                                 CHAPTER X.

THE JUDICIAL POWER
 88, The constitutional provisions.
 89. The theory of a judicial system under the common law.
 90. The necessity of a federal judiciary.
 91. Cases in law and equity, etc.
 92. Cases affecting ambassadors, etc.
 93. Admiralty.
 94. Controversies to which the United States shall be a party.
 95. Controversies between citizen of different states,.
 96. Controversies between two or more states.
 97. Controversies between a state and citizens of another stato
 98. Federal jurisdiction. etc.
 99. Exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction.
 100. The courts of the United States.
 101. Original jurisdiction.
 102. Appellate and supervisory jurisdiction.
 103. The necessity of a judicial "case".
 104. The federal judiciary.
 105. The federal supremacy.
 106. Constitutional and statutory construction.
 107, Judgments of courts.
 108. Treaties.
 109. The law admininistered in the federal courts.
 110. Courts martial and impeachments.
 111. The IV Amendment.
 112. The V Amendment (a) Due process of law; (b) Jeopardy, ete.
 113. The VI Amendment.
 114. The VII and VIII Amendments.
 115. The XI Amendment.
 116, The relations between the federal and state courts.
 117. The XIV Amendment as affecting state judicial proceedings.
 118. The "full faith and credit" clause.

The constitutional provisions.
88. Section 1 of Article III declares,that "the Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior court's as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." Section 2 declares that "the judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more states; between a state and citizens of another state; between citizens of different states; between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crime shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed."
	Clause 2 of Article VI declares that "this Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state  shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
	TheIV Amendment declaresthat "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasoiiiable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon  probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searehed, and the persons or things to be seized."
	The V Amendment provides that no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor sball any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
	The VI Amendment provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of' the state and district wherein the erime shall have been committed, which distriet shall have been previously ascertained bv law, and to be informed of the nature and eause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." The VII Amendment provides that 4 4 in suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-exami]aed in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."
	The VIII Amendment provides that "excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
	The XI Amendment provides that "the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the Uiaited States by citizens of aiaother state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state."

The theory of a judicial system under the common law.
89. Many of the men who, as members of the Convention of 1787, participated in the framing of the Constitution were lawyers, who had been trained in, and had
mastered, the principles of the common law. When the Convention had determined that there should be a judicial department of the government of the United States, those lawyers naturally found in the common law the principles of administration which they deemed it wise to adopt. If they had been asked to formulate those principles they would have stated them substantially as follows:
	It is the duty of everv civilized government to provide tribunals for the punishment of crimes and for thefinal determination of private controversies between individuals. The accusation cannot be accepted as proof of the prisoner's guilt, nor can the statement of a claim by one individual against another be received as conclusiveevidence of its validity. In each case there must be an inquiry by a tribunal before whom the respective parties can appear, to whom they can submit the evidence and the arguments on which they respectively rely, and who shall authoritatively decide the controversy.
	There are certain requirements of justice so obviously true that they do not need to be vindicated by argument, and so essential to the liberty of the citizen that their presence or absence is, in itself, a conclusive test of the existence of free institutions. Those requirements are purity, impartiality, and intelligence of administration, with as much rapidity of operation as is consistent with the attainment of a correct result. To that end every defendant who is accused of crime, or against whom a claim is attempted to be enforced by civil process, is entitled to an examination by an independent authority to determine, upon a prima facic presentation of the case and of the evidence supporting the charge, whether there should, or should not, be a trial; to due notice of the time and place of trial; to information of the precise charge against him; to a reasonable time in which to prepare his defense; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have full opportunity of testing, by cross-examination, the testimony of those witnesses; to have compulsory process for the production of witnesses on his behalf; and to be fully heard in his defense, at his option, either personally or by learned counsel of his own selection.
	Every civil action aud every criminal prosecution involve two questions: first, of fact; did the defendant do, or not do, the act with whose commission or omission he is charged? Second, of law; is that act forbidden, and if so, what is the nature of the remedy to be given to the Plaintiff, or the punishment to be inflicted upon the defendant? It is clearly not necessary that these two questions should be determined at the same time, nor even by the same tribunal. On the contrary it often is convenient to dispose of the question of law in the first instance. The defendant may say that, admitting for the sake of argument the fact that is charged against him, it yet does not constitute a subject of legal action against him. That preliminary question can then be determined, resulting, if in favour of the defendant, in the dismissal of the proceedings at that point, or, if adversely to him, settling the law as applicable to the facts, if they be found, upon subsequent inquiry, to be such as alleged against him. It is also clear that, while in either case the tribunal ought to act with integrity, and to that end must be guarded against corruption and the perturbing pressure of extraneous circumstances and undue imfluence brought to bear on behalf of either party, yet, as the question is of the one class or the other, different qualifications in the tribunal will be of greater, or less, importance in attaining a correct result. If the question be one of law, it is of chief importance that the tribunal have a competent knowledge of law, and possess that trained judicial discretion which will enable it to correctly construe statutes, and to estimate the relative weight and value of conflicting authorities and precedent. If, on the other hand, the question be one of fact, it is more important that the tribunal should be so constituted as to bring to bear upon the subject that experience which can only be gained in the pursuits of active life, and should take as nearly possible that plain common-sense view of the matter which the parties to the controversy would be likely to take if they were not biased by their interest in the result. It is certain that, as an aid to the correct determination of a question of fact, a knowledge of law is of no use, except in so far as the study of the law as a science has developed the mind and enlarged its powers, but any advantage from that source is more than counterbalanced by the tendency of studious and contemplative minds to substitute an imaginary world, peopled with fictitious beings and animated by artificial motives, for the real world in which we live, and, by the influence of professional, and especiallv judicial, training in the application of technical rules and in reasoning by analogy, to cause an undue subordination of fact to theory. This tribunal, as I have in general terms described it, is that which the common law, in its wisdom, has provided in its system of trial by jury. Wherever and whenever that system has been honestly and intelligently applied, it has not indeed been infallible in its determinations, nor has it achieved ideal justice, for it shares in that imperfection which is common toall institutions whieh are of human origin and operated by finite agencies, but it has in the vast majority of cases done substantial justice. Wherever and whenever that system has seemed to fail, it has so seemed because the judge has not been sufficiently learned and able, or because the jury has not been of average intelligence, or because the judge has not performed his proper functions, or has permitted the jury to disregard theirs.
	If the judge who presides at the trial be intelligent, courageous, and of sufficient decision of character, he will, by the application of the rules of evidence, prevent the minds of the jury from being diverted from the true point of inquiry, he will submit questions to them only upon adequate proof, and he will, in his charge, put clearly and unmistakably before them the precise questions of fact which it is their province to determine, and by his instructions upon the law of the case, conveyed in clear terms, and laid down with firmness and decision, he will prevent them from being swayed by extraneous circumstances, and from misapprehending either the question in the case, the evidence relevant to it, or the rules of law controlling their decision. On the other hand, a judge , however honest in intention, who talks and does not listen, who yields to hasty and ill-considered views of the testimony of witnesses, who anticipates the arguments of counsel, who is vacillating and indecisive in his determinations upon questions of evidence, or who either does not take clear views of the law applicable to the case, or fails to impress upon the jury, with force and energy, the law which they must apply is a serious obstruction to the administration of justice. So also is it essential that the jurors be impartial, biased neither by relation to the parties, by interest in the result of the contest, nor by prejudice, and that they should be of at least average intelligence. There is no magic in the jury box to dissipate the mists of prejudice, nor to convert ignorance into knowledge, nor stupidity into sense. Men of insufficient intelligence cannot be expected to decide correctly questions of fact, either simple or complicated.There must also be a supervisory body to determine whether or not justice requires that the party against whom judgment shall have been given should have a new trial upon the facts, either because of error in the tribunal in its application of the law, or in its admission or rejection of evidence, or in deciding against the weight of the evidence, or because of the subsequent discovery of new evidence which, if produced at the trial and if believed by the tribunal of the first instance, ought, in justice, to have led to a different verdict.
There must also be an appellate tribunal, not to give the unsuccessful litigant a second chance, nor to retry the case upon the facts, but to review the record of the case and to set aside the judgment, if in its entry the principles of justice, or the rules of law, have been violated; or to remit the cause to the lower court for retrial, if that court shall be found to have erred in the admission or rejection of evidence, or if the evidence for the prosecution, taken as a whole, and assuming its truth, and drawing all the inferences that can be drawn from it, is legally insufficient to justify the judgment. It has been found in all civilized countries that an appellate tribunal is essential to the maintenance of uniformity in the administration of the law, and to the prevention of tyranny and caprice in the judges of the courts of first instance.

The necessity of a federal judiciary.
90. Having regard to the relation between the United States and the states, and bearing in mind that the United States cannot impose duties upon officers of the states, and compel the performance by those officers of the duties so imposed.(1) it is, in an especial degree, essential that the United States should have the power of establishing courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction for the punishment of offenses against the laws of the United States, and for the protection and enforcement of rights created by the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. It is also necessary to the- enf orcement of the declared supremacy of the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, that a court constituted by the United States with jurisdiction coextensive with the territory subject to the Constitution, should be, so far as regards all subjects of judicial cognizance, the final arbiter by whom the construction of the Constitution of the United States is to be authoritatively determined,(2) for otherwise the Constitution might have one meaning in one state, and a different meaning in another state, and it might be construed in one way in one court and in another way in another court,(3) and if the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the several states were at liberty to conclusivelv determine for themselves the construction of that instrument, and the nature and the extent of the restraints upon freedom of state action imposed by it, those restraints would bind any one state onlv in so far as that state might choose to be bound at any particular time, and the inevitable result would be, as Marshall, C. J., said in Cohens v. Virginia,(4) to prostrate the federal government and its laws at the feet of everv state in the Union. " The framers of the Constitution also deemed it necessary, in order to guard against possible prejudice in the courts of the states as affecting citizens of other states, when litigants in those courts, that every citizen of a state should, when suing a citizen of another state, have the option of bringing his action in the federal court within that other state, or in the court of the state, as might seem advisable to him.
	The Constitution has, therefore, conferred upon the courts of the United States jurisdiction in two classes of causes, depending in the one class on the character of the cause, and in the other class on the character of the parties.(5)

Cases in law and equity, etc.
91."Cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority" include all subject-matters of litigation, civil or criminal, whose determination requires the application or construction of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. A suit brought against a state by one of its own citizens cannot be maintained under this provision of the Consititution.(6) As Strong, J., said,(7) "A case consists of the right of one party, as well as of the other, and may truly be said to arise under the Constitution, or a law, or a treaty of the United States, whenever its correct decision depends upon the construction of either. Cases arising under the laws of the United States are such as grow out of the legislation of Congress, whenever they constitute the right, Or privilege, or claim, or protection, or defense of the party, in whole or in part, by whom they are asserted." Fuller,
C. J., has also said forcibly (8) that if in the cause, "it appears that some title, right, privilege, or immunity on which the recovery depends will be defeated by one construction of the Constitution or a law of the United States, or sustained by the opposite construction, then the case is one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States."(9)

Cases affecting ambassadors, etc.
92. " Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls" are cases to which such officers are parties, or so far privies, that the determination thereof will conclude their rights.(10)

Admiralty.
93. "Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" comprehend litigated cases with regard to acts done and rights created, or contraets to be performed, upon the high seas or inland navigable waters, or with regard to Contracts for the transportation of passengers or goods on the high seas or on navigable waters between different states. The courts of the United States have, therefore, full jurisdiction in admiralty, and, as Bradley, J., said," the boundaries and limits of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction are matters of judicial cognizance, and cannot be affected or controlled by legislation, whether state or national.(12) But within these boundaries and limits the law itself is that which has always been received as maritime law in this country, with such amendments and modifications as Congress may from time to time have adopted. "
	The judicial power, being defined bv the Constitution,cannot be extended bv legislation under the guise of a regulation of commerce, for the legislative regulation of any subject-matter of jurisdiction is in its nature essentially distinct from the creation of a tribunal and the vesting in that tribunal of jurisdiction over any particular subject-matter.(13) Congress may legislate as to maritime torts,(14) and maritime contracts. Ships navigating the high seas, though in the prosecution of commerce between two ports of the same state, are subject to the federal power of regulation, and may therefore have the benefit of the limitation of liability under the statutes of the
United States,(15) and the limited liability statutes now extend to all vessels used in navigation of inland waters.(16) While states cannot create maritime liens, nor confer jurisdiction upon their courts for the enforcement of such liens,(17) nor authorize their courts to entertain suits for damages for the breach of contracts for transportation of passengers on the high seas,(18) nor proeeedings in rem in collision cases on navigable waters,(19) yet, as the general maritime law does not recognize liens in favour of material men for supplies furnished to vessels in their home ports, or for materials sold for ships in process of construetion, the states may by statute authorize liens therefor, which may be enforeed by proceedings in rem in the admiralty courts of the United States.(20) On the same principle, as both at common law and in admiralty the right of action for a tort is personal and dies with the person injured, and no action is maintainable therefor,(21) the right of action in such cases when conferred by a state statute is enforcible in a state court in a case of death caused by collision in navigable waters which are within the jurisdictioin of the state, and it is also enforcible when the navigable waters are also within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United State(22) in the courts of the United States on the admiralty side, (23) and also on the law side.(24) In England navigable waters are, in law, only those in which the tide ebbs and flows; and, in that country, the admiralty jurisdiction is further restricted by the requirement that the locus in quo, though within the ebb and flow of the tide, should not be infra corpus comitatus nor at sea infra fauces terrte. In certain of the earlier cases in this country the English test of navigability in a legal sense was applied, but, as the reason of the rule failed here, and as its adoption would have taken out of the jurisdiction of admiralty the inland waters and many rivers which are in fact navigable but where there is no ebb or flow of the tide, the 9th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 constituted navigability in fact the test of navigability in law, and the later cases have followed that statutory rule.(25)

Controversies to which the United States shall be a party.
94. The phrase "controversies to which the United States shall be a party" requires no elucidation further than to note that the United States, as a sovereignty, cannot be sued without its own consent(26) and the constitutional provision does not impose upon Congress any duty to constitute tribunals to take cognizance of claims against the United States. Under this provision the United States may bring suit against a state in the Supreme Court of the United States, but, by reason of the state being a sovereignty, interest upon the principal found to be due by the state will not be awarded, unless its consent to pay interest has been given by its legislative, or executive, act.(27)

Controversies between ocitizens of different states.
95. The phrase, colat=oversies "between citizens of different states, "vests in the courts of the United States jurisdiction over all proceedings in personam between such parties. As Marshall, C. J., said in Cohens v. Virginia,(28) "If these be the parties, it is entirely unimportant what may be the subject of controversy. Be it what it may, these parties "have a constitutional right to come into the courts of the Union;" and as Field, J., said in Gaines V. Fuentes,(29) "It rests entirely with Congress to determine at what time the power may be invoked, and upon what conditions."(30)
	A eitizen of a territory, or of the District of Columbia, cannot sue under this cIause,(31) nor can a state.(32) That jurisdiction which is dependent on the character of the parties does not include proceedings in rem, or quasi in rem, such as questions of probate,(33) or actions for divorce.(34)

Controversies between two or more states, etc.
96. The phrases "controversies between two or more states . . between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states" seem to be unambiguous. The case of suits between states have been mainly controversies as to conflicting boundaries,(35) and in these cases there is no doubt as to the jurisdiction. In 1790 it was assumed(36) that the courts had jurisdiction of a bill filed by one state against another state and grantees of that other state to enjoin ejectment suits by those grantees with regard to land, political jurisdiction over which was claimed by both states, but judgment was entered in favour of the defendant state on the ground that the plaintiff state had no property interest in the determination of the ejectment suits. It has since been held that a state cannot, upon an allegation of a violation of an interstate compact, enjoin another state and officers of the United States from diverting the water of a navigable river as a result of an improvement of navigation under congressional authority;(37) nor can a state in a suit against a municipality of another state, enjoin an improvement of navigation because of an apprehended diversion of trade from one of its municipalities to the defendant municipality;(38) nor can a state having assumed the collection of a debt due to one of its citizens by another state sue in its own name that other state;(39) nor can a state in an action against a corporation organized under the laws of another state invoke the exercise of the original jurisdietion of the Supreme Court to compel the payment of a penalty for a violation of the law of the plaintiff state;(40) nor enjoin the enforcement of the laws of another state upon an allegation that those laws, if executed, will build up the commerce of cities of the defendant state to the injury of the commerce of the plaintiff state.(41) On the other hand, a state may invoke the original jurisdiction of the e6urt by a bill against another state and a sanitary agency thereof to enjoin the discharge of sewage into a river flowing through the plaintiff state,(41) the ground of decision being that the relief prayed is the abatement of a nuisance injurious to the health of citizens of the plaintiff state, which can properly sue as parens patrice. So also a bill may be filed by a state on behalf of her citizens, as well as in vindication of her rights as an individual owner, to restrain another state 'from depriving it of the waters of a river accustomed to flow through and across its territory, and the consequent destruction of the property of herself and her citizens, and injury to their health and comfort.(43) The original jurisdietion extends to a suit by a state as the donce of certain bonds issued by another state, and secured by a mortgage of railroad stock belonging to the latter state, to compel payment of the bonds and a subjection of the mortgaged property to the satisfaction of the debt.(44) And that jurisdiction also extends to an action by a state against an officer of the United States, where the United States is the real party in interest adverse to the state.(45)
	It has, however, been held that as the United States " has no power to impose on a state officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it," a state cannot, by a suit against the governor of another state, compel the performance of a "duty" by an officer of that other state, for "there is no power delegated to the general government, either through the judicial department', or any other department, to use any coercive means to compel him.(46) An Indian tribe within the United States, being a "domestic dependent nation," and not a state, cannot bring suit against a state under this clause of the Constitution.(47)

Controversies between a state and citizens of another state, etc.
97. The clauses of the constitutional provision, giving jurisdiction to the courts of the United States in "controversies . . . between a state and citizens of another state . . .and between a state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects," were, at an early day in the history of the government, the subject of much controversy. There has never been much question as to the jurisdiction in causes in which a state was the plaintiff;(48) in such cases it has been denied only in an action to recover on a judgment for a penalty for a violation of municipal law(49) and in actions in which it was necessary to join citizens of the plaintiff state as parties defendant;(50) but the jurisdiction was earnestly contested in cases in which a state was defendant and citizens of other states were plaintiffs. In 1792 the Supreme Court of the United States, in Chisholm v. Georgia,(51) the cause being an action of assumpsit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the state of Georgia, sustained the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in suits by a citizen of one state against another state. In consequence of that judgment, and for the purpose of relieving the states from liability to suits to enforce the payment of their obligations,(52) the XI Article of the Amendments to the Constitution was adopted.(53)

Federal jurisdiction.
98. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is, in its character, either civil or criminal, and, in its exereise, either exclusive of, or concurrent with, the jurisdiction of the courts of the states, and either original or appellate, first, by appeal from a federal court of original jurisdietion to a federal court of intermediate, and then to the federal court of final, appeal; or second, by appeal directly from the federal court of original jurisdiction to the federal court of final appeal; or third, by appeal from a state court of last resort to the federal eourt of final appeal. The courts of the United States also exereise a supervisory jurisdiction, over the courts of the states by the removal therefrom, before trial, of certain causes of federal cognizanee,(54) and a general supervisory jurisdiction which may be invoked by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, whenever a person is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a couit or a judge thereof, or is in custody in violation of the Constitutioln, or a law or treaty of the United States.(55)
	As the courts of the United States are courts of limited jurisdiction, the record must show affirmatively that the cause is necessarily of federal cognizance, by reason of either the subject-matter of litigation,(56) or the character of the parties,(57) and this must be formally averred,(58) or dis-
tinctly appear on the face of the record.(59) If the jurisdictional fact does appear on the face of the record, it can only be traversed by a plea to the jurisdiction.(60) There is a conclusive presumption of law that a corporation and all its members are citizens of the state creating the corporation(61) and that a national bank is a citizen of the state within which it is located.(62)
	Original process of the circuit and district courts does not run outside of the district in which the suit is brought.(63)
	Where the jurisdiction depends on diverse citizenship, suit can be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or defendant.(64)
	An assignee of a chose in action cannot sue on the ground of diverse citizenship where his assignor could not sue, save in actions upon foreign bills of exchange and in actions against corporations.(65)
	In causes of criminal cognizance, the original jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited in two respects. In the first place, those courts cannot take cognizance of an act alleged to be criminal, which has not been declared to be(66) such by an act of Congress. In the second place, Congress cannot, under the Constitution, declare an act to be criminal, unless, as Field, J., said(67) that act has "some relation to the execution of a power of Congress, or to some matter within the jurisdiction of the United States."  Thus, a murder committed on board a vessel of the navy of the United States while at anchor in navigable waters within the jurisdiction of a state is not cognizable in a court of the United States;(68) Congress cannot make it a misdemeanor to sell within the territory of a state illumimating oil inflammable at less than a specified temperature;(69) while Congress may legislate with regard to bankruptcy, and may prohibit and declare to be punishable the commission of a fraud in contemplation of bankruptcy, it cannot constitute the obtaining of goods on false pretences with interat to defraud, but not in contemplation of bankruptcy, to be an offense against the United States;(70) and Congress cannot by statute provide for the punishment of state election officers for wrongully refusing to receive the vote of a qualified vidter at an election, when that refusal is not based upon a discrimination against the voter on account of his race, colour, or previous condition of servitude.(71)

Exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction.
99. It is a principle of constitutional construction, as stated by Marshall, C. J., in Sturges v. Crowninshield,(72) that "whenever the terms in which a power is granted to Congress, or the nature of the power, require that it should be exercised exclusively by Congress, the subject is as completely taken from the state legislatures as if they had been expressly forbidden to act on it."(73) In conformity with this principle, it has been decided in Martin v. Hunter's Leassee,(74) and in The Moses Taylor,(75) that Congress has power to divest the courts of the states of jurisdiction over all subject-matters which are included within the constitutional grant of judicial power to the United States, or whose determination by the judicial power of the United States is necessary to the exercise by Congress of its constitutional power of legislation, and where Congress has expressed its will that, as to any particular subject-matter of federal cognizance the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States shall be exclusive, the courts of the states cainnot take cognizance of such subject-matter.(76)
	Of course, the Constitution, having granted the power, and not having commanded Congress to exercise it, it is for Congress to determine when and to what extent it will exercise it. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States within the limits imposed by the Constitution is either exclusive of, or concurrent with, that of the courts of the states, as Congress may, from time to time, determine.(77) As the law now is, the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is exclusive of that of the states in cases of crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States; in suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States; in civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy, where the comon law is competent to give it; in seizures under the laws of the United States on land or on waters not within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; in cases arising under the patent right or copyright laws of the United States; in all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy; in all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its Citizens, between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens; and in all suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their domestics, or domestic servants, or against consuls or vice-consuls.(78)

The courts of the United States.
100. The courts of the United States are the district courts, the circuit courts, the circuit courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the district and circuit courts is exclusively original; that of the circuit courts of appeal exclusively appellate; and that of the Supreme Court both original and appellate. The United States is divided into judicial districts, in some cases one state constituting a judicial district, and, in other cases, a state including within its territory two or more distriets. There are also a court of claims, a court of private land claims, and in certain foreign countries, consular courts, and in the territories and in Alaska, Hawaii, Porto Riec), and the Philippines, territorial courts, whose jurisdiction and procedure are foreign to the subject of this book. There is for each district court one judge, who is required by statute to reside within his district.
	There are nine cireuit courts, the United States being divided into nine circuits, each eircuit including the districts in three, or more, states. For eaeh circuit there are two, or more, circuit judges, and in addition thereto, the justice of the Supreme Court allotted to that circuit. The circuit courts have no longer any appellate jurisdiction.(79) 
	In each circuit there is a circuit court of appeals, constituted at any one time of three judges, of whom two are a quorum."lf The judges therein are the Supreme Court justice assigned to the circuit, the circuit judges, and the several district judges thereof. The Supreme Court now consists of a chief justice and eight associate justices, any six of whom constitute a quorum; but Congress may inerease, or decrease, the number of justices, or change the quorum.(80)

Original jurisdiction.
101. The original jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is exercised in some cases by the Supreme Court, and, in other cases, by the inferior courts. As Johnson, J., said in United States v. Hudson,(81) "Only the Supreme Court possesses jurisdiction derived immediately from the Constitution, and of wiiieh the legislative power cannot deprive it. All other courts created by the general government possess no jurisdiction but what is given them by the power that creates them, and can be vested with none but what the power ceded to the general government will authorize them to confer."
	The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited by the Constitution to "cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party. "Congress cannot confer upon the Supreme Court any original jurisdietion other than that so conferred by the express terms of the Constitution.(82) Whether or not Congress can authorize other courts of the United States to exercise concurrent original jurisdiction in the cases, original jurisdiction over which is vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court, was for a long time an unsettled question. In U. S. v. Ortega,(83) the question was raised, but not decided, but in Bors v. Preston,(84) it was determined, that the Congress might confer a concurrent original jurisdiction upon the eircuit courts of the United States in actions against consuls of foreign states.(85) The Supreme Court may also issue writs of prohibition to the admiralty courts,(86) and writs of mandamus(87) "in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law."(88)
	The original jurisdiction of the subordinate courts of the United States, excepting the circuit courts of appeal, which have no original jurisdiction,(89) is, in the main, as follows:
	On the civil side, the circuit courts have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the courts of the states, of all suits at common law, or in equity, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds two thousand dollars, first, where the controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States; second, where the controversy is between citizens of different states, or between citizens of @ state and foreign states, citizens, or subjects; third, where the controversy is between citizens of the same state claiming land under grants of different states; and, fourth, where the United States are plaintiffs.(90) The circuit courts also have jurisdiction, withowt pecuniary limitation, of all suits under internal revenue and postal laws;(91) of all suits for penalties under laws regulating the cartage of passengers in merchant vessels(92) of patent,(93) copyright(94) and trade-mark(95) cases; of winding-up suits against national banks;(96) and of suits to recover damages for injuries to the person or property under revenue laws.(97)
	The circuit courts also have original jurisdiction under the Anti-trust Act of 1890,(98) and under the Interstate Commerce Act(99) and in customs cases.(100)
	The circuit courts also have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the court of claims, of all claims against the Uinited States, when the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds one thousand dollars and does not exceed ten thousand dollars.(101)
	The circuit courts have also, on the criminal side, exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offenses made such by the statutes of the United States, except where otherwise provided by law, and concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts of crimes and offenses cognizable therein.(102)
	The district courts have original jurisdiction of all crimes and offenses made such by the statutes of the United States when committed within their respective districts, or upon the high seas, and the punishment of which is not capital; and on the civil side, of all suits for penalties and forfeitures; of all suits at common law brought by the United States, or by any officer thereof, authorized by law to sue; of all suits in equity to enforce liens, etc., under the internal revenue statutes; of suits for the recovery of forfeitures or damages due to the United States; of all eauses of action under the postal laws; of admiralty causes, saving to suitors their common-law remedies, if any; and of all litigation in bankruptcy.(103) The district courts have also concurrent jurisdiction with the court of claims in claims against the United States when the matter in dispute does not exceed one thousand dollars.(104) The court of claims has original jurisdiction of claims against the United States, and of set-offs against the claims sued on.(105)

Appellate and supervisory jurisdiction.
102. As the Constitution has declared that in all cases, other than those in which original jurisdiction has been by its terms vested in the Supreme Court, that court " shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make," Congress may define and limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, (106) but the Supreme Court cannot be required to review the actions of officers of the United States under legislative or executive references.(107) In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction the Supreme Court of the United States may review the final judgments and decrees of the inferior courts of the United States under the restrictions stated in the acts of Congress,(108) and it may review the final judgments or decrees of the courts of last resort of the states in causes either civil or criminal, "where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any state, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favour of their validity; or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or immunity specially set up or claimed by either party, under such Constitution, treaty, statute, commission, or authority"(109) But even though the state court of last resort passes upon a question federal in its nature, if the decision also involves an independent ground sufficiently broad to sustain the judgment, that decision cannot be questioned in the Supreme Court.(110) The courts of the United States also exercise a supervisory jurisdiction over the courts of the states by a removal from a court of, a state to a federal court of a cause, either civil or criminal, depending but not yet finally adjudicated in the state court,(111) or by the issue of a writ of habeas corpus in cases of a restraint of personal liberty under process of a eourt of a state, void by reason of the off ense with which the prisoner is charged being a matter of federal, and not of state, cognizance, or by reason of the restraint of a prisoner in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty, or law of the United States.(112) The right of appeal, or of removal, or to the writ of habeas corpu@, is in any case dependent, not only on the federal character of the question involved, or the right of the party to sue in the federal court, but also on the terms of the act of Congress authorizing the exercise by the court of the United States of its supervisory jurisdiction in the particular case. The Constitution does not expressly authorize the removal of causes of federal cognizance from the courts of the states to the courts of the United States before final judgment, nor does it expressly authorize the review of such causes in the Supreme Court of the United States after the entry of final judment in a court of a state, nor does it expressly authorize the release by a court of the United States after a hearing on habeas corpus of a prisoner indicted in a state court for doing that which under the Constitution and laws of the United States he may rightfully do, but the right of removal, the right of appeal, and the right to a discharge after hearing on habeas corpus, alike result from the constitutional declaration of the supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the United States.
	The circuit courts have no appellate jurisdiction.(113)
	The appellate jurisdiction of each circuit court of appeals is exercised by appeal or by writ of error from the district and circuit courts within its circuit, and from territorial courts attached by statute to its circuit, in all cases other than those in which the Supreme Court has direct appellate jurisdietion,(114) and the judgments or decrees of each circuit court of appeal are final in all cases in which the jurisdiction is dependent exclusively upon diverse citizenship; and in all patent, revenue, and admiralty causes, and in all prosecutions not directly appealable from the district, or circuit, courts to the Supreme Court; excepting that upon every subject within its appellate jurisdiction, a circuit court of appeals may certify to the Supreme Court of the United States any question of law concerning which the circuit court of appeals desires the instruction of the Supreme Court for a proper decision; and excepting also that the Suprerae Court may, in any case, require a circuit eourt of appeals to certify any case for final review and determination.(115)
	The appeals or writs of error may be taken from the circuit court of appeals to the Supreme Court in all cases in which the judgment or decree of the circuit court of appeals is not made final by statute; and appeals or writs of error may be taken directly from the district and circuit courts to the Supreme Court from final sentences and decrees in prize causes; in cases of conviction of a capital or otherwise infamous crime; in any case involving the construction or application of the Constitution of the United States; in any case in which is drawn in question the constitutionality of any law of the United States, or the validity or construction of any treaty made under its  authority; in any case in which the constitution or law of a state is claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States; and on any case in which the jurisdiction of the court is in issue, but in such cases the question of jurisdiction alone shall be certified by the court below for decision.(116)
	The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court also extends to final judgrnents of the court of claims.(117)
	The supervisory jurisdiction of the federal courts is exercised by removal, upon petition of, and bond filed by, the defendant before filing plea or answer, of a pending civil case from a state court to the circuit court of the United States of the proper district where the case is one of a class of which the circuit court has jurisdiction under the statutes, and where the suit arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, or where the defendant is a non-resident of the state, or where the controversy is wholly between citizens of dim erent states, and it can be fully determined as between them, or where it shall be made to appear before the circuit court that the defendant, being a citizen of a state other than that in which the action is pending, cannot, bv reason of apprehended prejudice or local influence, obtain justice in the state court.(118) The circuit court may remand to the state court any cause not properly removed.(119)
	It is foreign to the purpose of this book to discuss in detail the practice in the different courts.

The necessity of a judicial "case."
103. Whatever be the form in which the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is invoked, it is essential to the exercise of the jurisdiction that there should be a "case" before the court, that is, a subject-matter for judicial determination contested by competent parties.20 The courts, therefore, will not give judgment upon "moot" questions, or abstract propositions. (21) If it appear from the reeord, or be proven aliunde, that a judgment brought up for review bas been satisfied, the appeal must be dismissed.(22) It is also essential that the question for decision be judicial in character, for the courts cannot decide political questions, such as whether or not the people of a state have altered their form of government by abolishing an old government and establishing a new one in its plaee,(23) or whether or not, in a foreign country, a new government has been established,(24) nor whether or not the United States has sovereignty over a territory,(25) nor can the courts by injunction restrain a state from the forcible exercise of legislative power over an Indian tribe asserting their independence, the right to which the state denies,"(126) nor enjoin the executive department of the government of the United States from carrying into effect acts of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional.(127) Such questions can only be decided by the political power, "and when that power has decided, the courts are bound to take notice of its decision and to follow it."(128) Upon this principle, the recognition by Congress and the executive of the state governments of the then lately rebellious states as reconstructed after the suppression of the rebellion was held to be binding upon the judicial department of the government.(129) But the courts may compel the performance of a ministerial and non-discretionary duty by an executive officer, as, for iustanee, the delivery of a signed and sealed commission to an officer who has been appointed, nominated, and confirmed(130)or the crediting to a government creditor of a sum of money found bv the Treasury to be due under the express terms of an aet of Congress.(131)

The federal judiciary.
104. The courts of the United States have contributed to the history of the country a chapter which every American citizen can read with pride. The dignity of the judicial office, its security of tenure, and its consequent independeiace of political dictation and control, have so far compensated for the inadequacy of the salaries that lawyers who might reasonably look forward to lucrative practice have, in many instances, been induced to accept seats upon the federal bench. The judges have been, with scarcely an exception, learned and able lawyers, and their personal characters have given weight to their judgments. They have performed their judicial duties with courage, faithfulness, and intelligelace. They have, in general, administered with firmness, and with tact, the extensive jurisdiction of their courts. All that is to be said of the federal judges, in general, can be said, with even greater force, of the successive Chief Justices and Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. Sovereign states, vast aggregations of capital, and the mass of the people have respectfully bowed to the judgments of that tribunal. No fair-minded man has ever doubted, however much he might be disposed to criticise the result in any particular cause, that the court in arriving at its conclusions had given full consideration to every fact and every argument and had earnestly endeavoured to do justice. The work of the court which has attracted most attentioin has been in its interpretation of the Constitution. In the performance of that duty the court has had to apply an instrument made at the birth of the government to the changing conditions of the nation's development. This has been done in all cases with judicial deliberation, and, in almost all cases, with the wisdom of statesmen.
	The court, in all but two instances, has wisely held itself aloof from political controversies whose consideration it was possible to avoid. In 1803,(132) judges who were Federalists united in an opinion which, if it could have been enforeed by a judgment, would have deprived the Democratic party of those spoils of office which that party regarded as the fruits of its triumph over the Federalist party. In 1857,(133) judges who were Democrats thought they had established the indefeasible right of slavery to occupy the territories of the United States. The cases were alike in that in each instance the eourt, having proved to its satisfaction that it had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of decision, proceeded to a judicial determination upon the merits of the controversy; and in each instance the country revolted against the attempted judicial usurpation of politieal functions.
	The greatest service whieh the Supreme Court of the United States has rendered to the country is that throughout our history it has been an object lesson of the supremacy of law. It ss impossible to overstate the vital importance to the republic of the teaching of this lesson, a lesson so hard for a democracy to learn, and so essential to the maintenance of free institutions.

The federal supremacy.
105. The law administered in the courts of the United States is found in the Constitution, in acts of Congress, in treaties made by the United States, and in the judments of the Supreme Court.
	Section 2 of Article VI of the Constitution declares, that "this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
	The Constitution is the Constitution as orginally ratified, and as subsequently amended in the manner and under the restrictions contained in the Constitution, and as construed by the judicial department of the government so far as regards all that irnav properiv become a subject-matter of judicial determination. The validity of an act of Congress is dependent upon its conformity to the Constitution.(134) The validity of an act of a state legislature is dependent upon its conformity to the Constitution of the United States and also upon its conformity to the constitution of its state.
	But an act of legislation will not, on slight implication, or vague conjecture, be judiciallv determined to be in conflict with the Constitution, for the presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of a law. (135) Statutes, which are constitutional in part only, will be upheld by the court so far as they are not in conflict with the Constitution, provided that their constitutional, and their unconstitutional, parts be severable;(136) but when the unconstitutional parts of such a statute are so connected with its general scope, that, should they be stricken out, effect cannot be given to the legislative intent, the other provisions of the statute must fall with them.(137)

Constitutional and statutory construction.
106. The colonial lawyers were familiar with the idea of a judicial determination of the invalidity of an act of legislation by reason of its contravention of an organic law, for they not infrequently had their attention called to deliverances by the Privy Council in England holding invalid acts of colonial legislatures for the want of conformity to colonial charters, or to English statutes. It is therefore not surprising that there are dicta and judgments of colonial courts recognizing this principle.(138)
	Alexander Hamilton,(139) after saying that the independence of the courts is essential in a country where the Constitution limits the power of the legislatures by specific exceptions therefrom, adds that such "limitations ... can be preserved in practice in no other way than through the medium of courts of justice whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.... The Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.... The prior charter of the superior ought to be preferred to the subsequent acts of an inferior and subordinate authority, and... accordingly whenever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the former." This reasoning has been adopted and uniformly followed by the court. (140)
	The most important function of the courts is that of construing the Constitution, and that construction is authoritatively and finally, so far as regards subject-matters of judicial determination, made by the Supreme Court of the United States. The rules, which are applied by the court in the construction of the Constitution, are few and simple. (1). The construction is neither lax nor rigorous, but such as to effectuate the purpose of the instrument as "an establishment of a frame of government and a declaration of that government's fundamental prilaciples intended to endure for ages and to be adapted to the various crises of humarr affairs."(141) (2). The antecedent history of the country and the state of the public affairs at the time of the adoption of the Constitution are considered in order that the old law, the mischief, and the remedy may have their relative weight.(142) (3). A contemporaneous legislative exposition acquiesced in for a long term of years fixes the construction.(143) (4). The words are read in their natural sense (144) departing from and varying by construction the natural meaning of the words only where different clauses of the instrument bear upon each other and would conflict, unless the words were construed otherwise than by their natural and common import.(145) (5). An exception from a power which is granted in express terms marks the extent of the power and shows that the power necessarily includes other cases which come within the terms of the grant and which might have been, but were not, specifically excepted.(146) (6). When a term of the common law is used, its common-law meaning is adopted with it.(147) (7). The Federalist is not, of course, of binding authority upon the Supreme Court with regard to the judicial construction of the Constitution, but as Marshall, C. J., said in Cohens v. Virginia,(148) the "opinion of the Federalist has always been considered as of great authority. It is a complete commentary on our Constitution, and is appealed to by all parties in the questions to which that instrument has given birth. Its intrinsic merit entitles it to this high rank, and the part two of its authors performed in fraining the Constitution put it very much in their power to explain the views with which it was framed." (8). The reported proceedings of the convention which framed the Constitution, and of the several state conventions which ratified it, though frequently referred to in the discussions of questions of constitutional construction, are not of binding authority. The views expressed in the debates are merely the views of the individual speakers, and do not necessarily express the view of the subject which induecd the federal convention to insert the particular provision in the Constitution as framed by them, or which led the convention of any one state to ratify the Constitution.(149) The votes of the convention on the details of the Constitution are of no greater importance, for an affirmative vote approving a particular section of the Constitution, throws no light on the meaning of the words of the section; and a negative vote rejecting a proposed constitutional provision may with equal propriety be regarded as an expression of opinion to the effect that the proposed provision is unnecessary because adequately supplied by other provisions of the Constitution, or as a refusal to adopt the particular provision because in the opinion of the convention such a provision ought not to be inserted in the Constitution. It must be remembered that the Constitution derives its whole force and authority from its ratification by the people,(150) and whenever it becomes necessary to determine the meaning of any clause in the Constitution, the real question for decision is, not what did the federal convention, or any member thereof, understand that clause to mean when that convention framed the Constitution, nor what did the members of any particular state convention understand that clause to mean when their convention ratified the Constitution, but what did that clause really mean as ratified by all the conventions, and that meaning can only be determined by the application of the established rules of judicial construction."
	The meaning of a statute is determined by the application of rules of construction, which are substantially the same as the rules of constitutional construction, and whose object is simply to determine the legislative intent, which is the natural and reasonable effect of the words used.(152)

Judgments of courts.
107. A judgment of a court is an application of a rule of law to the facts of a particular case, and its value as an authority is dependent upon the extent and finality of the jurisdiction of the court and upon an ascertainment of the facts as presented to the mind of the court and a deduction of the rule of law determining the decision on those facts.(153) The opinion of any court or judge upon a question whose determination is not essential to the decision upon the facts of the cause is only obiter dictum and, although entitled to be received with great respect, it is not to be regarded as an authoritative precedent. The opinions of the judges are, therefore, of value only in so far as they ascertain the facts and deduce the rule whose application deeides the cause. It would be well if dissenting opinions were not published, and if the fact ofany dissent were not recorded, for any dissent necessarily weakens the force of the judgment as a precedent.

Treaties.
108. Treaties, when duly ratified, are of inferior authority to the Constitution,(154) but they are superior in authority to state legislation.(155) Where there is a repugnancy between a treaty and an act of Congress that which is of later date will prevail.(156) Where a treaty declares the rights and privileges which the citizens or subjects of a foreign nation may enjoy in the United States it, in general, operates by its own force, and does not require the aid of any congressional enactment.(157) While, as respects the rights and obligations of the contracting governments, a treaty is to be regarded as concluded and binding from the date of its signature,(158) yet as respects the effects of the treaty on the rights of citizens of the United States vested before the ratification of the treaty but subsequently to its signature, the treaty is not to be considered as a part of the supreme law of the land until after its ratifications have been exchanged, for the Senate may in process of ratification amend the treaty,(159) and it cannot be known, until it be ratified, what it may command or prohibit.(160) Treaties do not, unless they be in express terms retroactive, affect rights vested, or liabilities incurred, before their ratification.(161) The abrogation of a treaty operates onlv on future transactions, leaving unaffected previously executed transactions and vested property interests, but not personal and non-transferable rights.(162)

The law administered in the federal courts.
109. In criminal cases the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is statutory and an indictment cannot be tried for a common-law offense. They, therefore, administer on the criminal side only that jurisdiction which is granted by the Constitution, treaties, and statutes of the United States.(163) 	In civil causes, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the character of the cause, as raising for decision a question of federal law, the only law that can be administered therein is that of the Constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United States. But in causes where the jurisdiction attaches only by reason of the diverse citizenship of the parties, the law administered ought to be that of the state within whose territory the court of the first instance sits, excepting, of course, in those causes in which the lex loci contractus differs from the lex fori, and the former law is applicable. The only reason that the framers of the Constitution could have had for opening the courts of the United States to one who litigates only in right of diverse citizenship is the possibility of bias or prejudice against him in the state court. This reason for the jurisdiction was recognized by the Supreme Court in an early case,(164) but later cases adopt a broader view, which must now be regarded as the established judicial theory of the constitutional intent. If a citizen of one state has a cause of action against a citizen of another state, and he brings his action in the courts of that other state his right is to have an impartial trial and to have his cause decided by the application of the law of that state. That law can only be found in the constitution and statutes of the state, as construed by the state court of last resort, and in the principles of the common, or civil, law.. as the case may be, as recognized by the judicial decisions of the state court of last resort. When that litigant goes into a court of the United States to enforce that cause of action, the change of forum should not change the law which must be applied to and must decide the cause. Each state is entitled as of right jus dare et jus dicere, to make the law and, to declare the law as to all subject-matter of legislative and judicial determination, which have not been delegated by the Coustitution to the United States; and any subject-matter of which a court of the United States can, only take jurisdiction by reason of the diverse citizenship of the parties is necessarily a subject-matter as to which the United States cannot legislate, and over which it ought not to exercise judicial jurisdiction otherwise than by applying the law of the state. it is is true that the federal tribunals exercise as to such subjeet-matters an independent though concurrent jurisdiction, but it does not follow that the federal judges should be at liberty to ascertain and declare the law of the state according to their own judgment, not of what that law is, but of what that law ought to be. On the contrary, the law of the state like the law of a foreign country should be proven and found as a fact by the federal judges. The Judiciary Act of 17S9 (165) of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at Common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply." This statutory requirement ought to have been construed to require the application of state rules of law as evidenced by state constitutions, statutes, and judgments of state courts of last resort, in all eases where the jurisdiction attaches solely by reason of diverse citizenship, but the court has held otherwise, and it is settled law, that while the courts of the United States will accept and follow a fixed construction by the judicial department of a state of its constitution and statutes,(166) yet, when the decisions of the state's court of last resort are not consistent the United States courts do not feel bound to follow the last decision;(167) nor will the federal courts follow a state de cision rendered after the cause of action has accrued. Upon questions of general commercial law,(168) and questions of real property law depending upon general principles of law,(169) and in actions upon contracts or upon questions of "general jurisprudence of national or universal application"(170)  the court will determine the law for itself and it will not follow state decisions which, in the judgment of the court, do not lay down the law as the federal courts hold that it ought to be laid down. The fundamental objection to this rule of the court is that, as Congress cannot under the Constitution legislate on any other than a federal subject-matter, the enforceent by the federal court, in controversies as to contracts, or commercial obligations, or title to real property, of a law different from the state law, as formulated in its acts of legislation and in the judgments of its courts, is nothing else than the establishment and enforcement of a body of judge-made law with no statutory basis, and without possibility of legislative amendment.(171)
	In causes of civil cognizance, where the federal court has acquired original jurisdiction under the Constitution and laws of the United States, it may protect rights and administer remedies not only under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, but also under the common law, as adopted by the state within which the court sits,(172) the principles of equitable jurisprudence, "as distinguished and defined in that country from whence we derive our knowledge of those principles,(173) and the statutes of the state.(174)
	In admiralty the maritime law is administered, "with such amendments and modifications as Congress may from time to time have adopted.(175)

Courts martial and impeachments.
110. The judicial jurisdietion of the United States, except as regards offenses of soldiers and sailors against the Articles of War, and crimes punishable by impcachment, can onlv be exercised by courts duly constituted under the Constitution and the laws. Congress, therefore, cannot invest courts martial or military commissions with jurisdietion to try, convict, or sentence for any offense, a citizen not being a resident of a state in rebellion, nor a prisoner of war, nor in the military or naval service of the United States. (176) That which may be termed the extra-ordinary judicial power of the United States is exercised only by courts martial and in the trial of impeachments. Courts martial may exercise judicial jurisdiction with regard to offenses against the Articles of War by soldiers, sailors, and militiamen when called out for service.(177)
	The relevant provisions of the Constitution, as to impeachments, are that, "the House of Representatives shall . . . have the sole power of impeachment;"(178) "the Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Uiaited States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside; and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honour, trust, or profit under the United States; but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment, according to law."(179) "The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors."(180) "The President shall....have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment."(181) "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury."(182) "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed."(183) The Supreme Court of the United States has never decided any question as to impeachment, but a consideration of the constitutional provisions shows clearly that, under them, the House of Representatives is the prosecutcor; any civil officer of the United States may be the defendant; the Senate of the United States is the court, its members being first sworn or affirmed, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States presiding in the case if a trial of the President, and a concurrence of two-thirds of the members present being necessary to a conviction; the offenses for which an impeached officer may be tried being "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors," as defined by laws of the United States enacted before the commission of the offense; the punishment extending only "to removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honour, trust, or profit under the United States," but without prejudice to indictment, trial, and conviction at law for the same offense; and a presidential pardon not being pleadable in bar of the impeachment nor efficacious in satisfaction of a conviction or impeachment, or in mitigation of the punishment.

The IV Amendment.
111. The exercise of judicial power by the United States is, in some respects, limited by certain other of the provisions of the Constitution and its Amendments. In the most important case that ever came before the Supreme Court" (184) it was held that neither the President, nor the Congress, nor the Judicial Department can deny to a citizen any one of the safeguards of eivil liberty incorporated into the Constitution, and in that cause a citizen who was held in custody under a sentence of death pronounced by a military commission was released upon habeas corpus. The last clause of Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution declares that "the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed." This clause controls criminal proceedings in the District of Columbia.(185) It does not probibit the establishment of consular tribunals in foreign lands;(186) or the waiver of jury trial for minor offenses.(187) The IV Amendment declares that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searehed, and the persons or things to be seized." This Amendment forbids Congress to authorize a court in revenue cases to require, on motion of the government's attorney, the defendant, or claimant, to produce in eourt his books, papers, etc., under penalty of admitting the allegations of the government's attorney as to that which those books, papers, etc., would prove if produeed.(188)

The V Amendment-(a) Due process of law.
112. The V Amendment(189) declares, that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger." This constitutional provision forbids a prosecution upon information in the courts of the United States in the cases of crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term of years at hard labour.(190) But a court may, for professional misconduct, strike an attorney from its rolls;(191) and a court martial may try a naval officer in time of peace, the qualification "when in actual service in time of war or public danger" applying only to the militia.(192) This Amendment also forbids the trial or conviction of a prisoner in a case where after presentment made by the grand jury, the indictment is without re-submission to the grand jury, amended by striking out words, even though those words be regarded by the court as surplusage, and a prisoner, after trial, conviction, and sentence on an indictment so amended, is entitled to his discharge on habeas corpus.(193) The same Amendment also declares that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." In Murray's Lessee v. H. L. & I. Co., (194) Curtis, J., said, "The words 'due process of law' were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words 'by the law of the land, in Magna Charta. Lord Coke, in his commentary on those words,(195) says they mean due process of law. The constitutions, which had been adopted by the several states before the formation of the federal Constitution, following the language of the great charter more closely, generally contained the words, 'but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land... The Constitution contains no description of those processes which it was intended to allow or forbid. It does not even declare what principles are to be applied to ascertain whether it be due process. It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which might be devised. The Article is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave Congress free to make any process due process of law by its mere will. To what principle, then, are we to resort to ascertain whether this process, enacted by Congress, is 'due process.' To this the answer must be twofold. We must examine the Constitution itself to see whether this process be in conflict with any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political conditions by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country.(196) In a later case, Field, J., said that the words, " due process of law, " mean " a course of legal proceedings, according to those rules and principles which have been established in our system of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights. To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution, that is, by the law of its creation, to pass upon the subject-matter of the suit; and, if that involves merely a determination of the personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within the state, or by his voluntary appearance. "(197) In conformity with these principles it has been held, that the trial of a citizen by military commission within a state where the courts are open and the course of justice unobstructed is not due process of law.(198) lt has also been held that there is a deprivation of liberty without due process of law when a court by its order, warrant, or commitment holds a prisoner in custody, when the prima facie case against the prisoner does not show that he has Committed an offense of which the court committing him can take cognizance, and in any such case of commitment by an inferior court of the Uiaited States the Supreme Court will issue a habeas corpses and discharge the prisoner.(199) On the other hand, it has been held that the owner of property distrained and sold for non-payment of taxes due to the United States, is not deprived of his property without due process of law.(200) It has also been held that an officer of the United States, whose accounts, as settled by the auditing officers of the Treasury, show him to have neglected to account for and pay over public moneys received by him, is not deprived of his property without due process of law, when the Solicitor of the Treasury, in obedience to an act of Congress has issued a distress warrant under which the defaulting officer's real property has been taken in execution and sold by a marshal of the United States without further proceedings, judicial, or otherwise.(201)

The V Amendment- (b) Jeopardy, etc.
"Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." "Everybody agrees that the principle in its origin was a rule forbidding a trial in a new and independent case where a man had already been tried once."(202) Nevertheless there may be a second trial if the jury disagree,(203) or if a verdict against the prisoner is set aside on his motion for error at the trial.(204) But a prisoner in the Philippine Islands having been tried and acquitted by the court of the first instance, and upon appeal by the government, the finding of acquittal having been reversed by the appellate tribunal in the islands, and the prisoner sentenced to imprisonment, the Supreme Court held(205) that the government's appeal twice put the prisoner in jeopardy. . When a court imposes a fine and imprisonment as a punishment where the statute under which the prisoner was indicted conferred the power to punish by fine or imprisonment, and the fine has been paid, the court cannot modify its judgment by thereafter imposting imprisonment alone, for the judgment of the court having been executed so as to be a full satisfaction of one of the alternative penalties, the power of the court as to that offense is ended, and a second judgment on the same verdict is, under such circumstances, void for want of power, and the party must be discharged.(206) So also where one of three defendants jointly indicted for murder has been acquitted and his associates have been convicted, upon a setting aside of the verdicts because of a defect in the indictment, the verdict of acquittal upon the merits is a bar to a second trial of the person acquitted; but the defendants who have availed themselves of the invalidity, of the first indictment eannot, upon the granting of a new trial, claim that their lives are for a second time jeopardized.(207) Moreover, a court may, when necessary, discharge a jury from giving a verdict and order a trial by another jury, and the defendant is not thereby twice put in jeopardy within the meaning of the Constitution.(208)
	The V Amendment also declares, that no person "shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself." In Brown v. Walker,(209) it was held that this provision does not protect a witness who refuses to answer a question when he is by law afforded absolute immunity, federal and state, for the offense to which the question relates. The fact that the testimony may tend to degrade the witness in public estimation does not exempt him from the duty of disclosure."(210)


	The provision that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation entitles a patentee to payment for the use of his invention,(211) and it entitles a corporation to compensation for the taking of a franchise to exact tolls as well as for the value of the tangible property taken;(212) but payment need not be made until the actual possession of land has passed,(213) benefits to the property left may be set off against damages for the property taken,(214) and compensation for an indirect injury to property need not be made.(215) Yet where, by the construction of a dam, the United States so floods lands belonging to an individual as to totally destroy its value, compensation must be rendered.(216) Congress does not deprive a contestant of a preemption entry on public lands of his property by confirming the title of the original entryman, for during the pendancy of the contest the contestant has no vested right.(217)

 The VI Amendment.

113. The VI Amendment deelares that,"in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."(218)
	This Amendment, of course, applies only to criminal proceedings;(219) and the right to trial by jury may be waived by persons charged with minor offenses.(220) When the crime has been committed within the territories Congress may designate the place of trial at any time previous to the trial.(221) An indictment for sending obscene matter through the mail need not set forth the objectionable language in full.(222) The requirement that the prisoner "be confronted with the witnesses against him" will not invalidate a conviction in a case where the witnesses are absent by the procurement of the prisoner, or where enough has been proven to throw on, him the burden of showing, and he having full opportunity therefor, fails to show, that he has not been instrumental in concealing or keeping away the witnesses, and ground having been thus laid, evideiace is admissible against him of that which the witnesses testified at a previous trial on the same issue between the United States and the prisoner.(223) In the event of the death of witnesses for the prosecution, testimony given by those witnesses at a previous trial on the same issue is admissible ;(224) but their evidence is not admissible when their absence is due to negligence of the officers of the government.(225) And in a trial for receiving stolen property, the record of the conviction of the thief cannot be admitted in evidence to prove the theft.(226)

The VII and VIII Amendments.
114. The VII Amendment declares, that, " in suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."(227) This Amendment does not affect equity causes in the federal courts, for the determination by a court of equity, according to its own course and practice of issues of fact, does not impair the right of trial by jury, because that right does not extend to causes of equitable jurisdiction.(228) Nor does this Amendment affect proceedings upon claims against the United States heard in the Court of Claims without the intervention of a jury, for the government being suable only by its own consent, may declare in what court it will be sued, and may prescribe the forms of pleading and rules of practice in that court, and such claims so prosecuted are not suits at common law.(229) Nor does it affect proceedings before a commission created for the purpose of hearing and deciding upon claims against a territorial municipal corporation which have no legal obligation, but which have such equity as to cause provision to be made for their investigation and payment when found proper.(230) Nor does this Amendment relieve a party from the consequences of his antecedent voluntary relinquishment of a right of trial by jury in any particular cause, as, for instance, in the case of a banking corporation whose state charter stipulates that the bank should have a summary remedy by execution without jury trial for the collection of notes indorsed to it, and in express terms made negotiable at the bank.(231) Nor is the granting of a nonsuit for want of sufficient evidence an infringement of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff.(232) In all cases, however, in which the right of trial by jury is secured by the Constitution the jury must be unanimous in rendering its verdict.(233) The VII Amendment also declares that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the common law." As Story, J., said in Parsons v. Bedford,34 "This is a prohibition to the courts of the United States to re-examine any facts tried by a jury in any other manner. The only modes known to the common law to re-examine such facts, are the granting of a new trial by the court where the issue was tried, or to which the record was properly returnable; or the award of a venire facias de novo by an appellate court, for some error of law which intervened in the proceediiags." The Amendment obviously governs both the original and appellate jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, and forbids the reversal of a verdict of a jury save as above indicated. But facts tried by a jury before a justiee of the peace
may be tried anew by a jury in the appellate court, for a trial by jury in the sense of the common law and of the, VII Amendment involves the presence of a judge having the usual powers of superintending the course of the trial, instructing the jury on the law and advising them on the facts, and setting aside their verdict if in his opinion against the law or the evidence.(235) And a trial court may make its decision of a motion for a new trial depend upon a remission of part of the verdict.(236) On the other hand, Congress cannot by statute provide for the removal from a state court into a federal eourt of causes tried by jury in the state court, and for a retrial in the federal court of the facts and law in such action in the same manner as if the same had been originally commenced in the federal court.(237)
	The Vlll Amendment deelares that " excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. "This Amendment restricts national and not state legislative and judicial action.(238) Neither shooting to death,(239) nor electrocution,(240)
as modes of inflicting the death penalty after trial, conviction, and sentence in a court of proper jurisdiction, nor a fine of fifty dollars and three months' imprisonment at hard labour for selling liquor in violation of law, (241) nor ten years' imprisonment for conspiracy to defraud, nor tbe infliction upon one prisoner of a heavier punishment than that inflicted upon another prisoner for an identical offense,(242) can be regarded as a violation of the VIII Amendment.
	The first ten Amendments were proposed by the first Congress for adoption by the states and were intended to constitute a federal Bill of Rights. These Amendmeints constitute restrictions upon the United States and they are obviously not restrictions upon the legislative or judicial powers of the states.

The XI Amendment.
115. The Supreme Court. having, in Chisholm v. Georgia,(243) affirmed its orginal jurisdiction in actions brought by citizens of one state against another state, in 1797 the XI Amendment was adopted, declaring that "the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state. " That Amendment having taken effect on 8th January, 1798, in that year the Supreme Court decided in Hollingsworth v. Virgiiaia,(244) that the Amendment barred any further proceedings in cases then depending in the courts of the United States in which a citizen of one state was the plaintiff, and another state was the defendant. In Osborn v. Bank of U. S.,45 Marshall, C. J., said: "The XI Amendment . . . is of necessity limited to those suits in which a state is a party to the record," but he added,(246) "the state not being a party to the record, and the court having jurisdiction over those who are parties on the record, the true question is not one of jurisdiction, but whether in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the court ought to make a decree against the defendants; whether they are to be considered as having a real interest, or as being only nominal defendants." On the other hand he said,(247) "This suit is not against the state of Ohio within the view of the Constitution, the state being no party on the record." The jurisdictional question in the cause was as to the power of the court to take cognizance of a suit in equity brought by the Bank of the United States against the auditor of the state of Ohio to enjoin the collection of a tax on the business of the bank imposed by a statute of Ohio, and recover a sum of money wrongfully taken out of the vaults of the bank by the state auditor by way of enforcing the payment of the tax, and the court sustained the jurisdiction on the grounds stated by the chief justice. In view of the judgment in the cause and the dicta of the chief justice, it was not un-natural that the presence or absence of a state as a party defendant on the record should have been regarded as the criterion by which to determine whether or not a suit was within the purview of the XI Amendment. Indeed in Davis v. Gray,(248) the court went so far as to hold that a receiver of a railway could sue in equity the governor of the state incorporating the railwav and the land commissioner of the state to restrain the issue of patents to individuals for certain lands theretofore granted by the state to the railway on certain conditions, and resumed by the state for alleged non-perforimance of the condition, and that it not being possible to m ake the state a party the plaintiff's rights could be vindicated by a decree against the officers of the state, but the later decisions of the court have tended toward the establishmient of a sounder rule on this subject; and it is now settled, that the criterion is not the presence or absence of the state as a party defendant on the record, but the question of fact, is or is not the suit in substance, though not in form, a suit by a citizen of another state against a state? If a state be either a defendant on the record, or the real defendant though not a party on the record, the XI Amendment forbids the court to take jurisdiction of the cause, unless the state by its voluntary appearance, as in Clark v. Barnard,(249) submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court. In conformity with this view it has been held that a suit by, or against, the governor of a state in his representative capacity is a suit against the state;(250) that the XI Amendment prohibits a suit in the federal courts against the officers of a state to enforce the performance of a contract made by the state, where the controversv is as to the validity and obligation of the contract, and where the remedy sought is a performance of the contract by the state, the nominal defendants having no personal interest in the subject-matter;(251) it has also been held that where a state had bought a railway from a receiver appointed at its instance, as the holder of the first mortgage bonds of the railway, the holders of junior bonds having filed a bill to foreclose their mortgage and to set aside the sale to the state, making the governor and treasurer of the state parties defendant, the state being a necessary party to the relief sought, the XI Amendment barred the suit;(252) and that state officers cannot be compelled, at the suit of a citizen of another state, to appropriate the public money of the state in a way prohibited by the laws of the state, for such a suit is in fact against the state, and where a state cannot be sued, the court cannot assert jurisdiction over the officers of the state, so as to control them in their administration of the finances of the state.(253) It has also been held that the XI Amendment bars a suit by one state against another state, where the plaintiff state sues, not in its own right, but only f or the benefit of certain of its citizens who have assigned to it their claims against the state defendant;(254) that a private person cannot bring a personal suit in the Supreme Court of the United States against a state to recover the proceeds of property in the possession of that state, such as the proceeds of certain slaves alleged to have been illegally seized by the state,(255) and, in the case of ln re Ayers,(256) that the XI Amendment forbids the court to take jurisdiction of a bill in equity filed by a holder of, and dealer in, coupons of the bonds of the state, the coupons under the statutes of the state and the judgments of the court being receivable in payment of state taxes, to enjoin the officers of a state from prosecuting, on behalf of the state, actions against citizens of the state for colleetion of taxes, under a statute of the state directing the rosecution of the actions, and providing that "if the defendent relies on a tender of coupons as payment of the taxes claimed, he shall plead the same specifically and in writing, and file with the plea the coupons averred therein to have been tendered," and "the burden of proving the tender and the genuineness of the coupons shall be on the defendants;" the equity set up by the plaintiffs in the injunction suit being that they had purchased coupons for th@ purpose of dealing in them and selling them to taxpayers to use in payment of taxes to the state, and that, unless the action threatened by the state officers were enjoined, the plaintiffs would not be able to sell their coupons at a profit. So, also, suit cannot be maintained against a state officer to compel the levying of a special tax for the benefit of bondholders.(257) On the other hand, it has been helld that the Amendment does not protect from suit a county of a state,(258), nor prohibit the exercise by the court of its appellate jurisdiction over state courts in cases of criminal cognizance, for the purchase or prosecution of a writ of error to reverse a criminal conviction at the prosecution of the state is not the Commencement or prosecution of a suit at law against that state;(259) nor does the XI Amendment prohibit the exercise by the court of jurisdiction over a controversy between individuals as to land granted by and claimed under a state ;(260) nor does the fact that a state is a, or the sole, shareholder in a banking corporation prevent the courts of the United States from taking cognizance of a suit against such a corporation,(261) for, as Marshall, C. J., said,(262) "when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizeen. " Nor does the fact that a state claims property, which is not in its own possessioln but in the possession of an individual who has been made defendent in an action to recover that property, oust the jurisdiction of the court of the United States, nor forbid the court to give judgment in favour of the plaintiff.(263) It is likewise well settled, that "when a plain official duty, requiring no exercise of discretion, is to be performed" by an officer of a state, "and performance is refused, any person who will sustain personal injury by such refusal may have a mandamus to compel its performance; and when such duty is threatened to be violated by some positive official act," of an officer of a state, "any person who will sustain personal injury thereby, for which adequate compensation cannot be had at law, may have an injunction to prevent it,"(264) or he may maintain an action at law for damages against the officer as a wrongdoer. "In either case, if the officer plead the authority of an unconstitutional law for the non-performance or violation of his duty, it will not prevent the issuing of a writ. An unconstitutional law will be treated by the courts as null and void."(265) In conformity with this principle, it has been held that the XI Amendment does not forbid the courts of the United States to take cognizanee of a cause wherein a federal agency, as, for instance, a national bank, brings suit against the officers of a state to enjoin the enforcement of an unconstitutional law of the state taxing that agency.(266) It has also been held that state officers may be enjoined at the suit of a holder of consolidated bonds of the state which had been issued under an agreement for the funding of the debt of the state, from issuing others of the consolidated bonds in violation of the contract between the state and its bondholders ;(267) and that an action brought by a taxpayer against an officer of a state to recover possession of property which that officer has wrongfully seized under an unconstitutional law of the state for non-payment of taxes is an action against that officer as a wrongdoer, and not such an action as is prohibited by the XI Amendment.(268)
	As the immunity from suit is a personal privilege, the state may waive that privilege, and it does waive it, when, in a cause pending in a court of the United States, in which it has a sufficient interest to entitle it to become a party defendant, it causes an appearance to be entered by counsel on its behalf, for such an appearance is a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.(269) It is obvious that the XI Amendment does not affect the jurisdiction granted by the III Article to the courts of the United States in actions wherein a foreign state, or one of the United States, is the plaintiff and one of the United States is the defendant.(270)

The relations between the federal and state courts.
116. The federal supremacy prevents the states from regulating the process or practice of the courts of the United States at law,(271) or in equity,(272) or in causes of criminal cognizanee,(273) but "the laws of the several states, except when the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law. in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply." (274) The federal supremacy also forbids the courts of the states to refuse obedience to a mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States, reversing a judgment of a state court in a cause which is of federal cognizance;(275) and it prevents a state legislature from annulling by statute the judgment of a court of the United States in a cause which is within the jurisdiction of the court.76 While a stato cannot coinfer jurisdiction on a court of the United States, yet a state may by its legislation create legal and equitable rights which can be enforeed in a court of the United States in a cause whereof that court has acquired jurisdiction by reason of either the citizenship of the parties or the federal character of the subject-matter of litigation; thus, pilotage being a subject of admiralty and, therefore, of federal jurisdiction, a pilot may sue in a court of the United States to recover pilotage under a state statute;(277) and the right under a state statute to recover damages for a death caused by negligence is enforcible in a cause between proper parties in a court of the United States;(278) and liens created by state laws in favour of material men for supplies furnished to vessels in their home ports or for materials furnished to ships in process of construction may be enforeed in the courts of the United States.(279)
	A court of the United States cannot enjoin proceedings in a court of a state,(280) save in aid of bankruptcy proceedings pending in a court of the United States, or as a means of preventing the enforcement in a court of a state of a judgment entered therein after a cause has been properly removed to a court of the United States;(281) nor can the courts of the United States issue writs of mandamus to courts of the states, except to compel the performance of purely ministerial,(282) and not judicial,(283) duties.
	Chattels taken in execution under the judgment of a court of a state and delivered to a claimant upon his giving bond therefor cannot be seized by a marshal under the process of a court of the United States.(284) A court of the United States exercising jurisdiction in bankruptcy cannot divest liens upon the bankrupt's property created by the judgments, either interlocutory or final, of the courts of the states;(285) the assets of the estate of an insolvent decedent in process of judicial administration under the order of a probate court of a state are not subject to lexy under an execution issued by a court of the United States;(286) and the trustee appointed by a court of a state under a state statute to liquidate a corporation whose charter has been forfeited cannot be sued in a court of the United States by creditors of the corporation to compel his allowance of a claim against the corporation. As Catron, J., said in the judgment in the case of The Bank of Alabama v. Dalton,118 "In administering justice...the states o@is Union act independently of each other, and their courts are governed by the laws and municipal regulations of that state, where a remedy is sought, unless they are controlled by the Constitution of the United States, or by laws enacted under its authority." The most important of the restraints imposed by the Constitution upon the exercise of judicial jurisdiction by the states result from the grant in Article III of the Constitution, of judicial power to the United States over certain subjects of jurisdiction, and from the power of Congress to render that jurisdiction exclusive. Nevertheless, as the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States are "the supreme law of the land," the states, wherever Congress has not, by legislation within the limits of its constitutional powers, excepted any subject from the jurisdiction of their courts, may exercise jurisdiction therein, and, in such cases, rights arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States may be administered, subject, of course, to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States, and to the power of removal to the federal courts of the first instance; thus, a tribunal constituted by a state may enfores the militia laws of the United States;(289) and an assignee in bankruptcy may sue in a court of a state to recover the assets of the bankrupt.(290) But where Congress has expressed its will that the courts of the United States shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any subject-matter which is included within the constitutional grant of judicial power to the United States, the courts of the states cannot directly exercise judicial jurisdiction over such subject-matter. Upon this principle, a court of a state cannot take cognizance of an act declared to be criminal by the statutes of the United States, unless that act be also an offense against tlhe laws of the state.(291) A state court cannot take jurisdiction of a cause of admiralty cognizance,(292) such as a proceeding in rem founded upon a contract for the transportation of passengers by sea, or upon a collision,(293) or upon a contract of affreightment,(294) but a state court may take jurisdiction of an action in personam for mariners' wages, (295) or of a proceding in rem founded upon a lien given by a state statute for materials supplied in building a ship,(296) for such actions are not necessarily of admiralty cognizance. A state court cannot take jurisdiction of an action at law against a foreign consul.(297) A state court cannot take jurisdiction in patent causes, nor determine the validity of a patent, or a question of infringement,(298) but a state court may incidentally pass upon the validity of a patent as, for instance, where it is questioned in an action for the priee of the patent.(299) The distinction running through the cases is, that, where Congress has excepted from the action of the courts of the states any subject-matter of federal jurisdiction as designated in the Constitution, the courts of the states thence-forth cannot directly, but may indirectly and collaterally, act upon such subject-matter. The courts of the states cannot issue an injunction before final decree, nor an attachment on mesne process, against a national bank.(300) The federal supremacy forbids a court of a state to issue a mandamus to an officer of the United States,(301) or to try a federal officer for an act done by him in the discharge of his official duties,(302) or, by its process, to take in execution goods imported into a port of the United States, but not yet entered at the custom-house for payment of duties to the United States,(303) or goods, which, having been seized for violation of the revenue laws of the United States, are in the custody of a marshal of the United StateS.(304) Nor can a court of a state take jurisdiction of a suit to determine whether or not property has been rightfully forfeited under the laws of the United States.(305) Nor can it take jurisdiction of a complaint for perjury in testifying before a local notary public upon a contested congressional electioin.(306) Nor can a court of a state by injunction restrain the execution of a judgment of a court of the United States;(307) nor, under a state insolvent law, regulate the distribution of assets of an insolvent national bank;(308) nor discharge a defendant held in custody under a capias ad satisfaciendum issued by a court of the United States; "nor replevy property taken in execution under a judgment of a court of the United States;(310) nor order the release, after a hearing on habeas corpus, of a prisolner held in custody by an officer of the United States under a warrant of commitment from a commissioner of a circuit court of the United States upon a charge of the commission of an offense against the laws of the United States, or of a prisoner held in Custody by the United States after a trial and conviction in a court of the United States of an off ense against the laws of the United States;(311) nor release upon habeas corpus an enlisted soldier in the army of the United States, detained in custody under the order of his commanding officer.(312) Nor can an attaehment of a debt by the proeess of a state court, after the commencement of a suit upon that debt in a court of the United States bar the plaintiff's recovery in that suit;(313) nor ean the pendency of state insolvent proceedings be set up as a bar to suits in the courts of the United States brought by parties who are constitutionally entitled to sue therein.(314)
	In the cases of persons who, or of property which, may be subject to the jurisdiction cpf the courts of the United States, and also to that of the courts of the states. that jurisdiction, which first actuaIly attaches either to the person or the property, will retain control and cannot be divested by process issued from the other jurisdiction.(315) An officer who, in executing thie process issued by a court in a cause within its jurisdiction, seizes property which that process specifically designates, is not liable to action therefor in a court of another jurisdiction; but an officer who, under a judgment in personam, seizes property not specifically designated in the process is liable, and may be sued therefor in a court of another jurisdiction,(316) and the party injured by such a wrongful act by a marshal of the United States may sue on the marshal's official bond;(317) or, he may file a bill in the federal court to restrain or regulate its judgment.(318)

The XIV Amendment as affecting state judicial proceedings.
117. The exercise of judicial jurisdiction bv the states is also restricted by that provision of the XIV Amendment which declares, "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Within the meaning of the Constitution, this due process of law is secured when the laws operate on all alike and no one is subjected to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.(319) The provision "does not control mere forms of procedure in the state courts or regulate practice therein. All its requirements are complied with provided in the proceedings which are claimed not to have been due process of law the person condemned bas had sufficient notice and adequate opportunity has been afforded him to defend."(320) In proeeedings in personam service must be made within the state unless the defendant voluntarily appears;(321) in proceeding in rem the res must be within the jurisdiction and constructive notice of the proceed ings must be given.(322) A state may regulate its judicial proceedings,(323) provided that it does not discriminate against classes of citizens. A state may therefore restrain or take away the right of trial by jury in civil cases;(324) or it may permit the prosecution of crimes by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate;(325) or it may provide for the trial of criminal cases by a struck jury,(326) or by a jury composed of eight instead of twelve jurors;(327) or it may permit a person charged with murder to waive the right of trial by jury;(328) or it may permit a court to enjoin the commission of a crime and then punish its commission by contempt proceedings without the intervention of a jury;(329) or it may even provide that any pe rson mav summarily destroy, without judicial proceedinws, fishing nets that have been placed in public streams in, defiance of statute.(330) 
	A state may freely proscribe the jurisdiction of its several courts, both as to their territorial limits and the subject-matter, amount and finality of their respective judgments and decrees, and it may vest in one court final appellate jurisdiction over the courts of certain counties, and in another court the like jurisdiction over other counties.(331) It may, in providing for local prohibition of retail liquor selling, leave the word "retail" to judicial definition, aud the amount of the penalty to judicial discretion.(332) A statute of a state which, as construed by its courts, provides that a person called as a juror in the trial of a criminal cause is not to be disqualified because he has formed an opinion or impression based upon rumor or newspaper statements, if he shall upon oath state that his verdict will be based only on the evidence at the trial, does not deprive the prisoner tried by such jurors of his life, liberty, or property witliout due process of law.(333) And in a criminal trial, upon proof of non-residence, permanent absence, and inability to procure the attendance of a witness, the state may put in evidence the deposition of such witness, taken upon the preliminary examination before a committing magistrate when defendants were present and their counsel was afforded opportunity to cross-examine.(334) The Amendment does not interfere with a state's regulation of the remedies afforded to creditors of its municipalities for the collection of their debts.(335) But due process of law is denied by a statutory requirement that a master's deed be taken out by the purchaser at a foreclosure sale within a specified time, where failure to comply with such requirement is held by the highest state court to destroy the rights of the mortgagee in possession after condition broken, and to entitle the mortgagor, without payment of his debt, to recover possession in ejectment (336) The Amendment being directed against state legislation and not against a judicial misconstruction of such legislation by the courts of the state, when a state legislature has enacted laws for the government of its courts, which, if followed, will furnish all parties with the needed protection to life, liberty, and property, it has performed its constitutional duty, and if one of its courts, acting within its jurisdiction, make an erroneous decision, the state cannot be deemed guilty of violating the Amendment; thus, where a state statute required of all guardians the giving a bond before selling their wards' real estate, the faet that a court permitted a sale to be made without requiring the giving of such a bond is not a violation of the Amendment;(337) nor is due process of law denied where the court permits an irregularity -in the polling of the jury in a criminal trial, the irregularity working no injury to the defendant;(338) nor is due process of law denied where the court refuses a jury trial in civil proceedings, even though such mode of trial be required by statute;(339) nor do mere errors in the administration of a statute afford constitutional grounds for the reversal of a judgment.(340) On the same principle, the constitutional requirement is not violated when an accused person is tried and sentenced to imprisonment by a judge de facto of a court de jure.(341)
	But the phrase " due process of law " does not necessarily mean a judicial proceeding. The nation from whom we inherit that phrase has never relied upon the courts of justice for the collection of her taxes, though she passed through a successful revolution in resistance to unlawful taxation. (342) Due process of law is secured in the procedure for the collection of assessments and taxes,(343) and in the exercise of the right of eminent domain (344) if provision be made for a mode of confirming and contesting the charge thus imposed, with such notice to the person, or such proceedings in regard to the property as is appropriate to the nature of the case. It has also been held that a state may by statute prohibit the manufacture of liquors;(346) and it may prohibit their sale in saloons to women;(347) it may regulate the hours of labour of persons employed in hazardous occupations;(348) it may prohibit the waste of natural gas and oil;(349) it may fix a reasonable limit upon the rates which may charged by railway,(350) grain elevator,(351) and water supply (352) companies; it may impose special liabilities upon railroad companies; (353) it may require practitioners of medicine to undergo examinations as to their attainments;(354) it may reduce the rate of interest upon judgments previously obtained in its courts,(355) it may provide that an insurer cannot, in an action upon a policy of insurance, deny that the value of the goods destroyed was that set forth in the insurance papers;(356) it may require the redemption in cash of store orders issued by employers in payment of wages due to employees;(357) it may prohibit the manufacture and sale of oleo margarine containing colouring matter;(358) it may prohibit its railway companies from charging greater rates for shorter than for longer hauls, except by permission of the railroad commission;(359) it may require railways to erect and maintain stations on orders of the railroad commission which are not shown to be unreasonable;(360) it may forbid the selling of options for the purchase or sale of commodities;(361) and it may forbid the maintenance of a cow stable within municipal limits without permission from the municipal assembly.(362) It has also been held that a state may by statute make water rates a lien on land prior to the lien of a mortgage of date subsequent to the statute;(363) it may validate a legally defective mortgage;(364) it may require a purchaser of land under a sale for non-payment of taxes to bring his possessory action within five years after the sale;(365) it may shorten the period of limitation of actions, provided it allows a reasonable time for the bringing of actions after the passage of the statute and before the bar takes effect;(366) and it may, without depriving a debtor of his property, repeal a statute of Iimitations after the debt is thereby barred.(367) So also a state may tax remainders created by will before the precedent estates terminate and the remainders vest in possession.(368) So also a state may provide for the inspection of mines, establish a fee for the same, and allow the inspectors to determine the number of inspections per year required by each mine;(369) the date of the execution of a murderer may be fixed by the court in the absence of the convict,(370) or it may be fixed by the governor;(371) if permitted by statute, the governor may remove a subordinate official from office;(372) and a mayor may, by municipal ordinance, be given the power to grant or refuse permission to move buildings upon the public streets of the City.(373) On the same principle, the trial of contested elections may be committed by the state constitution to the legislature of the state and the provision of the XIV Amendment that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law is not thereby violated.(374)

The "full faith and credit" clause.
118. The judicial action of the states is also restrained by Section I of Article IV of the Constitution, which declares that, "full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof."(375) Under this constitutional grant of authority Congress has enacted(376) that "the acts of the legislature of any state or territory, or of any country subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, slall be authenticated by having the seals of such state, territory, or country affixed thereto. The records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any state or territory, or of any such country, shall be proved or admitted in any other court within the United States by the attestation of the clerk, and the seal of the court annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate, that the said attestation is in due form. And the said records and judicial proceedings so authenticated, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from which they are taken." Legislative acts of a state are, under the terms of the Act of 1790, authenticated by the seal of the state, and in the absence of contrary proof, the seal will be presumed to have been affixed by the officer having its custody and duly authorized to affix it to the record.(377) Such acts will "be given the same effect by the courts of another state that they have by law and usage" in the state of their enactment;(378) "and, as the courts of every state and country have the exclusive power of construing its local statutes, their construction thereof will be followed in the courts of other countries and stateg.(379) On this line it has been held that if a state court has decided that a law is in harmony with the state constitution its validity, so far as the state constitution is concerned, cannot be questioned elsewhere.(380) Yet even an erroneous construction of a statute by the courts of another state does not deny to it the faith and credit required by the Constitution where the local courts have not considered the statute or where their construction has not been proved as a fact in the foreign state.(381) And a construction by a state court of decrees made by a federal court and by a court of another state will not be held to deny full faith and credit to those decrees unless the unreasonableness of the constructiorn is clearly shown.(382) It is essential to the enforeement in the courts of the states of the legislative acts(383) and records of judicial proceedings in the courts(384) of another state, that they be certified in strict compliance with the directions of the act of Congress. But a judgment of a state court, though certified in accordance with the act of Congress, does not operate proprio vigore in another atate, and in order to give it the force of a judgment in that other state, suit must be brought upon it there, and the period of limitation as prescribed by the lex fori may be pleaded as against such a judgment.(385) When so certified and sued upon, such judgments must be given the same effect that is given to them in the jurisdiction in which they have been rendered. Theref ore, to an action on a judgment so eertified, nil debet cannot be pleaded;(386) nor, it seems, can fraud be pleaded to an action on such a judgment.(387) When the record of a judgment falsely recites an appearance by counsel, it cannot be collaterally impeached, when sued upon in another state, for it might have been set aside by audita qiterela, in the jurisdiction wherein it was rendered.(388) But no greater effect can be given in a state court to a judgment of a court of another state than would be given to that judgment in the state where rendered. Therefore, a personal judgment which has been rendered in one state against several parties jointly, service of process having been made on some of them, or they having voluntarily appeared, and service having been made by publiccation as to the others, is not evidence outside of the state of any liability on the part of those not personally served.(389) Nor will a judgment rendered in one state against two joint debtors, only one of whom has been served with process, support an action in a court of another state against the party not served, nor avail as the foundation of a judgment against him.(390) A judgment recovered in one state against two joint defendants, one of whom has been duly summoned and the other has not, and which is valid and enforcible by the Iaw of that state against the party served with process, will support an action against that party in another state.(391) It is an essential prerequisite to the enforcement in any court of a judgment, either in personam or in rem, rendered in any court, that the court rendering the judgment had by law jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit;(392) and, if the judgment was in personam, that the defendant either was served with process within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or voluntarily appeared in the suit;(393) and, if the judgment was in rem, that the res was within the territorial jurisdiction of the court acting upon it, and was properly brought under its control;(394) for process issued by any court, and served personally on a defendant out of its territorial jurisdiction, and process published within that territorial jurisdiction, are equally unavailing in a proceeding to establish a personal liability on the part of the defendant, and while, where property is by seizure or some equivalent act brought within the control of a court, substituted service by publication is sufficient to inform a non-resident owner of the property of the object of the proceeding, such publication is not effectual to ground a personal liability upon.(395) But if a non-resident defendant has by attorney voluntarily appeared in the action, and judgment has been rendered in his favour in the court of the first instance, he may, after the withdrawal of his attorney's appearance, be notified, by publication, of a writ of error or appeal, by means of which the cause is removed to an appellate tribunal, and a judgment of reversal in that tribunal will be binding on him as a judgment in personam, and as such enforcible against him in the court of another state. (396) And a judgment in personam may be rendered in proceeding in rem against a defendant out of the jurisdiction, who has by his voluntary appearance made himself a party to the litigation, and such a judgment is enforeible by an action thereon in another state against that defendant.(397) Yet where the defendant takes no part in the proeeedings after responding to the complaint as filed, and on those pleadings a judgment is rendered which is in no way responsive to them, that fact may be set up in bar to a recovery on the judgment.(398) A court may take jurisdiction of an action for divorce brought by a citizen of its own state, upon constructive notice of the action being given to the defendant,(399) but where neither party is domiciled within the state, then, although the defendant has received actual notice, a decree of divorce is not entitled to faith and credit in any other jurisdiction.(400) Where a corporation chartered by one state is permitted by another state to transact business therein upon condition that service of process upon a resident agent of the corporation should be considered as service upon the corporation, a judgment rendered in the latter state against the corporation, and based upon such service of process upon the agent must be received in the state chartering the corporation with the same faith and credit that is given to it in the state wherein it is rendered.(401) But a judgment in personam rendered against a foreign corporation in a suit begun in a state court by an attachment of property, and, as incident thereto, a service of a copy of the writ and an inventory of the attached property on a resident agent, without appearance by the corporation, is not conclusive in another action to which the corporation is a party in a court of the United States.(402) Where a court of one state grants probate of a will disposing of lands in another state, it merely decides that the will @as executed in accordance with the laws of the domicile, mnd a court of the state in which the land is situated does not violate the constitutional provision in deciding thamt the will was not executed in accordance with its own laws.(403) The record of a judgment rendered in another state may be contradicted as to the facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction, and its recital of the existence of such facts is not conclusive, and want of jurisdiction may be shown either as to the subject-matter or as to the person, and, in proceedings in rem, as to the res. Therefore, in an action of trespass de bonis, etc., in a court of the United States against a county sheriff of New Jersey for taking the plaintiff's oyster boat, the defendant having pleaded in justification the record of a forfeiture of the boat under a New Jersey statute authorizing a summary conviction on a hearing by two justices of the county in which the seizure was made, it was held, that the recital in the record of a seizure of the boat in the county in which the justices exercised jurisdiction was open to contradiction by evidence that the seizure was not made within the territorial limits of that County.(404) On the same principle, a recital in a record of a personal service of a summons upon a defendant, may be contradicted by proof that the defendant was not served; (405) and a recital of appearance by attorney may be contradicted by showing that no attorney was authorized to appear for the defendant in the suit.(406) Administrators in different jurisdictions of the personal estate of the same decedent are not privies in estate to the extent that a judgment in one jurisdiction against one administrator is enforcible in the other jurisdiction against the administrator therein;(407) and the grant of letters of adminis- tration in one state eannot authorize the administrator to maintain any suit in the courts, either state or federal, held in ainy other state." An objection to the informality of the authentication of a record cannot be made by a party who has antecedently offered that identical record in another proceeding.(409) In a suit for wages the defendant can set up a judgment in garnishment proceedings against the same wages, recovered in another state, and that judgment is a bar to further action.(410) A state statute of limitations, providing that suits upon judgments rendered in other states, if not brought within two years, shall be barred, is a bar to an action on such a judgment against one who only became a citizen of the state on the day on which suit was brought.(411) A judgment recovered on a penal statute of a state eannot be enforeed in another jurisdiction;(412) but the rule is otherwise when the judgment has been recovered on a statute affording a private remedy to the person injured.(413) A state may deny to its courts jurisdiction over suits between foreign corporations on a foreign judgment for "this provision of the Constitution establishes a rule of evidence rather than of jurisdiction.(414) Wherever a state court refuses in a cause to give due effect to a judgment rendered in a court of the United States, or in a court of another state, having by law jurisdiction of the subject-matter of litigation, and having acquired by due service of process, or otherwise, jurisdiction of the person of the party against whom judgment has been rendered, the action of the state court in so refusing is subject to review in the Supreme Court of the United States under the 25th Section of Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Act of 5th February, l867.(415) The record of a court of the United States is sufficiently proved when certified by the clerk of the court under its seal.(416) And the judgments of the courts of the United States, when sued upon, or set up by way of defense in state courts, are, if rendered in a cause of which the court of the United States had jurisdiction both as to the subject-matter and the res or the person of the defendant, conclusive upon the parties and privies thereto, and enforeible in the state courts to the same extent as in courts of the United States.(417) Judgments rendered in courts of the United States- in causes, jurisdiction of which was obtained by reason of the citizenship of the parties, and in whicli the law of tile state within which the court sat was administered, have only that validity and effect which is due to a judginent of a court of the state in such a cause,(418) and, therefore, a court of a state which refuses to give a greater effect to such a judgment of a court of the United States cannot be said to decide against a title or right claimed under an authority exercised under the United States.
(1) Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539; Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66.
(2) Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee, 2 Pet. 492, 524; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, 347; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304; Missouri v. Andriano, 138 U. S. 496; Connolly v. U. S. P. Co., 184 id. 540.
(3) Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. 1 37; Van Horne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304; The Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247; Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425.
(4) 6 Wheat. 385.
(5) Chisholm v. Georgia, q Dall. 419, 475; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 378; Martin v. Hunter's Lemee, I Wheat. 304, 331, 343; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, 429.
(6) Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1.
(7) Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 264.
(8) Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S. 375, 384. .
(9) See also Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 379; Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 9 id. 738, 824; The Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 252; G.W. & W. Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 20,1; R. Co. v. Mississippi, 102 id. 135, 140; Ames v. Kansas, Ill id. 449, 462; K. P. R. v. A., T. & S. P. R., 112 id. 414, 416; Provident Savings Society v. Ford, 114 id. 635; P. R. Removal Cases, 115 id. 1; Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 id. 586; Burthe v. Denis, 133 id. 514; Bock v. Perkins, 139 id. 628; Mitchell v. Smale, 140 id. 406; Cooke v. Avery, 147 id. 375; Belden v. Chase, 150 id. 674; N. P. R. v. Colburn, 164 id. 383; In re Lennon, 166 id. 548; A. Ex. Co. v. Michigan, 177 id. 404; W. U. T. Co. v. A. A. R., 178 id. 239; Lampasas v. Bell, 180 id. 276; Tulloek v. Mulvane, 184 id. 497; Patton v. Brady, ibid. 608; Howard v. U. S., ibid. 676; V. W. Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 id. 65; Filhiol v. Maurice, ibid. 108; Talbot v. S. C. First Nat. Bank, ibid. 172; Swafford v. Templeton, ibid. 487; Marsh v. N., S. & Co., 140 id. 344; Holt v. 1. Mfg. Co., 176 id. 68; Arkansas v. K. & T. C. Co., 183 id. 185; C. C. D. Co. v. Ohio, ibid. 238; N. F. & P.'W. v. 0. W. S.Co., ibid. 216; F.-G. L. S. Co. v. Springer, 185 id. 47; Kennard v. Nebraska, 186 id. 304; Sawyer v. Piper, 189 id. 154. For cases affecting officers of the United States see In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1; Sonnentheil v. M. B. Co., 172 id. 401; Bausman v. Dixon, 173 id. 113; Auten v. U. S. Nat. Bank, 174 id. 125; Boske v. Comingore, 177 id. 459; Gableman v. P., D. & E. Ry., 179 id. 335. For cases affecting corporations created by the United States see N. P. R. v. Amato, 144 U. S. 465; T. & P. Ry. v. Cody, 166 id. 606. 
(10) U.S. v. Ortega, 11 Wheat. 467; Blyew v. U. S., 13 Wall. 581.
(11) In re Garnett, 141 U. S. 1, 14.
(12) The St. Lawrence, I B]. 522, 6, 7; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 575.
(13) The Genesee Chief i,,. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 452.
(14) In re Garnett, 141 U. S. 1; Workman v. New York, 179 id. 552.
(15) Rev. Stat. Secs. 4283 and 4289; Lord v. G.N.&P.S.S.Co., 102 U. S. 541.
(16) Act of 19th June, 1886; 24 Stat. 80, 81; In re Garnett, 141 TJ. S. 1.
(17) The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624; Moran v. Sttirges, 154 U. S. 256; The Roanoke, 189 id. 185; The R. W. Parsons, 191 id. 17.
(18) The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411.
(19) The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555.
(20)  Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall- 532; The Lottawanna, ibid. 558; The Kate, 164 U. S. 458; rhe R. W. Parsons, 191 id. 17.
(21) Higgins v. Butcher, Yelv. 89; Ex parte Gordon, 104 U. S. 515.
(22) S. Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99; Butler v. B. & S. S. Co., 130 id. 527.
(23) Ex parte Gordon, 104 U. S. 515; Ex parte Perry Co., ibid. 519.
(24) Ry. Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270.
(25) The Genesee Chief u. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443; Hobart v. Drogan, 10 Pet. 108; Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441; N. J. N. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 id. 344; Fretz v. Ball, 12 id. 466; Allen v. Newberry, 21 id. 244; Maguire v. Card, ibid. 248; The St. Lawrence, 1 Bl. 522; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411; The Hinev. Trevor, ibid. 555; The Belfast, 7 id. 624; The Eagle, 8 id. 15; The Daniel Ball, 10 id. 557; The MonteHo, 20 id. 430; Butler v. B. & S. S. Co., 130 U. S. 527; Belden v. Chase, 150 id. 674; Moran v. Sturges, 154 id. 256; P. R. v. N-apier S. Co., 166 id. 280; The Glide, 167 id. 606; Workman v. New York, 179 id. 552; The R. W. Parsons, 191 id. 17.
(26)  MeElrath v. U.S., 102 U.S. 426; Schellinger v. U.S., 155 id. 163; Belknap v. Schild, 161 id, 10; Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 id. 255; Ainsa v. U.S., 184 id. 639; Bigby v. U.S., 188 id. 400. See also 24 Stat. 505, c. 359.
(27) U. S. v. North Carolina, 136 U.S. 211.  U. S. v. Michigan, 190 id.379.
(28) Wheat. 378.
(29) 92 U. S. 10, 18.
(30) See also Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425; Hyde v. Stone, 20 How. 170, 175; Ry. Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 2'70, 287; Boom Co- v. Patterson, 98 LT. S. 403; Dennick v. R. Co., 103 id. 11; Ex parte Boyd, 105 id. 647; Koenigsberger v. R. S. Al. Co., 158 id. 41; St. L. & S. F. Ry. v. James, 161 id. 545; St. J. & G. 1. R. v. Steele, 167 id. 659. The law applied in controversies between citizens of different states is discussed by Professor Pepperin "Borderland of Federal and State IDecisions, " and infra, see. log. And see Bucher v. C. R., 125 U. S. 555; Fr--iedlander v. T. & P. Ry., 130 id. 416; Clark v. Bever, 139 id. 96; Scott v. Neely, 140 id. 106; Cross v. Allen, 141 id. 528; Ellenwood v. M. C. Co., 158 id. 1005; H. P. T. Co. v. C., M. & St. P. Ry., 175 id. 91; Dooley v. Pease, 180 id. 1 26; W. U. T. Co.v. C. P. Co., 181 id. 92.
(31) Barney v. Baltimore, 6 WAII.- 280; Cameron v. Hodges, 127 U. S. 322; Koenigsberger v. R. S. M. Co., l@8 id. 41; Hooe v. Jamieson, 166 id. 395.
(32) P. T. C. Co. v. Alabama, 155 - U. S. 482; Arkansas v. K. & T. C. Co., 183 id. 185; cf. M., K. & T. Ry. v. MFassouri R. & W. Comrs., ibid. 53.
(33) Fouvergne v. New Orleans, 198 How. 470; Byers V. McAWey, 149 U. S. 608; Clarke v. Clarke, 178 id. 1865; cf. Clark V. Bever, 139 id. 96; Hayes v. Pratt, 147 id. 557. S" allso Elleiinwood v. M. C. Co., 158 id. 105; S. T. Co. v. D. R. Nat. Bank, 187 id. 211.
(34) Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582
(35) New Jersey v. New York, 5 Pet. 284; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 id. 657, 724; Missouri -v. Iowa, 7 How. 660; Florida v. Georgia, 11 id. 293, 17 id. 478; Alabama v. Georgia, 23 id. 505; Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39; Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U. S. 479; Nebraskav. Iowa, 145 id. 51'9; Iowa u,. Illinois, 147 id. 1; Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 id. 503; Tennessee v. Virginia, 177 id. 501.
(36) New York v. Connecticut, 4 Dall. 1.
(37) South Carolina v. Geor a, 93 S. 4.
(38) Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U. S. 379.
(39) New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U. S. 76; ef. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 id. 2S6.
(40) Wisconsin v. P. 1. Co., 127 U. S. 265.
(41) Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1, 17, 18.
(42) Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208; Fuller, C. J., and Harlan and White, JJ., dissented.
(43) Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125.
(44) South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286; White, J., Fuller, C. J., and McKenna and Dav, JJ., dissented.
(45) Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373. See U.S. v. Michigan, 190 id. 396.
(46) Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66.
(47) The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1.
(48) Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700.
(49) Wisconsin v. P. I. Co., 127 U. S. 265.
(50) California v. S.P.Co. 157 U.S. 229; Minnesota v. N. S. Co., 184 id. 199.
(51) 2 Dall. 419.
(52) Cohens v. Vir@a, 6 Wheat. 406.
(53) Infra, Section 115.
(54) Infra, Section 102.
(55) Rev. Stat., sees. 753, 761; In re @Neagle, 135 U. S. 1; In re Loney, 134
id. 372; Medley, Petitioner, ibid. 160; In re Frederich, 149 id. 70; Ohic) v.
Thomas, 173 id. 276; Boske v. Comingore, 177 id. 459; ef. Storti v. Massa-
ehusetts, 183 id. l@iS.
(56) Lawler 7:. Walker, 14 How. 149; Osborn v. Bank of the United States,9 Wheat. 738, 823; Mills v. Brown, 16 Pet. 525; R. Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. :L77, 180; Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454; Chappell v. Waterworth, 155 id. 102 ; P. T. C. Co. v. Alabama, ibid. 482;E. L. L. Co. v. Brown, ibid. 488; Say-Nvard v. Denny, 158 id. 180; H. & T. C. R. v. Texas, 177 id. 66; W. U. T. Co- v. A. A. R., 178 i(l. 239; ef. K. W. P. Co- V. G. B. Co., 142 id. 254.
(57) Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393; Bingham v. Cabot, 3 Dall. 382; Capron v. Van N@den, 2 Cr. 126; Breithaupt v. Bank of Georgia, I Pet. 238; Brown v. KeerLe, 8 id. 112, 115; Hornthall v. The Collector, 9 Wall. 560; Godfrey v. Terry, 97 U. S. 171; Robertson v. Cease, ibid. 646; Grace v. A. C. I. Co., 109 id. 278, 283; Camerou v. Hodges, 127 id. 322; Chapman v. Barney, 129 id. 677; Stevens v. Nichols, 130 id. 230; Timmons V. E. L. Co., 139 id. 378; Denny v. Pironi, 141 id. 121; Mattingly v. N. W. V. R., 15S id. 53; 1. C. & 1. Co. v. Gibney, 160 id. 217; St. L. & S. F. Ry. v. James, 161 id. 545; Benjamin v. New Orleans, 169 id. 161.
(58) Montalet v. Murray, 4 Cr. 46.
(59) Jones v. Andrews, 10 Wall. 327; Godfrey v. Terry, 97 U. S. 171; Rolbert-
son v. Cease, ibid. 646. See also Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 191 id. 405; Min-
nesota v. N. S. Co., 194 id. 48.
(60) Wickliffe v. Owings, 17 How. 47.
(61) 0. & M. R. v. Wheeler, I Bl. 286; B. & 0. R. v. Harris, 12 WaU- 65; Ry. Co. v. Whitton, 13 id. 270; Mulier v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444; St. L. & @. F. Ry. v. James, 161 id. 545; Blake v. McClung, 172 id. 239; S. Ry. v. Allisou, 190 id. 326; cf. St.J. & G.I.R.v. Steele, 167 id. 659.
(62) Act 13th Aug.,1888, sec. 4, 25 Stat. 433.
(63) Ibid., see. 1.
(64) Ibid., see. 1.
(65) Ibid., sec. 1.
(66) U. S. v. Hudson, 7 Cr. 32; U. .9. v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415; Bush v. Ken tucky, 107 U. S. 110; Jones v. U. S., 137 id. 202, 211. But see Tennessee v. Davis, 100 id. 257.
(67) U. S. v. Fox., 95 U. S. 670.
(68) U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336.
(69) U. S. v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41.
(70) U. S. v. Fox, 95 U. S. 670.
(71) U. S. v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214; TT. S. v. Cruikshank, ibid. 542.
(72) 4 Wheat. 193.
(73) See also Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 730.
(74) 1 Wheat. 304.
(75) 4 Wall. 411. See als4) Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 314,315,325; Slocum v. Mayberry, 2 id. 9; Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 id. 246; Waring V. Clarke, 5 How. 451; G., C. & S. F. Ry- v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98. Sed. cf. Story's Commentaries, see. 1672, note 4.
(76) In Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, Bradley, J., said, the general principle is, "that, where jurisdiction may be conferred on the United States courts, it may be made exclusive where not so by the Constitution itself; but, if exclusive jurisdiction be neither express nor implied, the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction whenever, by their own constitution, they are competent to take it." In Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, Brown, J., said that the judicial power which the Constitution intended to eonfine to courts created by Congress "extends only to the trial and determination of 'cases' in courts of record, and Congress is still at liberty to authorize the judicial officers of the several states to exercise such power as is ordinarily given to officers of courts not of record; such, for instance, as the power to take affidavits, to arrest and commit for trial offenders against the laws of the United States, to naturalize aliens, and to perform such other duties as may  be regarded as incidental to the judicial power rather than a part of the  judicial power itself."
(77)Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 331, 333; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, 429.
(78) Rev. Stat., see. 711.
(79) Act 3d Mar., 1891, c- 517, see. 4, 26 Stat. 826.
(80) Act 3d Mar., 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
(81) 7 Or. 32.
(82) Marbury v. Madison, I Cr. 137.
(83( 11 Wheat. 467.
(84) 111 U. S. 252.
(85) Rev. Stat., see. 687. @e also Ames v. Kansas, Ill U. S. 449; P. T. C.
(86) Co. v. Alabama, 155 id. 48 But see Curtis's Jurisdiction of the Courts of the U. S., p. 10.
(87) U. S. v. Peters, 3 Dall. 121.
(88) Hayburn Is Case, 2 Dal-1. 409.
(89) Rev. Stat., sec. 688.
(90) See Act 3d Mar., 1891_ c. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
(91) Act 13th Aug., 1888, @. 866, 25 Stat. 433.
(92)  Rev. Stat., see. 629.
(93)  Rev. Stat., see. 629; Act 3d Mar., 1897, c. 395, 29 Stat. 695.
(94)  Rev. Stat., see. 629; Act 6th Tan., 1897, c. 4, 29 Stat. 481.
(95)  Act 3d Mar., 1881, c. 138, 21 Stat. 502.
(96)  Act 13th Aug., 1888, c. 866, see. 4, 25 Stat. 436, amending Rev. Stat., w. 629.
(97) Rev. Stat., see. 629.
(98) Act 2d July, 1890, 'c. 647, 26 Stat. 209.
(99) Acts 4th Feb., 1887, c.104, sec.16, 24 Stat. 384; 2d March, 1889, c. 382,
 See. 5, 25 Stat. 855.
(100) Under see. 15 of the Act of 10th June, 1890, c. 407Y 26 Stat. 131.
(101) Act 3d Mar., 1887, c. 359, see. 2, 24 Stat. 505.
(102) Act 13th Aug., 1888, c. 866, 25 Stat. 433.
(103) Rev. Stat., sec. 563.
(104) Act 3d Mar., 1887, c. 359, sec. 2, 24 Stat. 505.
(105) Rev. Stat., see. 1059 et seq.
(106) Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 Dall. 321; Durousseau v. U. S., 6 Cr. 307, 314; The Francis Wright, 105 U. S. 381; L. & G. W. S. Co. v. P. I. Co., 129 id. 397.  (107) Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409; Hunt v. Palao, 4 How. 589; MeNulty v. Batty, 10 id. 72; U. S. v. Ferreira, 13 id. 40; Gordon v. U. S., 2 W&U. 561. See also language of Taney, C. J., in appendix to 117 U. S.
(108) Rev. Stat.,sec. 690 et seq.
(109) Rev. Stat., see. 709. See al@ Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wbeat. 264; Worces ter v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515; Twitchell v. The Commonwealth, 7 Wall. 321; spies V. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131; Illurthe v. Denis, 133 id. 514; Missouri v. Andriano, 138 id. 496; Etheridge v- Sperry, 1,19 id. 266; Williams v. Heard, 140 id. 529; Metropolitan Bank v. Claggett, 141 id. 520; Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 id. 135; Roby v. Colehour, 146 id. 153; Sayward v. Denny, 158 id. 180; C. & N. W. Ry. v. Chicago, 164 id. 454; Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 id. 193 Scudder v. Comptroller, 175 id. 32; Boske v. ComiBgore, 177 id. 459; Rothschild v. Knight, 184 id. 334; M. L. 1. Co. v. McGrew, 188 id. 291; @ooker v. Los Angeles, ibid. 314; N. M. B. & L. Assn. v. Brahan, 193 id. 635; ef. Moran v. Horsky, 178 id. 205; Y. & M. V. Ry. v. Adams, 180 id. 1. 
(110) De Saussure v. Gaillard, 127 U. S. 216; Hale v. Akers, 132 id. 554; Hopkins v. McLure, 133 id. 380; Beatty v. Benton, 135 id. 244; Johnson v. Risk, 137 id. 300; Cook County v. C. & C. C. & D. Co., 138 id. 635; Hammond v. Johnston, 142 id. 73; Eustis v. Bolles, 150 id. 361; R. R. v. C. V. R., 159 id. 630; Seneca Nation v. C@ty, 162 id. 283; Allen v. S. P. R., 173 id. 479; Beeberger v. McCormick, 175 id. 274; Moran v. Horsky, 178 id. 205; Hale v. Lewis, 181 id. 473; Howard v. Fleming, 191 id. 126. See also Dreyer V. Illinois, 187 id. 71.
(111) West v. Aurora City, 6 Wall. 139; Philadelphia v. The Collector, 5 id. 720; The Mayor v. CmVer, 6 id. 247; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257; Removal Cases, ibid. 457; Ames v. Kansas, Ill id. 449; Young v. Parker, 132 id. 267; Bock L,. Perkins, 139 id. 628; Marshall v. Holmes, 141 id. 589; Martin v. B. & 0. R., 151. id. 673 cf. Brown v. Trousdale, 138 id. 389; Bellaire v. B. & 0. R., 146 id. 117; Chappell v. Waterworth, 155 id. 102; E. L. L. Co. v. Brown, ibid. 488; Arkansas v. K. & T. C. Co., 183 id. 185.
(112) In re Loney, 134 U. S. 372; Medley, Petitioner, ibid. 160; In re Neagle, 135 id. 1; In re Frederich, 149 id. 70; Ohio v. Thomas, 173 id. 276; Booke v. Comingore, 177 id. 459; ef. Storti v. Mamachusetts, 183 id. 138. But ordinarily the writ issues only when the court under whose warrant the petitioner is held is without juristliction. In re Duncan, 139 U. S. 449; Wbitten v. Tomlinson, 160 id. 231; Crossley v. California, 168 id. 640; Baker v. Grice, 169 id. 284; Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 id. 101; Harkraderv. Wadley, 172 id. 148; Markuson v. Boucher, 175 id. 184; Davis v. Burke, 179 id. 399; Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 id. 499. See also U. S. v. Sing Tuck, 194 id. 161; ef. Ex parte Rovall, 117 id. 241, 252; New York v. Eno, 155 id. 89;
(113) Act 3d Mar., 1891, c. 517, see. 4, 26 Stat. 826.
(114) Ibid., we. 5.
(115) lbi&, sec. 6.
(116) Act 3d Mar., 1891, c. :517, see. 5, ut supra.
(117) Rev. Stat., sec. 709.
(118) Act 13th Aug., 1888, c. 866, 25 Stat. 433.
(119) Ibid.
(120) Osborn v. Bank of the U. S., 9 Wlheat- 738; Cobens v. Virginia, 6 id. 379; Ul)shur County v. Rich, 135 U. S. 467; L. A. S. M. Co. v. U. S., 175 id. 423; Lampasas v. Bell, 180 id. 276.
(121) Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651; N.O.F. Inspectors v. Glover, 160 id. 170; Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 id. 404; Codlin v. Kohlhausen, 181 id. 151; Tilrpin v. Lemon, 187 id. 51; Chadwick v. Ke]Iey, ibid. 540; Smith v. Indiana, 191 id. 138.
(122) A. B. Co. v. Kansas, 193 tT. S. 49.
(123) Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 147.
(124) Rose v. Himely, 4 Cr. 241, 272; Goiston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246, 324; Kennett v, Chambers, 14 How. 38; Terlinden v. Ames, 184 id. 270.
(125) Jones v. U. S., 13i U.S. 202; In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472, 503; cf. U.S. v. Texas, ibid. 621.
(126) The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 20.
(127) Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475; Georgia v. Stanton, 6 id. 50. See,
however, dicta in Cruickshank v. Bidwell, 176 U.S. 73, and cases there cited.
(128) Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1.
(129) Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700.
(130) Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. 137.
(131) Kendall v. U.S., 12 Pet.,521. See also Noble v. U.R.L.R., 147 U.S. 165; Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497; U. S. v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 378; Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 id. 50; U.S. v. Black, 128 id. 40, 50; U.S. v. Windom, 137 id. 636; U. S. v. Blaine, 139 id. 306; New Orleans v. Paine, 147 id. 261; Roberts v. U. S., 176 id. 221; De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 id. 1; Fok Yung Yo v. U.S., 185 id. 296; A. S. of M. H. v. MeAnnulty, 187 id. 94. 
	In the courts of the United States, laws of foreign countries may be proved as facts, C. & A. R. v. W. F. Co., 119 U. S. 615, 622; L. & G. W. S. Co. v. P. 1. Co., 129 id. 397, 445; Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cr. 1; Church v. Hubbart, 2 id. 187; Strother v. Luetts, 6 Pet. 763; Armstrong v. Lear, 8 id. 52, by official publications thereof, satisfactorily certified, Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400, or by written copies thereof attested by the oath of a United States consul, Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cr. 187. Unwritten foreign laws may be proved by the testimony of experts, Livingston v. M. I. Co., 6 Cr. 274; Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400; Pierce v. Indseth, 106 U. S. 546. The courts of the United States take notice, without proof, of the laws of the several states, C. & A. R. v. W. P. Co., 119 U. S. 615, 622; Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet. 607, andof the laws governing territory subsequently acquired by the United States, U.S. v. Perot, 98 U. S. 428; Fremont v. U. S., 17 How. 542, 557. But the  Supreme Court of the United States, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, does not take judicial notice of the laws of foreign countries, nor of the laws of the several states of the United States, if such laws have not been found as facts in the courts of the first instance, Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U.S.1; C. & A. R. v. W. F. Co., 119 U. S. 615, 623.
(132) Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. 137.
(133) Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393.
(134) Marbury v. Madison, I Cr. 137; Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425. (135) Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. 87; Legal Tender cases, 12 Wall. 531; U. S. v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629; U.S. v. G. E. Ry., 160 id. 668; Brown v. Walker, 161 id. 591; Nicol v. Ames, 173 id. 509; H. & T. C. R. v. Texas, 177 id. 66; Fairbank v. U. S., 181 id. 283; Booth v. Illinois, 184 id. 425; Reid v. Colorado, 187 id. 137; The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 id. 86, 101; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 id. 470.
(136) Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80; Pollock v. F. L. & T. Co., 158 id. 601; cf. Presser v. Illinois, 116 id. 252.
(137) Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82; Allen v. Louisiana, 103 id. 80; U.S. v. Harris, 106 id. 629; Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 id. 269; Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 id. 90; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 id. 678; Pollock v. F. L. & T. Co., 158 id. 601; cf. Connolly v. U. S. P. Co., 184 id. 540.
(138) Commonwealth v. Catom, 4 Call, Virginia Reports, 5, per Wythe, J.; Holmes v. Walton, cited in State v. Parkhurst, 9 N. J. L. 427, 444; Trevett v. Weeden, 2 Arnold's History of Rhode Island, 525; Bayard V. Singleton. 1 Martin, North Carolina Reports, 42; Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay, South Carolina Reports, 252; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 55.
(139) Federalist, No. 78, 9 Hamilton Is Works, Lodge's Edition, pp. 482, 484.
(140) Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. 137. See also the language of Taney,, C. J., quoted in the,appendix to 117 U. S.
(141) Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U. S. 421; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304.
(142) Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, T 2 Pet. 657; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 602.
(143) Stuart v. Laird, 1 Or. 299; Briscoe v. The Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257, 317; C. M. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727. See also Downes, v. Bidwell, 182 id. 244.
(144) Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. I

(145) Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122. Story, J., said, in Prigg v. Penna., 16 Pet. 610, "Perhaps, the safest rule of interpretation after all will be found to be to look to the nature and obj@ts of the particular powers, duties, and rights, with all the lights and aids of contemporary history; and to give to the words of each just such operation and force, consistent with their legitimate meaning, as may fairly secure and attain the ends proposed."
(146) Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Rhode Tsland v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 438.
(147) In Schick v. U. S., 195 U. S. 65, Brewer, J., said, in reference to a clause of Article III, "It must be read in the light of the common law. 'That,' said Mr. Justice Bradley, in Moore v. U. S., 91 U. S. 270, 274, referring to the common law, 'is the system from which our judicial ideas and legal definitions are derived. The language of the Constitution and of many acts of Congress could not be understood without reference to the common law.' Again, in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 478, is this declaration by Mr. Justice Matthews: 'The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history.' In U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 654, Mr. Justice Gray used this language: 'In this, as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution.'" Duncan, J., said in Lyle v. Richards, 9 S.&R. 356, "In American legislation, when a term of the common law is adopted, the common-law meaning is adopted with it." Marshall, C. J., said in U. S. v. Burr, 4 Cr. 470, in commenting on the phrase "levying war" in the constitutional definition of treason, "It is a technical term; it is used in a very old statute in that country, whose language is our language, and whose laws form the substratum of our laws. It is hardly conceivable that the term was not employed by the framers of our Constitution in the sense which has been affixed to it by those from whom we borrowed it. So far as the meaning of any terms, particularly terms of art, is completely ascertained, those by whom they are employed must be considered as employing them in that ascertained meaning, unless the contrary be proved by the context."
(148) 6 Wheat. 418. Bee Sir HenLry Maine's "Popular Government," p. 202, for references to foreign eulogies of,the Federalist.
(149) U. S. v. U. P. E., 91 U. S. 72, 79.
(150) McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 404.
(151) The view as stated in the text was forcibly put by R. C. McMurtrie, Esq., in his "Observations on Mr. George Bancroft's Plea for the Constitution, II p. 8 et seq. See also Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 601.
(152) Henderson t,. N. Y., 92 U. S. 259, 260; Boon Hing v. Crowley, 113 iA. 703, 710; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 id. 623, 661; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 id. 313, 320.
(153) Knatchbull v. Hallett. 13 Ch. Div. 712; Ginegi v. Cooper, 14 id. 601; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 333.
(154) Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 267; Thomas v. Gay, 169 id. 264, 271. (155) U. S. v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U. S. 188; Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 id. 483; Butler v. B. & S. S. Co., 130 id. 527; G., C. & S. F. Ry. v. Hefley, 158 id. 98; Ohio v. Thomas, 173 id. 276; Boske v. Comingore, 177 id. 459; Easton v. Iowa, 188 id. 220.
(156) U. S. v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cr. 103; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314; The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616; Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580; Whitney v. Robertson, 124 id. 190; Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 id. 238; The Chinese Exclusion Case, ibid. 581; Horner v. U. S., 143 id. 570; Pong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 id. 698; Wong Wing v. U. S., 163 id. 228; De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 id. 1. See also U. S. v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 id. 213.
(156) Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259; Hughes v. Edwards, 9 id. 489, 496; Carneal v. Banks, 10 id. 181; Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483. But see Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678.
(158) Dana's Wheaton's International Law, 36.
(159) Art. 11, Section 2, of the Constitution requires the advice and consent of the Senate, and the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators present, to the making of any treaty by the President.
(160) U. S. v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 749; Haver v. Yaker, 9 Wall. 32.
(161) Prevest v. Greueaux, 1 9 How. 1 ; Frederickson v. Louisiana, 23 id. 445.
(162) Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581.
(163) U. S. v. Hudson, 7 Cr. 32; U. S. t,. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415; Penna. v. W. & B. Bridge, 13 How. 519. The United States have no common law Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 478; W. U. T. Co. v. C. P. Co., 181 U. S. 92, 101.
(164) Polk's Lessee v. Wendell, 9 Cr. 87. Johnson, J., said: "The sole object for whieh jurisdiction of cases between citizens of different states is vested in the courts of the United States is to secure to all the administration of justice upon the same principles upon which it is administered between citizens of the same state. The Court, in a later and unanimous judgment, speaking by Bradley, J., said (Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 34): "The very object of giving to the national courts jurisdiction to administer the laws of the states in controversies between citizens of different states was to institute independent tribunals which it might be supposed would be unaffected by local prejudice and sectional views." This broad statement is quoted with approval in the most recent case, G.S.F.R.Co. v. Jones, 193 U. S. 532, 544.
(165) Rev. Stat., see. 721.
(166) Webster v. Cooper, 14 How. 488; Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153, 1167; Townsend v. Todd, 91 U. S. 452; H. F. I. CO. v. C., M. & St. P. Ry., 175 id. 91, 100; Dooley v. Pease, 180 id. 126.
(167) Pease v. Peck, 18 How. 595; Cross v. Allen, 141 U. S. 528; Burgess v. Beligman, 107 id. 20, 33; Carroll County v. Smith, 111 id. 556; S. T. Co. v. B. R. N. Bank, 187 id. 211.
(168) Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1.
(169) Town of Venice v. Murdock, 92 U. S. 494.
(170) Gelpeke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175; 0. L. & T. Co. V. Debolt, 16 How. 416, 432; R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; Oates v. Nat. Bank, 100 U. S. 239; R. Co. v. Nat. Bank, 102 id. 14, 30, 3 1; Myrick v. M. C. R., 107 id. 102, 109; Pana v. Bowler, ibid. 529; Bolles v. Brimfield, 120 id. 759; Clark v. Bever, 139 id. 96.
(171) This subject is ably discussed in Mr. George Wharton Pepper's brilliant
essay upon "The Borderland of Federal and State Decisions," 1887.
(172) Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433; Wheaton v. Peters, 8 id. 591; Parish v. Ellis, 16 id. @; Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout, 4 Cr. 75; Cross v. Allen, 141 U. S. 528 ; Dooley v. Pease, 180 id. l@-6; W. U. T. Co. v. C. P. Co., 181 id. 92; cf. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1; Bucher v. C. R., 125 U. S. 555; L. & G. W. S. Co. v. P. 1. Co., 1,-)9 id. 397, 443; Clark v. Bever, 139 id. 96; T. & P. Ry. v. Cox, 145 id. 593; Ellenwood V. M. C. Co., 158 id. 1(15. See also Pepper: "Bordlerland of Federal and State Decisions."
(173) Robinison v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 222; Livingston v. Story, 9 Pet. 632; Pennsylvania v. W. & B. Bridge Co., 13 How. 563; Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15; Ridings v. Johnson, 128 id. 212; Mi-issippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 id. 202; Hollins v. B. C. & I. Co., ibid. 371; cf. Scottv. Neely, 140 id. 106. 
(174) Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532; The Lottawanna, ibid. 558; Ry. Co. v. Whitton, 13 id. 27o; Ex parte Gordon, 104 U. S. 515; Ex parte Ferry Co. ibid. 519; Case v. Kelly, 133 id. 21; Turner'v. Wilkes County Commissioners 173 id. 461; H. F. 1. Co. v. C., M. & St. P. RY., 175 id. 91; cf. Priedlander T. & P. Ry., 130 id. 416; C., M. & St. P. Ry. v. Solaia, 169 id. 133.
(175) In re Garnett, :141 U. S. 1, 14; supra, see. 93.
(176) Ex parte Millisan, 4 WaR. 2.
(177) Wise v. Withers, 3 Cr. 331; Houston v. Moore15 Wheat. 1; Martin v. Mott, 12 id. 19; Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65; Ex parte Mason, 105 U. S. 696; Keyes v. U. S., 109 id. 336; Wales v. Whitney, 114 id. 564; Johnson v. Sayre, 158 id. 109.
(178) Art. I, See. 2.
(179) Art. 1, Sec. 3.
(180) Art. II, Bee. 4.
(181) Art. II, See. 2.
(182) Art. III, Sec. 2.
(183) Art. 1, Bee. 9.
(184) Ex parte Milligam, 4 Wall. 2.
(185) Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540.
(186) In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453.
(187) Schick v. U S., 195 U. S. 65; Harlan, J., dissented. On the same clause, see also N.,C.& St.L.Ry. v. Alabarm, 128 id. 96; In re Debs, 158 id. 564, 581.
(188) Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616. See also Adams v. New York, 192 id. 585, for a discussion of the Amendment.
(189) The V Amendment is a restraint upon the exercise of powers by the United States, but not by the states: Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243; Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 id. 78; Thorington v. Montgomery, 147 id. 490; C.C.D.Co. v. Ohio, 183 id. 238; Ohio v. Dollison, 194 id. 445; nor by an Indian tribe: Talton v. Mayes, 163 id. 376.
(190) Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417; Mackin v. U. S., 117 ia. 348; Parkinson v. U. S., 121 id. 281; U. S. v. De Walt, 128 id. 393.
(191) Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265.
(192) Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U. S. 109.
(193) Ex parte Bain, 1 21 U. S. 1.
(194) 18 How. 272, 276.
(195) 2 Inst. 50.
(196) In Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 385, which arose under the XIV Amendment, Brown, J., while quoting the language of Curtis, J., said that the court " bas not failed to recognize the fact that the law is, to a certain extent, a progressive science; that in some of the states methods of procedure, which at the time the Constitution was adopted were deemed essentia.1 to the protection and safety of the people, or to the liberty of the citizen, have been found to be no longer necessary.... The whole fabric of special pleading, once thought to be necessary to the elimination of the real issue between the parties, has crumbled to pieces.... Witnesses are no longer incompetent by reason of interest, even though they be parties to the litigation. Indictments have been simplified, and an indictment for the most serious of crimes is now the sidapiest of all. In several of the states grand juries, formerly the only safeguard against a malicious prosecution, have been largely abolished, and in others the rule of unanimity, so far as applied to civil cases, has given away to verdicts rendered by a three-fourths majority. This case does not call for an expression of opinion as to the wisdom of these changes, or thier validity under the XIV Amendment. . . . They are mentioned only for the purpose of calling attention to the probability that other changes of no less importance may be made in the future, and that while the cardinal principles of justice are immutable, the methods by which justice is administered are subject to constant fluctuation, and that the Constitution of the United States, which is necessarily and to a large extent inflexible and exceedingly difficult of amendment, should nolt be so construed as to deprive the states of the power to so amend their laws as to make them conform to the wishes of the citizens as they may seem best for the public welfare without bringing them into conflict with the supreme law of the laiad. Of course, it is impossible to forecast the character or extent of these changes, but in view of the fact that from the day Magna Charta was signed to the present moment, amendments to the structure of the law have been made with increasing frequency, it is impossible to suppose that they will not continue, and the law be foreed to adapt itself to new conditioias of society."
(197) Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 733.
(198) Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2.
(199) United States v. Hamilton, 3 Dall. 17; Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout, 4 Cr. 75; Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38; Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 307; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. -t63; Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651; U. S. v. Waddell, 112 id. 76; Hans Nielsela, Petitioner, 131 id. 176; In re Swan, 150 id. 637; In re McKenzie, Petitioner, 180 id. 536. See also Cosgrove v. Winney, 174 id. 64. 
(200) Spring? v. U.S., 102 U.S. 586. 
Murray's Leasee v. H. L. & 1. Co., 18 How. 272.
	The constitutional requirement is designed to prevent the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government. See See. 117, infra. In trials within a court of justice the defendant must be given a hearing before judgment can be pronounced against his property or against himself, and the rights which are secured to him by other provisions of the Constitution, such as the right to trial by j*ury, must be held sacred. See See. 117, infra; cf. Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289. ]But the requirement of due process of law does not of itself control mere forms of procedure or require the following of any one course of action in all cases; the Amendment is complied with if, in each case, a procedure be adopted wbich is appropriate to the end sought: Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181. It is not necessary that the entire work of government be transacted in a courtroom, in the presence of judge and jury. Congress may grant to executive officers the power to exclude or expel aliens: The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86; U. S. v. Williams, 194 id. 279; ef. Wong Wang v. U. S., 163 id. 228; to exclude sub-standard proposed imports: Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470; and to refuse delivery of mail to persons seeking to defraud: Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497. Taxes and assessments may be levied, and property may be taken for public use, by special commissions; and the Constitution is complied with when the taxpayer or property-owner is given an opportunity for a hearing at some stage of the proceedings: Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548; Wilson v. Lanibert, 168 id. 611; Wight v. Davidson, 181 id. 371. So also, Congress may, in the ordinary course of legislation, prohibit the making of contracts in restraint of interstate commerce without thereby depriving any citizien of his liberty without due process of law: A. P. & S. Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 211. And Congress miay impose an excise upon artificially coloured oleo margarine, although it does not tax butter which is artificially coloured, and although the effect of the tax is to suppress the manufacture of such oleo margarine. McRay v. U. S., 195 U. S. 27; Fuller, C. J., Brown and Peckham, JJ., dissenting. On congressional legislation, see also Mormon Church v. U. S.' 136 U. S. 1. 
(202) Per Holmes, J., Kepner v. U. S., 195 U. S. 100, 134. 
(203) U. S. v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579. 
(204) Hopt v. People, 104 U. S. 631, 635; Hopt v. Utah, 110 id. 574; 114 id. 488, 492; 120 id. 430, 442; U. S. v. Ball, 163 id. 662, 672.
(205) Kepner v. U.S., 195 U.S. 100; Holmes, White, and McKenna, JJ., dissenting.
(206) Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163; cf. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, 557; Carter v. McClaughry, 183 id. 365.
(207) U. S. v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662.
(208) Thompson v. U.S., 155 U.S. 271. See also Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 id. 71.
(209) 9 161 U. S. 591.
(210) P. 605. Four justices dissented.
(211) Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10.
(212) M. N. Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S. 312.
(213) Cherokee Nation v. S. H. Ry., 135 U. S. 641.
(214) Bauman v. Ross, 167 IT. S. 548.
(215) Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141; Gibson v. U.S., 166 id. 269; Bedford v. U. S., 192 id. 217.
(216) U. S. v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445; cf. Bedford 'V. U. S., 192 id. 217.
(217) Emblen v. L. L. Co., 1:84 U. S. 660.
(218) This Amendment is a restraint upon the judicial action of the United States, and not of the states: Twitchell V. The Commonwealth, 7 Wall. 321.
(219) U. S. v. Zueker, 161 U. S. 4:75; Ex parte Terry, 128 id. 289; Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 id. 698; Wong Wing v. U. S., 163 id. 228; U. S. v. Williams, 194 id. 279.
(220) Schick v. U. S., 195 U. S. 65. Harlan, J., dissented.
(221) Cook v. U.S., 138 U. S. 157. See also Art. III, See. 2; supra, see. 111.
(222) Rosen v. U. S., 161 U. S. 29.
(223) Revnolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 145.
(224) Mattox v. U. S., 156 U. S. 237.
(225) Motes v. U. S., 178 U. S. 458.
(226) Kirby v. U. S., 174 U. S. 47.
(227) This Amendment is a restraint upon the exercise of powers by the United States, but not by the states: Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 5252; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90; Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 id. 294. 
(228) Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126; Paxsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 4 46. But where a plaintiff has an appropriate remedy at law he cannot seek relief in a court of equity: VThitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146; Cates v. Allen, 149 id. 451.
(229) MeElrath v. U. S., 102 U. S. 426.
(230) Guthrie Nat. Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U. S. 528.
(231) Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235.
(232) Coughran v. Bigelow, 164 U. S. 301.
(233) A. P. Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S- 464; SpringviUe v. Thomas, Salt Lake City v. Tucker, ibid. 707.
(234) 3 Pet. 447.
(235) C. T. Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1.
(236) A. V. L. & C. Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 69.
(237) The Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall. 274; C., B. & Q. R. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226.
(238) Pervear v. The Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475; O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323.
(239) Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130.
(240) In re Kenunler, 136 U. S. 436.
(241) Pervear v. The Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475.
(242) Howard v. Fleming, 191 U. S. 126.
(243) 2 Dall. 419.
(244) 3 Dall. 378.
(245) 9.Wheat. 738, 857.
(246) P. 858.
(247) P. 868.
(248) 16 Wall. 203.
(249) 108 U. S. 436, 447.
(250) Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 DaH. 4tO2; The Governor of Georgia V. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110; Kentucky v. Dennitson, 24 How. 66.
(251) Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52; Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, I Pet. 110; Louisiana v. Junel, 107 U. S. 711; North Carolina v. Temple, 134 id. 22; Louisiana v. Steele, ibid. 230. See also Chandler t,. Dix, 194 id. 590.
(252) Cunningham v. M. & B. R., 109 TJ. S. 446.
(253) Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711.
(254) New Hampshire v. Louisiana, New York v. Louisiana, 108 U. S. 76; South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 id. 286.
(255) Ex parte Madrazzo, 7 Pet. 627; The Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, I Pet. 110.
(256) 123 U. S. 443.
(257) N. C. v. Temple, 134 U. S. 22 ; Louisiana v. Steele,.ibid. 230. And, although it is not forbidden by tlne Amendment, a suit against a state cannot be brought by one of its own citizens, nor by a corporation created by the federal government, even when a federal question is involved: Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1; SmLth v. Reeves, 178 id. 436.
(258) Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 tv. S. 529.
(259) Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 26-4.
(260) Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 Dall. 411.
(261) L., C. & C. R. v. Letson, 2 How.- 497, 550; Bank of U. S. v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 907; Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 2 Pet. 318, 323; Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257, 324; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304, 309.
(262) 9 Wheat. 907.
(263) U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cr. 1 15.
(264) Per Bradley, J., in Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531, 54L.
(265) Per Bradley, J., in Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 541 Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203; MeGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 id. 1; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 id. 1; Smyth v. Ames, 169 id. 466; Prout v. Starr, 188 id. 537; ef. Fitts V. McGhee, 172 id. 516; 1. C. R. v. Adams, 180 id. 28. In Hans v. Louisiana, supra, Bradley, J., said, p. 20: " Although the obligations of a state reat for their performance upon its honou:r and good faith, and cannot be raade the subjects of judicial cognizance unless the state consents to be sued, or comes itself into court; yet where property or rights are enjoyed under a grant or contract made by a state, they cannot wantonly be invaded. Whilst the state cannot be compelled by suit to perform its contracts, any attempt on its part to violate property or rights acquired under its contracts, may be judicially resisted; and any law impairing the obligation of contracts under which such property or rights are held is void and powerless to affect their enjoyment."
(266) Osborn v. The Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 846.
(267) Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531.
(268) The Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 269, 284. Some of the cases were actions of trespass or detinue; others of them were bills in equity for an injunction. Bradley, J., with whom concurred Waite, C. J., and Miller and Gray, JJ., dissented. Upon a like principle, it has been held that officers of the United States being wrongfully in possession of land, the fact that they held that possession not for themselves but for the government of the United States will not forbid courts to take jurisdiction of the rightful owner's action to recover his land, nor prevent judgment in his favour, if his title be made out: Meigs v. McClung's Lessee, 9 Cr. 11; Wilcox 1,,. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498; Grisar v. McDowell, 6 Wall. 363; Brown v. Huger, 21 How. 305; United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196. In Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, and in Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204, the same rule was applied in actions of trespass against military olricers of the United States for the wrongful seizure of certain personal property of the plaintiffs, in obedience to unlawful orders from a military superior.
(269) Clark u. Barnard, 108 T-T. S. 436.
(270) U. S. v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621.
(271) Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1; Bank of U. S. V. Halstead, ibid. 51; Lincoln v. Power, 151 U. S. 436.
(272) Borer v. Chapman, 119 tT. S. 587; Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 id. 202; Hollins v. B. C. & 1. Co., ibid. 371.
(273) 13 U. S. v. Reid, 12 How. 361.
(274) Act of 24th September, 1789, c. 20, see. 34, 1 Stat. 92; Rev. Stat. sec. 721. See Field's Federal (7-ourts, p. 430. The general principle that the lex fori goverds the limitation of actions applies to actions brought originally in the courts of the United States, and also to actions removed thereto froni the courts of the states: Arnson v. Murphy, 109 U. S. 238; Mitchell v. Clark, 110 id. 633.
(275) Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304.
(276) U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cr. 115.
(277) 77 Hobart v. Drogan, 10 Pet. 10.8; Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236.
(278) Ry. Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270.
(279) Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532; The Lottawanna, ibid. 558; U. S. v. P.-D. M. Co., 176 U. S. 317; cf. The Roanoke, 189 id. 185. Where the jurisdiction of a court of the United States has attached. a party to the suit who refuses or neglects to obey its process will be liabl@ in damages to any party injured by such neglect or refusal: Amy v, 9upervisors, 11 Wall. 136; and a trustee of property to which the jurisdiction of a court of the United States has attached will be held personally responsible if, without adequate resis-tance, he surrenders such property to the process of a court of a state: Chittenden v. Brewster, 2 Wall. 191. See also In re Watts and Sachs, l9O U. S. 1.
(280) Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Cr. 179; Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679; Haines v. Carpenter, 91 U. S. 254; Dial v. Reynolds, 96 id. 340; Leroux v. Hudson, 109 id. 468; Byers v. MeAuley, 149 id. 608; Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 id. 148; ef. In re Neagle, 135 id. 1; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 id. 107. See also In re Watts and Sachs, 190 id. 1.
(281) French v. Hay, 22 WalL. 250; Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 494.
(282) Riggs v. Jobuson County, 6 Wall. 166; Amv v. Supervisors, 11 id. 136; Supervisors v. U. S., 154 U. S. 576.
(283) In re Blake, 175 U.S. 114. See also The Mayor v. Lord, 9 Wall. 409; The Supervisors v. Durant, ibid. 415; Bath County v. Amy, 13 id. 244.
(284) Hagan v. Lucas, 10 l@et. 400.
(285) Peck v. Janness, 7 Ifow. 612.
(286) Williams v. Benedict, 8 How. 107.
(287) Peale v. Phipps, 14 How. 368. See @ Vaughan v. Northup, 15 Pet. 1; Wiswall v. Sampson, 14 Ilow. 52; cf. Erwin v. Lowry, 7 How. 172.
(288) 9 How. 522, 527.
(289) Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1.
(290) Claflin V. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130; Teal v. Feltou, 12 How. 284, referred to by Bradley, J., 93 U. S. 142, was an action of trover for a newspaper which a @tmaster wrongfully refused to deliver. See also Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U. S. 521; Ex parte Christy, 3 How. 292, 318, 319; Nugent v. Boyd, ibid. 426; Williams v. Heard, 140 U. S. 529.
(291) There is a concurrent jurisdiction over crimes, when the Criminal act is an offense against the laws of both the United States and of the states; thus, a state may punish the offense of uttering or passing false coin as a fraud practiced on its citizens: Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 432, and the United States may punish the same act as a crime against it: United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560. In the same way, a state might have, before the adoption of the XIII Amendment, punished the harbouring of a fugitive slave: Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, while the same act could have been punished in the courts of the United States as an offense against the fugitive slave legislation of Cong-ress. So also a state may punish the forging of a promissory note, although the forger commits the further crime of making false entries concerning such notes on the books of a national bank: Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U. S. 131. And a state may punish the murder of a locomotive engineer, although his death be caused by the derailment of a train carrying the mails of the United States:Crossley v. California, 168 U. S. 640. But it may not punish an officer of a national bank who, knowing that the bank is insolvent, nevertheless receives a deposit: Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S. 220.
(292) The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411; Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. S. 256.
(293) The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 55Ei.
(294) The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624.
(295) Leon v. Galceran, I 1 Wall. 185.
(296) Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532.
(297) Davis v. Packard, 7 Pet. 276.
(298) Rev. Stat., sec. 711. Per Bradley, J., in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 140.
(299) See the judgment of Gray, J., in Nash v. Lull, 102 Mass. 60; cf. Marsh v. N., S. & Co., 140 U. S. 344; Holt v. 1. Mfg. Co., 176 id. 68.
(300) Rev. Stat. 5@42; Pacific Nat. Bank v. Mixter, 124 U. S. 721.
(301) McClung v. Sillhban, 6 Wheat. 598.
(302) In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1; Etheridge v. Sperry, 139 id. 266; Ohio v. Thomas, 173 id. 276; Booke v. Comingore, 177 id. 459. See also Gableman v. P., D. & E. Ry., 179 id. 335.
(303) Harris v. Dennie, 3 Pet. 292.
(304) Slocum v. Mayberry, 2 Wheat. 1.
(305) Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246.
(306) In re Loney. 134 U. S. 372.
(307) McKim v. Voorhies, 7 Cr. 279.
(308) Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U. S. 275; cf. Earle v. Conway, 178 id. 456.
(309) Duncan v. Darst, I How. 301.
(310) Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450; Covell v. Heyman, Ill U. S. 176.
(311) Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506.
(312) Tarble Is Case, 13 Wall- 397. A state e-ourt may, nevertheless, by process of habeas corpus, inquire into the legality of the detention of a person, who, having been arrested as a fugitive from the justice of another state, is detained in custody by an agent of that other state under a wa"ant issued b3, the governor of the state within whose territory the alleged fugitive has come: Robb v. Connolly, ill U. S. 624.
(313) Wallace v. McConnell, 13 Pet. 136.
(314) Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Pet. 67; Hvde v. Stone, 20 How. 170; Green
 v. Creighton, 23 id. 90.
(315) Slocum v. Mayberry, 2 Wheat. 1; Srraith v. McIver, 9 id. 532; Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400; Wallace v. McConnaell, 13 id. 136; Erwin v. Lowry, 7 How. 172; Peck v. Janness, ibid. 612:; Williams v. Benedict, 8 id. 107; Wiswall v. Sampson, 14 id. 52; Peale v. Phipps, ibid. 368; Pulliam v. Osborne, 17 id. 471; Taylor v. Carryl, 2co id. 583; Freeman v. Howe, 24 id. 450; Covell v. Heyman, 111 U. S. 176;; Heidritter v. Elizabeth Oil-cloth Co., 112 id. 294; Cross v. North Carolina, 132 id. 131; R.G.R. v. Gomila, ibid. 478; L.C. Co. v. MeCreety, 141 id. 475; In re Tyler, 149 id. 164; Byers v. MeAuley, ibid. 608; Cemtral Nat. Baiak v. Stevens, 169 id. 432; Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 id. 148; White v. Schloerb, 178 id. 542; cf. Etheridge v. Sperry, 139 id. 266; Bock v. Perkins, ibid. 628; Moran v. Sturges, 154 id. 256; Earle v. Pennsylvania, 178 id. 449; Earle v. Conway, ibid. 456. In Covell v. Heyman, Lll U. S. 182, Matthews, J., said: "The forbearance which courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, administered under a single system, exercise toward each other, whereby conflicts are avoided, by avoiding interference with the process of each other, is a principle of comity, with, perhaps, no higher sanction than the utility which comes from coneord; but between statoe courts and those of the United States it is somethilag more. It is a pwinciple of right and of law, and, therefore, of necessity. ][t leaves nothimg to discretion or mere convenience. These courts do not belong to the same system, so far as their jurisdiction is concurrent; and although they coexist in the same space, they are independent, and have no common superior. They exercise jurisdiction, it is true, within the same territory, but not in the same plane; and when one takes into its jurisdiction a sgpecific thing, that res is as much withdrawn from the judicial power of the other as if it had been carried physically into a different territorial sovereignty. To attempt to seize it by a foreign process is futile and void. The regulation of process, and the decision of questions relating to it, are part of the jurisdiction of the court from which it issues."
(316) Slocum v. Mayberry, 2 Wheat. 1; Day v. Gallup, 2 Wall. 97; Buck v. Colbath, 3 id. 334.
(317) Lammon v. Feusier, Ill U- S. 17.
(318) Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276.
(319) Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692; Leeper v. Texas, 139 id. 462; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 id. 657; 1. C. Ry. v. Iowa, 160 id. 389; Tonawanda U. Lvon, 181 id. 389; Detroit v. Parker, ibid. 399.
(320) L. & N. R. v. Schmidt, 17T U. S. 230; see also In re Kemmler, 136 id. 436; cf. Simon v. Craft, 182 id. 427.
(321) Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 9 How. 336; Harris v. Hardeman, 14 id. 334; Nations v. Johnson, 24 id. 195 ; York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15; Kauffman v. Wooters, 138 id. 285; Dewey 'V. Des Moines, 173 id. 193; Roller v. Holly, 176 id. 398; cf. Gallup v. Schmidt, 183 id. 300.
(322) Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316; see also Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 id. 181; cf. Ro Bards v. Lamb=m, 127 id. 58. But a court may not, by any proceedings, grant administrati@n of the estate of a living person: Scott v. MeNeal, 154 U. S. 34.
(323) Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. . 377; Holden v. Hgrdy, 169 id. 366; Backus v. P. S. U. D. Co., ibid. 557; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 id. 172; L.&N.R. v. Schmidt, 177 id. 23O; Freeland v. Williams, 131 id. 405; L. & N. R. v. Woodson, 134 id. M614; Natal v. Louisiana, 139 id. 621; Andrews v. Swartz, 156 id. 272; Lowe v. Kansas, 163 id. 81; Jones v. Brim, 165 id. 180; Nobles v. Ge- orgia, 168 id. 398. See also Minder v. Georgia, 183 id. 559.
(324) Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90; Church v. Kelsey, 121 id. 282; cf. I. C. Ry. v. Iowa, 160 id. 389.
(325) Hurtado 1,,. California, 110 U. @. 517; MeNulty v. California, 149 id. 645; Hodgson v. Vermont, 168 id- 262; Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 id. 83; Maxwell v. Dow, ibid. 581; Davis v. Burke, 179 id. 399.
(326) Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S-. 172.
(327) Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581.
(328) Hal@ger v. Davis, 146 U. S. 3=14.
(329) Enenbecker v. Plymouth County-, 134 U. S. 31; cf. In re Debs, 158 id. 564; Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 id. lo=l.
(330) Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133.
(231) Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 id. 377; Moore v. Missouri, 159 id. 673.
(232) Ohio v. Dollison, 194 U. S. 445.
(233) Spies v. Dlinois, 123 U. S. 131.
(234) West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258.
(235) Commissioners of Tippecanoe v. Lucas, 93 U. S. 108; Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 id. 285.
(336) Bradley v. Lighteap, 195 U. S. 1.
(337) Arrowsniith v. Harmoning, 118 U. S. 194.
(338) Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U. S. 131.
(339) 1. C. Ry. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389.
(340) Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316; B. T. Co. v. B. B. R., 151 id. 137. See also Marrow v. Brinkley, 129 id. 178; In re Converse, 137 iti. 624; C. L. Co. v. Laidley, 159 id. 103; Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 id. 314; Arbuekle v. Blackburn, 191 id. 405.
(341) In re Manning, 139 U. S. 504.
(342) Palmer 7. @MeMahon, :L33 U. S. 660.
(343) MeMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 id. @)7; Kelly v. Pittsbtirah, 104 id. 78; Hagar v. Reclamation District, Irl i(l. 701; Head v. A. '.qfg. Co., 113 id. 9; Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 id. 60(5; Kentucky R. Tax Casts, 115 id. 321; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 id. 345; Walston v. -N@evin, 128 id. 578; Lent v. Tillson, 140 id. 316; Paulsen v. Portland, 149 id. 30; P., (., ('. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 id. 421; W. & St. P. L. Co. v. Minnesota, 159 id. 526; Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 id. 112; M. & M. B;trtk v. Pennsylvania, 167 id. 461; King v. Mullins, 171 id. 404; B. B. & B- (I. R. v. New Whatcom, 172 id. 314; Weyerhaueser v. Minnesota, 175 id. 550; French v. B. A. P. Co., 181 id. 324; Detroit ii. Parker, ibid. 3919; Gallup v. Schmidt, 183 id. 300; King v. Portland, 184 iti. 61; Voi,t v. Detroit, ibid. 115; Goodrich v. Detroit, ibid. 432; Turpin v. Lenion, 187 id. 51; Glidden v. Harrington, 189 id. 255; Hibben v. Smith, 191 id. 310; Leigh v. Green, 193 id. 79; cf. Carson v. Broekton Sewerage Com., 182 id. 398; League v. Texas, 184 id. 156. And a state may provide that a proposed improvement shall not be made if a protest is filed by a majority of resident owners of property liable to assessment therefor, although no such privilege of protest is afforded non-resident owners, where there is no discrimination in assessing for the improvement:Field v. B. A. P. Co., 194 U. S. 618.
(344) Pearson v. Yewdall, !95 U. S. 294; Huling v. K. V. Ry. & Imp. Co., 130 id. 559; K. W. P. Co. v. G. B. & M. C. Co., 142 id. 254; L. I. W. S. Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 id. 685; Backus v. F. S. IT. D. Co., 169 id. 557; Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 id. 314.
(345) It may not tax a franchise granted by another state: L. & J. F. Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385. The bare observance of legal forms is insufficient where the proceedings are manifestly fraudulent: C., B. & Q. R. v. Chicago,166 U.S. 226; cf. Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 id. 112, 168. And compensation must be made or secured when private property is taken for public use: T. 1. W. S. Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 id. 685; Norwood
v. Baker, 172 id. 269; cf. K.W.P. Co. v. G.B.&M.C. Co., 142 id. 254; Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 id. 452; H. Bridge Co. v. Henderson (ity, 173 id. 592; A. Ry. v. New York, 176 id. 335; 0. 0. Co. v. Indiana, 177 id. 190; Williams v. Parker, 18S id. 491. The XIV Amendment, unlike the V Amendment. does not contain an express provision that just compensation shall be rendered.
(346) Mugler v. Kansas, 1'.)3 U. S. 623; Kidd v. Rearson, 128 id. 1.
(347) Cronin v. Adams, 192 T@. S. 108.
(348) Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366. And it may limit the hours of labour on work thereafter contracted for by its municipalities: Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207.
(349) O. O. Co. v. Indiana, 1 i-7 U. S. 190.
(350) Dow v. Beidelmain, 125 V. S. 680; N., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Alabama, 128 id. 96; C. & G. T. @v. v. Wellman, 143 id. 339; St. L. & S. P. Ry. v. Gill, 156 id. 649; C., M. & St. P. Ry. v. Tompkins, 176 id. 167; ef. C., M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 id. 418; M. E. Ry. v. Minnesota, ibid. 467; Smyth v. Ames, 169 id. 466; L. S. & M. S. Ry. v. Smith, 173 id. 684.
(351) Munn v. Illinois' 94 U. S. 113; Budd v. New York, 143 id. 517; Brass v. North Dakota, 153 id. 391.
(352) S.D.L.&T. Co. v. National City, 174 U.S. 739; K.W. Co. v. Knoxville, 189 id. 434: S.D.L,&T. Co. v. Jasper, ibid. 439; Stanislaus County v. S. J. & K. R. C. & I. Co., 192 id. 201. See also Cotting v. K. C. S. Y. Co., 183 id. 79.
(353) M.P.Ry. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205; M.&St.L. Ry. v. Herrick, ibid. 210; St. L. & S. P. Rv. v. Mathews, 165 id. 1; cf. M. & St. L. Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 id. 26; C., C. & A. R. v. Gibbes, 142 id. 386; New York v. Squire, 145 id. 175; M. P. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 id. 403; G., C. & S. P. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 id. 150. See also C., R. I. & P. Ry. v. Zerneeke, 183 id. 582.
(353) Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114; Reetz v. Michigan, 188 id. 505.
(354) MorIey v. L. S. & M. S. Ry., 146 U. S. 162.
(356) O. I. Co. v. Da.ags, 172 U. S. 557.
(357) K. 1. Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13.
(358) C. C. D. Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238.
(359) L. & N. R. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503.
(360) M. & St. L. R. v. Minnesota, 193 U. S. 53.
(361) Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425.
(362) Fischer v. St. Louis, 194 U. S. 361.
(363) Provident Inst. for Savings v. Jersey City, 113 U. S. 506.
(364) Gross v. U. S. Mtge. Co., 108 U. S. 477.
(365) Barrett v. H4mes, -102 U. S. 651.
(366) Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U. S. 245; Turner v. New York, 168 id. 90; S. L. & T. Co. v. Comptroller of New York, 177 id. 318.
(367) Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620.
(368) Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278.
(369) St. L. C. C. Co. v. Illinois, 185 U. S. 203.
(370) Fielden v. Illinois, 143 U. S. 452.
(371) Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U. S. 483. On the power of executive officers to decide upon a term of imprisonment, see Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71.
(372) Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U. S. 586.
(373) Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U. S. 32.
(374) Taylor and Marshall v. Beckham, 178 U. S. 548. ]For decisions as to liberty, "see Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 id. 578; Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 id. 43; and also G. S. F. H. Co. v. Jones, 193 id. 532; as to "property," see Pennie v. Reis, 132 id. 464; Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 id. 452; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 id. 537; M. P. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 id. 403; Sentell v. N. 0. & C. R., 166 id. 698; W. I;L v. Deffimee, 167 id. 88. On due process of law" under the V Amendment, see Sec. 112, supra. The XIV Amendment is directed against the states and, therefore, does not protect individuals against actions by officials in violation of state laws: Barney v. City of New York, 193 U. S. 430.
(375) "The judgments of a foreign state are prima facie evidence only, and but for these constitutional anci legislative provisions judgments of a state of the Union, when sued upon in another state, would have no greater effect. . . . Judgments rendered in . . . foreign country, by the laws of which our own judgments are reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled to full credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but are prima facie evidence only of tlhe justice of the plaintiff's claim:" Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 182, 227. But where, by international comity, the courts of another country give full effect to the judgment of an American court, a judgment rendered in that country can be impeached only on the ground of fraud: Ritchie v. Mwuen, 159 U. S. 235.
(376) Act of 26th May, 17901, 1 Stat. 122; Rev. Stat., see. 905.
(377) U. S. v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. 392.
(378) C.&A.R. v. W.F.Co., 119 U.S. 615, 622; cf. Friedlander v. T.&P.Ry., 130 id. 416.
(379) Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152; Smith v. Condry, 1 How. 28; Bueher v. C. R., 125 U. S. 555; Cross v. Allen, 141 id. 528; B. T. Co. v. B. B. R., 151 id. 137; Laing v. Rigney, 160 id. 531; Turner v. Wilkes County Comrs., 173 id. 461; Mitchell v. First Nat. Bank, 180 id. 471; A. A. P. Co. v. D. P. Co., 191 id. 373.
(380)  Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345; Fallbrook Irr. Dist. V. Bradley, 164 id. 112; Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 id. 506; In re Duncan, 139 id. 449; Leeper v. Texas, ibid. 462; Andrews V. Swartz, 156 id. 272; Miller ,v. C. R., 168 i& 131; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 id. 172; Erb V. Morasch, 177 id. 584; Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 id. 506.
(381) Glenn v. Garth, 147 U. S. 360; Lloyd v. Matthews, 155 id. 222; Banholzer v. N. Y. L. 1. Co., 178 id. 402; Johnson v. N. Y. L. I. Co., 187 id. 491; E. B. & L. Assn. v. Williamson, 189 id. 122; Finney v. Guy, ibid. 335. Bee also E. B. & L. Amn. v. Ebaugh, 185 id. 114.
(382) C. P. Co. v. @kwitif, 188 U. S. 567.
(383) S. v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. 392.
(384) Caperton v. Ballard, 14 Wall. 238; Ferguson v. Harwood, 7 Cr. 408 Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet. 607, 627.
(385) MeElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312; Bank of Alabama v. Dalton, 9 How. 522; Bacon v. Howard, 20 id. 22.
(386) Armstrong v. Carson, 2 Dall. 302; Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cr. 481; Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234.
(387) Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290; Maxwell v. Stewart, 22 id. 77. See, however, dicta in MeNitt v. Turner, 16 Wall. 352, 366; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 112; Simmons v. Saul, 138 id. 439, 454. In Cole v. Cunningham, it was held that a court may enjoin a citizen of its own state from prosecuting fraudulent proceedings commenced by him in the courts of another state. In Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, a state court properly refused credit to a divorce obtained by fraud in another state.
(388) Landes v. Brant, 10 How. 348, 371; cf. Knowles v. G. & C. Co., 19 Wall. 58; Cooper v. Newell, 173 U. S. 555. A judgment conclusive in the state in which R has been rendered is conclusive in the courts of the United States: Caldwell v. Carrington, 9 Pet. 86; Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 302; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 id. 108; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714; C. & A. R. v. W. F. Co., 108 id. 18; Erb v. Morasch, 177 id. 584.
(389) Board of Pub. Works v. Columbia College, 17 Wall. 521.
(390) D'Arey v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165.
(391) Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U. S. 1; -Renaud v. Abbott, ibid. 277.
(392) Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 Dall. 6;Rose L. Himely, 4 Cr. 241, 269; Elliott v. Peiraol, 1 Pet. 328, 340; Voorhees v. Bank of the U. S., 10 id. 449, 475; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 id. 498, 511; Shriver's Lessee v. Lynn, 2 How. 43, 59; Lessee of Hickey v. Stewart, 3 id. 750, 762; Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 495, 540; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457; Maxwell v. Stewart, 22 id. 77; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107; Simmons v. Saul, 138 id. 439; Thormann v. @me, 176 id. 350; Clarke v. Clarke, 178 id. 186; Andrews v. Andrews, 188 id. 14; G. S. & L. S. v. Dormitzer, 192 id. 125.
(393) Mayhew v. Thatcher, 6 Wheat. 129; D 'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165; v. Hardeman, 14 id. 334; L.I. Co. v. French, 18 id. 404; Bischoff v. Wethered, 9 Wall. 812; Hoard of Public Works v. Columbia College, 17 id. 521; Pennoyer v. Neff, !95 U.S. 714; St. Clair v. Cox, 106 id. 350; G.&B.S.M. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 id. 287; Cooper v. Newell, 173 id. 555. See also Wedding v. Meyler, 192 id. 573.
(394) Boswell v. Otis, 9 How. 3&6; Ennis v. Smith, 14 id. 400, 430; Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308; Jcihnson v. Powers, 139 U. S. 156; Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 iti. 254; Carpenter v. Strange, 141 id. 87; Cooper v. Newell, 173 id. 555; Howard v. De Cordova, 177 id. 609; Clarke 'V. Clarke, 178 id. 186.
(395) Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714; Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308; Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437; Phelps v. Holker, I Dall. 261; Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U. S. 185.
(396) Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 195.
(397) Maxwell v. Stewart, 22 Wall. 77.
(398) Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254.
(399) Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155.
(400) Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14; Brewer, Shiras, and Peckham, JJ., dissenting. See also G. S. & L. S. v. Dormitzer, 192 id. 125; Bell v. Bell, 181 id. 175; Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, ibid. 179.
(401) L. I. Co. v. Prench, 18 How- 404.
(402) St. Clair v. Cox, 106 tT. S. 350.
(403) Blount v. Walker, 134 U. S. 607.
(404) 1 Thompson v. Whitman, IS Wall. 457.
(405) Knowles v. G. & C. Co-, 19 Wau. 58.
(406) Cooper v. Newell, 173 U. S. 555.
(407) Stacy v. Thrasher, 6 How. 44.
(408) Johnson v. Powers, 139 U. S. 156.
(409) Urtetiqui v. D'Arbel, 9 Pet. 092.
(410) C., R.I. & P. Ry. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710.
(411) Bank of the State of Alabama v. Dalton, 9 How. 522.
(412) Wisconsin v. P. I. Co., 127 U. S. 265.
(413) Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657; Whitman v. Oxford Nat. Bank, 76 id. 559; Hancock Nat. Bank v. Parnum, ibid. 640.
(414)  A. A. P. Co. v. D. P. Co., 191 U. S. 373.
(415) 14 Stat. 385. Rev. Stat., Sec. 709.
(416) Turnbull v. Payson, 95 U. S. 418.
(417) Embry v. Palmer, 107 U. S. 3; Werlein v. New Orleans, 177 id. 390. See also N. F. & P. W. v. 0. W. S. Co., 183 id. 216; Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 id. 499.
(417) Dupasseur v. Roebereau, 21 Wall. 130.

