S. & W. Co. v. Speed, 192 id. 500.
(175) Maine v. G. T. Ry., 142, U. S. 217. Bradley, Harlan, Lamar, and Brown, JJ., dissented. See also Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 id. 47; Ashley v. Ryan, 153 id. 436; N. Y., L. E. & W. R. v. Pennsylvania, 158 id. 431; New York v. Roberts, 171 id. 658.
(176) Allen v. P. P. C. Co., 191 U. S. 171.
(177) Robbins v. Shelby County, 120 U. S. 489; Asher v. Texas, 128 id. 129; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 id. 289; Stockard v. Morgan, 185 id. 27; Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 id. 622.
(178) Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676; Emert v. Missouri, 156 id. 296; Rash v. Farley, 159 263; A. S. & W. Co. v. Speed, 192 id. 500.
(179) Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How.73.
(180) Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270.
(81)McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104. See also N. & W. R. v. Pennsylvania, ibid. 114; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 id. 47.
(182)P. T. C. Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 692; Osborne v. Florida, 164 id. 650; P. Co. v. Adams, 189 id. 420; Allen v. P. P. C. Co., 191 id. 171.
(183) Ratterman v. W. U. T. Co., 127 U. S. 411; W. U. T. Co. v. Alabama, 132 id. 472; P. Ex. Co. v. Seibert, 142 id. 339.
(184) A company which carries to or from a ferry passengers intending to go to another state, and which makes a separate charge for such service, is not engaged in interstate commerce, and a license tax upon such company is constitutional: New York v. Knight, 192 U. S. 21.
(185)Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 id. 47.
(186)Maine v. G. T. Ry., 142 U. S. 217.
(187) People v. Commissioners, 104 U. S. 466.
(188) B. & 0. R. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 456.
(189) The Delaware r. Tax,18 Wall. 206.
(190) P., C., C. & St. L. Ry. w. Backus, 154 U. S. 421; C., C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, ibid. 439; P. P. C. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 id. 18; A. R. T. Co. v. Hall, 174 id. 70; U. R. T. Co. v. Lynch, 177 id. 149; A. Ex. Co. v. Ohio, 165 id. 194, 166 id. 185; A. Ex. Co. v. Kentucky, 166 id. 171; W. U. T. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 id. 530; W. U. T. Co. v. Taggart, 163 id. 1;  W. U. T. Co. v. Missouri, l90 id. 412. But in estimating the value of the whole property the state may not include property in another state which is not used by the company in its business: Fargo v. Hart, 193 id. 490.
(191) Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. 1.
(192) Hays v. P. M. S. S. Co., 17 How. 596; St. Louis v. W. F. Co., 11 Wall. 423; Morgan v. Parham, 16 id. 471; Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69; G. F. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 id. 196; P. & S. S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 id. 326.
(193) The Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283;Henderson v. The Mayor, 92 U. S. 259; Chy Lung v. Freeman, ibid. 275; People v. C. G. T., 107 id. 59; P. & S. S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 id. 326, overruling the case of the State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284.
(194) Almy v. California, 24 How. 169.
(195) Steamship co. v. Portwardens, 6 Wall. 31.
(196)W. U. T. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460.
(197) The State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232; E. Ry. v. Pennsylvania, ibid. 282, note.
(198) Packard v. P. S. C. Co., 117 U. S. 34; Tennessee v. P. S. C. Co., ibid 51; Allen v. P. P. C. Co., 191 id. 171.
(199) Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230.








