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Item 22 (Tue, Sep 27, 1988 (18:34)) Joe Durnavich (jjd)
 The Fundamentals of Reality 

 Ben, I'm still having trouble getting a complete picture of
 your view of objective reality.  I find your viewpoint interesting
 because of your confidence when answering certain questions.
 In the tree item, it seemed most people felt the answer was
 unknowable, irrelevant, or uncertain.  But you answered
 with a definite, "YES, it does make a sound!"  I'm still not
 sure why you are so sure, but it seems to involve objective
 reality.  So I wouldn't cause the causality item to drift, I
 started a new item.
 
 To get started, I'm just going to blurt out some statements
 and let you comment on them:
 
        There is an objective reality.
        It is external to the mind.
        The senses are your only way of getting knowledge about reality.

[PAUSE]       123 responses total.


-------------------------
22.1 Tue Sep 27 22:31:27 1988   Ben Kovitz (kiwi) 
 I know the title of this item, jjd, means that you want to talk about
 metaphysics (the fundamentals of reality), but in your message you said
 you wanted to know why I am "so sure".  So, I'm goint to talk about
 epistemology (how we get knowledge).  And, I'm going to write my reply
 off-line.  Be back in a while...

-------------------------
22.2 Tue Sep 27 22:41:40 1988   Joe Durnavich (jjd) 
 You're right.  I already put the title in before I realized it wasn't
 really appropriate.  But at least I spelled everything right this time.

-------------------------
22.3 Wed Sep 28 00:04:41 1988   Ben Kovitz (kiwi) 
 Well, I think the title was right, though.  My previous response didn't
 say exactly what I wanted to say.  Aarghs, I'll just finish my big
 response...

-------------------------
22.4 Mon Oct  3 08:08:44 1988   H¡en Kovitz (kiwi) 
[PAUSE]        A friend of mine used to teach classes in word processors, spreadsheets,
 and other "productivity" software.  Often he would be hired to teach a
 class in a program he had never seen or used before.  He would spend one
 night or so reading the manual and playing with the program, and then he
 would be all ready to teach--and the companies hiring him had no complaint
 with this.  They were fully aware that he had never touched the software
 before, and yet were quite willing to pay him $500 an afternoon to teach
 their employees how to use it.
 
 Now, doesn't this strike you as a bit bizarre?  This guy spends one night
 learning a program and suddenly is able to teach it to others. Why not
 just let those other people spend a night learning on their own, forget
 the whole teaching setup, and save $500?  What do they need him for?
 
 You might be tempted to answer that the reason he is able to learn the
 programs so much faster than his students is because he is familiar with
 certain general concepts which are common to all software of that type.
 That is true, but there is an even more fundamental aspect to this.
 
 He is only able to learn those programs much faster than his students
 because he already knows the important concepts which are necessary for
 gaining a detailed knowledge of that kind of software. His students, in
 order to reach that same level of knowledge of just one word processor,
 must *first* learn those fundamental concepts. For example, in the case of
[PAUSE]        a word processor, some basic concepts which newcomers to computers always
 have a hard time grasping are: the difference between the copy of the
 document that is being edited and the copy that is stored on disk; the
 difference between the text of a document and its format (i.e., information
 about paragraphing, pagination, indents, margins, etc.); the difference
 between a keystroke which enters a character into a document and a
 keystroke which gives a command to the word processor. A great deal of a
 naive user's early time at a word processor is spent grasping these basic
 concepts, because until he knows them there is no way he can get a detailed
 understanding of how to use the program.
 
 That last point is the one I'm trying to stress.  Until a user knows about
 the fact that the word processor allows him to edit an edit buffer, which
 is in volatile RAM, and not a disk file, which is stored in a medium which
 retains its data even after the computer is shut off, he's not going to be
 able to understand the "SAVE" command, no matter how it's implemented on
 the particular word processor he's using.  I've done my share of trai7{ing
 users on word processors (never made $500 an afternoon, though), and I've
 lost track of the number of times I've had users shut off the computer
 before they've saved their document, only to call me up the next day
 wondering what happened.
 
 Another concept which one must grasp before one can understand the SAVE
 command, besides the concepts of volatile and permanent storage, is the
[PAUSE]        concept of a document. If you don't know what a document is, you can't
 understand the SAVE command, because what is it saving?  This never
 presents a problem for people learning to use a word processor, though,
 because everyone who has a need of using a word processor already knows
 about books, letters, articles, and has a very solid grasp of the concept
 "document".  I am only bringing this up to (a) further amplify my point
 some knowledge cannot be acquired until one has first acquired more basic
 knowledge, and (b) to begin linking back to the original question.
 
 In general, one cannot grasp any concept of action, until one has grasped
 the concept of that which acts.  In the word processor example, SAVEing is
 an action, impossible to grasp until one understands the concept of a
 document, or that which is SAVEd.  And here are three fundamental concepts:
 entity, nature, and action--and here is a fundamental principle of reality:
 an entity's actions are caused by its nature.  When you PRINT (another
 action) document A, what shows up on the printer is different than when you
 print document B, because the two documents are different.  If you put a
 different print-wheel in the printer, the form of the letters on the page
 is different, beCAUSE the nature of the printwheel (the shape of the
 letters) is different.
 
 But suppose someone were to say that there are no entities, only actions;
 that there are no documents, there are only the actions of saving,
 printing, etc. That is obvious nonsense: if there are no documents, then
[PAUSE]        documents cannot be saved, printed, or anything else.  If the concept of
 "entity" is bogus, then so is the concept of "action".  To affirm the
 latter while denying the former is to deny one's own premises.
 
 Now, is there anything which must be grasped before one can grasp the
 concept "knowledge"?  Yes: "that which is known"--i.e., reality.  Speaking
 on the most fundamental level possible, before one can identify that one is
 conscious, one must have been conscious of something.  This basic fact,
 existence, must be identified before ANYTHING else, and it is implicit and
 self-evident in every perception.  If the concept of existence is bogus,
 then so is any concept pertaining to consciousness--or anything else.
 Unless and until you have identified that what you perceive exists, and
 that you do perceive it, you aren't going to get anywhere, you aren't going
 to learn anything, and you aren't even going to be able to ask stupid
 questions like "If a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear
 it, does it make a sound?"  What are trees?  What are forests?  What is
 hearing?  How did you find out about those?  You could not have formed any
 of these concepts without using the fundamental concepts of existence and
 consciousness. For example, you could not have formed the concept
 "hearing" until you had first identified WHAT you are hearing.  Some time
 you might want to observe children being taught about the five senses, and
 observe that the only way to do it is to have them identify some quality
 they can directly perceive, and then have them close their eyes, cover
 their ears, etc., until they finally grasp that not only are there sounds,
[PAUSE]        but that they hear them.  And then think to yourself how horrible it would
 be to try telling them that all they can really know is their sensations,
 that consciousness creates reality, how you can't *know* that the tree
 makes a sound, and how they can't *know* that reality will behave
 consistently, since that is only an "assumption", etc., etc., etc.  All
 those phony pseudo-intellectual games would do is cripple the child's mind
 before it had a chance to develop, no less than if you had smashed his
 skull with a hammer.
 
 Now, perhaps, you see not only why I am so sure about the existence of an
 objective reality, but why I feel so strongly about attempts to deny it.

-------------------------
22.5 Mon Oct  3 19:03:47 1988   Joe Durnavich (jjd) 
 Your response came at a good time since I am in the middle of
 reading some of Descarte's Meditations on the First Philosophy.
 He comes to some of the same conclusions you do:  he knows he has a mind
 mind and at least some of the ideas in it had to come
 from an external, formal reality (through cause and effect if
 I understand him right).  He uses the term "objective reality"
 to mean *ideas in the mind* which represent real objects.  Your
 definition implies objective reality is the real objects
 themselves, which are outside the mind.  Did the definition
 change over time?
[PAUSE]        
 So far, I understand and agree that:
        - I have a mind.
 
        - There is an objective (external to my mind) reality.
 
        - To know I had a mind I had to be conscious of something first.
           In other words, one of the main functions of my mind is to
           perceive a reality.  If there is no reality to perceive, then
           my mind is useless and I'm stuck.  To see I had a mind, my
           mind must have first perceived something that exists
           in reality.  I know I have a mind.  Therefore, I know
           reality exists.
 
 Now, I am going to ask some more stupid and pseudo-intellectual
 questions because that is the only way I know how to approach
 this subject.  Can I know what reality is made out of, or can
 I only know its nature (how it behaves)?  In other words, I
 could be nothing more than a brain in a jar connected to a
 computer.  My brain would still contain my mind, and the
 computer would provide the external reality.  The computer
 stimulates all my senses so that it looks to me like I am
 a human living on the planet Earth, typing in this message
 on this bbs.  Can I figure out that I am really a brain in
[PAUSE]        a jar connected to a computer, or can I only understand
 the reality the computer program is showing me.  (That is
 the silliest question I have ever asked anybody, so feel
 free to say whatever you feel like, however mean and nasty.)

-------------------------
22.6 Mon Oct  3 21:16:57 1988   Bronis Vidugiris (bhv) 
 I would say that there is no way for you, me, or anyone else to KNOW they
 are not a computer simulation.

-------------------------
22.7 Mon Oct  3 21:22:16 1988   Leslie Mikesell (les) 
 Even very young children know that they participate in the act of
 seeing.  Cover your eyes and you don't see any more.

-------------------------
22.8 Tue Oct  4 23:56:51 1988   tom chapin (tjc) 
 OK. Now you've read DesCartes.  Remember that if he was right, then
 God has been shown to exist...  Now read Hume's response.  Then read
 Kant to get thoroughly confused...

-------------------------
22.9 Wed Oct  5 01:54:50 1988   Ben Kovitz (kiwi) 
 jjd: A question is not stupid, silly, or pseudo-intellectual if it is asked
[PAUSE]        honestly.  I do think a lot of people who ask the question about the tree
 falling in the forest (and, yes, the brain in the jar) do it, not because
they
 want to know the answer, but because they delight in subverting other
people's
 ability to think.  A lot, but certainly not all of them.
 
 First, about Descartes: it is my understanding that his central argument goes
 that you can't be sure of anything, because you can doubt everything, with
one
 exception: since the act of doubting is itself an act of consciousness, you
 CAN be sure that you are conscious.  Hence, "I think therefore I am".  He
 wanted to defend the existence of the reality outside the mind, and so he
 cooked up a rather convoluted argument to get from his famous axiom to the
 existence of reality.  However, it is impossible to prove existence on the
 basis of anything which is derived from it; any such argument is totally
 circular.  Consequently, philosophers after Descartes were quick to point out
 the flaws, and ever since, subjectivism has been gaining dominance in the
 Western world. (Notice that only two people said that the tree makes a sound;
 if you asked that question at a university philosophy department, the results
 would be even more disappointing.)
 
 The primary problem with Descartes' argument is that you can't identify the
 fact that you are conscious until you are conscious of something.  First you
[PAUSE]        identify some fact of reality, e.g., "the table is there", and only then can
 you reflect and identify that "I know the table is there".  His attempt to
 prove existence on the basis of consciousness breeds subjectivism, because it
 says, in effect, that if you believe something, that is proof that it's so.
 It denies that the role of your mind is to perceive reality, and that the
 proper use of your mind consists in rigorously keeping it it accord with
 reality, and says instead that reality is whatever happens to be in your
mind.
 It's not a long leap from there to "I wish it, therefore it is so."
 
 A few other problems that occur to me off the top of my head are: why is
 doubt the basis for a philosophy?  A philosophy starts by identifying
 fundamental truths; a "fundamental doubt" is a contradiction in terms.  The
 arguments consists of taking a random, arbitrary conjecture, i.e., "how do I
 know there is not an evil demon controlling all of my perceptions?", and then
 saying that it is not the arbitrary conjecture which must be proven, but its
 contrary.  This is a basic logical fallacy, known as "appealing to
ignorance".
 Notice that the argument contains a train of reasoning: because of X, Y
 logically follows.  (I.e., because doubting is an act of the mind, I have a
 mind.) That means the argument presupposes the laws of logic (despite the
 fallacy), which depend on the fact that everything that exists, possesses a
 certain, definite, specific nature.  Descartes' argument is a classic example
 of that denying of one's own premises I was trying to illustrate in that
[PAUSE]        example of saying that there are actions but not entities.  However, none of
 the problems in this paragraph are as bad or important as the basic idea of
 subjectivism I was describing in the previous paragraph.
 
 Now, about the brain in the jar.  How did you find out about brains?  How did
 you find out about jars?  How did you find out about computers?  How are
 computers created?  Do these things exist?  Do you know about them?  If not,
 if you say that there is no objective reality or that you can't know about
 objective reality, then there is no way you could discover all of these
 things.  Do you see what I am getting at here? To doubt that what you see is
 real, because you have seen brains, jars, and computers, is craziness!
 
 (I should add, though, that computer simulations, while they are not the same
 thing as what they simulate, nevertheless do possess definite properties of
 their own, and are real.)
 
 But, getting more serious here, when I read, think, and talk about
philosophy,
 I am trying to find answers: real, useable answers which I can apply in real
 life, here in the real world.  Debating about whether we can ever know that
we
 are not a computer simulation just doesn't have anything to do with real
life.
 What is the proper relationship between one's intellect and one's emotions?
[PAUSE]        What is the right kind of life for a human being?  What are correct
guidelines
 for generalizing from observation?  How does one prove a causal relationship?
 What obligations (if any) do I have toward other people?  These are important
 questions, and questions only philosophy can answer.  And they cannot be
 answered by concocting arbitrary conjectures about brains in jars hooked up
to
 computers.  Ever since I was very young, I have *hated* schools, but *loved*
 learning; much of my interest in epistemology has grown out of this: in order
 to develop a correct theory of learning and teaching, it is necessary to have
 a correct theory of knowledge and proof.  Again, random speculations about
 brains in jars don't help much to accomplish anything constructive, in the
 field of education or anywhere else.
 
 (However, I have spent plenty of time grappling with the computer-simulation
 question, and doing so was very valuable.  It taught me quite a lot, both
 about fundamental principles of reality, and about epistemology.  I wish
 someone had said something like the above two paragraphs to me back then, but
 I doubt it would have sped me up that much, because no matter how much truth
 you hear, you still have to understand it for yourself, and that takes time.
 So, if you are really having troubles with this problem of how do you
validate
 that there is an objective reality and even if there is, how can you ever
know
[PAUSE]        anything about it, don't take the previous paragraph to mean that you should
 just suddenly quit thinking about it even if you aren't confident that your
 answer is right.)
 
 Lastly, about "Can I know what reality is made of, or can I only know its
 nature (how it behaves)?", this doesn't seem to be the same question as the
 one about the brain in the jar.  I'm not sure what you mean by "what reality
 is made of"; it's made of reality, of course!  Nothing exists except reality;
 there is no more fundamental, "substrate" of reality which is the "real"
 reality, compared to the mere "surface", "fake" reality.  (I've been thinking
 about starting a "real reality vs.  what only looks that way" item, since
that
 seems to be at the center of all my disputes with Bronis, but I haven't
 thought of a good way to explain my view on this, though.)  Even in the
 brain-in-the-jar conjecture, the things the computer is showing you are no
 less real than the computer.  Then again, I'm not sure I'm answering the
 question you had in mind.

-------------------------
22.10 Wed Oct  5 05:41:52 1988   Duffy Toler (duffy) 
 I took a similar stance on a discussion of "accepted reality" with
 Dave Sueme some months ago.  I didn't realise how stupid it sounds
 untill i noticed my own thoughts on the matter echoed in the above
 response.
[PAUSE]          After considering that the Pythagorean's killed the fellow who
 discovered irrational numbers, and considering the numerous
 misconceptions about the nature of how everything from the universe
 to the human body works, it seems that my current view of what's
 "real" is colored by current scientific understanding.  That view
 is not only subject to change, it is probable that it really will
 change according to historic precedent.
   While it seems incomprehensible that we will someday discover
 that we are disembodied brains in jars, i suspect that a person
 from ancient times would find it equally incomprehensible that
 his heart was just a pump.  
   A computer simulation would have an even more difficult time
 discovering the nature of reality because it could have been
 programmed not to discover it.  The way to prevent it from 
 discovering the real world would be to programm it so that
 it thinks it knows The Truth.

-------------------------
22.11 Wed Oct  5 12:40:46 1988   Leslie Mikesell (les) 
 Ben: I don't think that the concept of consciousness creating reality
 leads directly to "I wish it, therefore it is so".  First, there is
 the difference between thinking "about" something and the thought
 that creates an action.  For example you can think about running or
 wish you were running while sitting perfectly still.  But, running is
[PAUSE]        certainly a conscious activity.  There is a "thought" that makes your
 foot move, although it is not the same as thinking "about" moving.
 Second, there is no reason to suppose that there would be no limits on
 the possibilities that could exist.  Obviously any reasonable explanation
 of reality must be able to produce exactly the results that we experience.
 Beyond that, there is no basis for any kind of judgement.

-------------------------
22.12 Wed Oct  5 17:27:35 1988   Bronis Vidugiris (bhv) 
 My position on this, and similar topics, is that the possibility of me
 being a computer simulation is a futile question to think about BECAUSE
 there is no way to disprove it experimentally. 

-------------------------
22.13 Wed Oct  5 18:40:55 1988   Joe Durnavich (jjd) 
 tjc:  I read some Hume once, but all I remember is something about
 billiard balls.  I will read him again to see what he has to
 say about Descartes' ideas.  I don't want to dwell *too* much
 on this subject though, because I can only spend so much time
 wondering if reality exists before I have to get up and leave
 for work.
 
 As for your response Ben, I see my mistake now of trying to
 create a meta-reality with objects from the real reality
[PAUSE]        (i.e., brains, jars, and computers).  I was trying to find
 the extent of your definition of reality by trying to go
 beyond or above it.  I can't seem to do that unless I bring
 in a God of some sort (supernatural, infinite, etc.).  But
 comparing the finite with the infinite doesn't tell me
 anything either.  I guess I am stuck with the reality I am
 immersed in then.
 
 Which brings me too your "But, getting more serious" paragraph.
 I agree with you that philosophy is supposed to find real
 usable answers for real questions asked by real human people
 living real human lives.  But I did not intend for this item
 to be a reflection of what philosophy was all about.  I am
 not a philosopher.  I know *little* about philosophy.  I
 was hoping all you guys would show me what it was all about.
 Most of the debates here reduced themselves to an objective
 versus subjective reality debate. I wanted to get to the
 bottom of things here.  Maybe getting this out of the way
 will allow this conference to move on to more useful things.

-------------------------
22.14 Wed Oct  5 18:55:27 1988   Joe Durnavich (jjd) 
 (Oh by the way, I am begging everybody to please keep this discussion
 on at least a semi-intelligent level.  Please, no more fighting
[PAUSE]        and hurling of insults at each other.  Specifically, please don't ignore
 anybody Ben, not even Duffy.  Say what you will about his responses,
 but don't just ignore him.  Otherwise I have no choice but to believe
 *everything* he says.  And everybody else, you can tell Ben he is
 an obnoxious snob in the "Why I Hate Kiwi" item in the ccc conference.
 Let's just try to attack his *responses* here.)

-------------------------
22.15 Wed Oct  5 23:45:02 1988   tom chapin (tjc) 
 As Ben was ably pointing out, the difference between DesCartes and
 Hume IS one of trying to find objective reality versus subjective
 one.  DesCartes tried to use doubt, hoping that whatever could not
 be doubted had to be true, and that consciousness could not be doubted.
 This led him to believe in thobjective reality of existence.  But
 Hume replied that our consciousness was not of objective reality, but
 only of our sense-impressions, and our senses filter reality, and
 cannot be depended on to give on objective reality, but only a
 subjective one.  
 
 And as Ben pointed out, since then, philosophers have tended to move
 from objectivism to subjectivism.  While there seems to be an objective
 reality out there somewhere, our senses are so limited, so likely to
 filter and alter reality as it comes to us, and since our very brains
 are limited and may be unable to organize our sense-impressions into
[PAUSE]        a true picture of objective reality, all we have left is our
 subjective view.

-------------------------
22.16 Thu Oct  6 10:33:47 1988   Leslie Mikesell (les) 
 A necessary problem, though.  Our senses function by organizing reality
 into patterns, so that repeating patterns can be recognized.  This is
 reenforced by assigning words to the patterns so that we can talk and
 think about them.  As my example of the TV image showed, it doesn't
 really matter that the underlying reality is only slightly related to
 the pattern that it projects.  The real process of learning is to perceive
 the same patterns as everyone else.  Perhaps unfortunately, it is a
 creative process, but without it we would have nothing to talk about.

-------------------------
22.17 Thu Oct  6 17:44:53 1988   Joe Durnavich (jjd) 
 It seems the only way everyone can get more accurate patterns
 into their brains though, is to pay closer attention to that
 underlying reality.  Eventually, you will figure out that the
 TV image is just a dot moving rapidly on the screen...

-------------------------
22.18 Thu Oct  6 21:32:38 1988   Leslie Mikesell (les) 
 I don't think so.  When you stop seeing the agreed upon patterns, things
[PAUSE]        are no longer interesting.  How may people would keep a TV around if
 they just saw the electron beam instead of the image?  Even if someone
 does perceive something "underneath" the patterns, there are no words
 to describe it.  How often do you notice the pressure of air on your
 body?  It is one of the main forces that affects you, but since it is
 uniform it does not present a pattern that you generally recognize.

-------------------------
22.19 Thu Oct  6 22:01:52 1988   Ben Kovitz (kiwi) 
 Here is my refutation of the "we can't be objective, because our senses
 'filter' reality" argument, at least in brief outline.
 
 The argument (and it was Kant who really developed it into its most fully
 developed form, not Hume) rests on the premise that there is a way things
 "really" look, which is different from the way they look to us.  However,
 what something looks like is not an attribute intrinsic to that object, it
 depends on *both* the nature of the object and the nature of person looking
 at it.
 
 Stating this principle in more abstract terms, every perception has both a
 CONTENT and a FORM.  (Please note that I am not using "form" as a synonym 
 for "shape".)  The content is the thing which is perceived.  The form is
 what it looks like to the perceiver.  What the subjectivist argument fails
 to recognize is that there can be no such thing as a "formless" perception;
[PAUSE]        it says that our perceptions, because they have a form which is partly 
 dictated by the nature of the mind, are not "true", because they are not a
 "formless" perception, dictated by nothing but the content.
 
 Several months ago, I got into a length argument about this on another BBS,
 and I came up with the following analogy to help clarify these two concepts
 "content" and "form".  Suppose you have two different books on the care and
 feeding of cats.  Book A uses all kinds of fancy, polysyllabic words, most
 of which haven't been used since the nineteenth century.  Book B is written
 is simple, straighforward prose.  But they both describe the same things:
 they both describe the care and feeding of cats.  That is, their CONTENT is
 the same, but the FORM in which it is expressed is different.
 
 Now, try to imagine a book on the care and feeding of cats which doesn't
 express its content in *any* form at all.  You can't; the whole idea is
 total nonsense.  (Which is what makes talking about this so difficult: the
 subjectivist argument premises something which literally can't be described,
 contemplated, proven, or understood, and which can't exist.)  Now, which of
 the two books is the "true" book?  The answer, of course, is that since they
 have the same content, they are both equally "true".
 
 The same goes with perception: there can be no formless state of awareness,
 where the nature of the perceiver plays no part.  And, the mere fact that
 you perceive by some means, rather than by some magical means, does not mean
[PAUSE]        that you aren't perceiving at all.
 
 It might be objected that all of the above is totally irrelevant, since no
 one who has argued that perception is unable to be objective has said
anything
 about a formless state of awareness.  However, that is a premise of the 
 argument, despite the fact that most subjectivists haven't identified it.
 Notice that tjc said that because our brains are "limited", i.e., because
 they possess a definite, specific nature, they can't give us a "true picture
 of reality".  Well, what would be a "true picture of reality"?  What,
exactly,
 are our "limited" perceptions being compared against?  
 
 Finally, I should mention that there is a lot more to the issue than what
 I've stated here.  For example, it is wrong to say that we perceive
 sensations, not reality; that's like saying that we perceive our nervous
 systems, not reality.  Sensations are part of the means by which we perceive;
 they are not what we perceive.  But the basic idea (or rather non-idea) of
 a perception without any means or form as the standard by which to judge the
 "truth" of a perception is the primary error in the subjectivist viewpoint.

-------------------------
22.20 Thu Oct  6 22:30:21 1988   tom chapin (tjc) 
 I may be missing a bit here, but you seem to be saying the subjectivists
[PAUSE]        wrongly demand that objective reality be "perfectly" (without limitations
 or filtering) perceived to be believed.  I would, rather, say that most
 subjectivists would be epistemological agnostics rather than atheists.
 In other words, a subjectivists would allow that an objective reality
 most likely exists, but the nature of objective reality is too far removed
 from us by our own physical limitations for us to have faith in our
 interpretations of it.
 
 The question is where does that leave us subjectivists?  We can't live in
 a world of mere random chaos, we need to find some order.  If we don't
 have faith in our ability to determine the nature of teh world beyond
 our distorted perceptions of it, we may have to look for such things as
 consensus of outlook.

-------------------------
22.21 Fri Oct  7 09:59:08 1988   Leslie Mikesell (les) 
 The problem is not well addressed because philosophers tend to not have
 a good understanding of information storage and processing or the
 underlying mechanisms e.g. body chemistry.  Perhaps a starting point
 would be to compare actual reality to a network with layered protocols.
 Wasn't there a philosophy that there were seven levels of Logos?  This
 might mesh nicely with the OSI seven-layer network model.  We can examine
 the lower levels closely, but all we can do about the upper levels is
 speculate about whether the lower levels reflect them by design.
[PAUSE]        Now - about those lower levels.  I'm convinced that ideas have a physical
 substance not unlike viruses, that knowing a word requires the creation
 of a specific complex molecule, and that we cannot make sense of anything
 that cannot be stored at this level.
 Is this getting too bizarre?

-------------------------
22.22 Fri Oct  7 11:37:57 1988   Joe Durnavich (jjd) 
 tjc:  I think Ben was trying to point out that it is in the
 nature of perception to use the senses to perceive reality.
 You are saying that because we use our senses, we can never
 see the true reality.  That implies that the only observer
 who can see a true picture of reality is one who doesn't
 use senses.  But such an observer doesn't exist (and doesn't
 make sense).  It is unfair to compare our power of perception
 to something that doesn't exist.  (Nonetheless, I still
 feel Ben is trying to pull one over on us.  I need to
 think about this some more.)
 
 Compared to one another though, we obviously have different
 views on reality in our mind.  Certainly, everything I
 perceive is not necessarily true.  And others have either
 more or less true perceptions than me.  How do we know
 which knowledge is correct?  To quote Dav Holle:
[PAUSE]        
      How do we know what we know?  Simply because we
      can get a lot of agreement on it?  Does that mean
      that the world really WAS flat in Copernicus'
      time? (People lived as though it were true...)
 
 (I take that to be the same concept as tjc's "consensus of
 opinion" and Leslie's "we must try to perceive the same
 patterns as everybody else.")

-------------------------
22.23 Fri Oct  7 17:20:00 1988   Bronis Vidugiris (bhv) 
 I think doubt, and the possibility of error, are part of the human
 condition.  I also think that any philosophy that attempts to make
 absolutely and uncoditionaly true statements about anything is most
 likely in error.  (I obviously can't say it must definitely be in
 error, of course :-)).
 
 It may be comforting to believe that one 'knows' reality, but it is
 probably not true.

-------------------------
22.24 Fri Oct  7 21:57:27 1988   Leslie Mikesell (les) 
 Has anyone read "Flatland"?  It is a little book that attempts to
[PAUSE]        address this issue by analogy.  The scene is a two-dimensional land
 peopled by one dimentional creatures as pompous and self-assured of
 their understanding of reality as you might find anywhere.  Then one
 of them discovers the "up" direction and tries to explain to the
 others.

-------------------------
22.25 Fri Oct  7 22:40:53 1988   tom chapin (tjc) 
 Joe--yes, I was saying because we use senses we cannot achieve
 a true picture of reality (or be sure if we have).  All we have
 is senses and reasoning, and both are limited, and we do not even
 know how limited (yeah, Flatland...).  So the most important parts
 of reality could be totally beyond us, knowable only by a God, whom 
 we do not know to exist.
 
 Consensus would give us at least a way to deal with a common reality
 even if not an ultimately true one, but we don't seem to be able to
 achieve consensus...

-------------------------
22.26 Fri Oct  7 23:42:04 1988   Ben Kovitz (kiwi) 
 tjc: WHY?  (re: what you said about consensus.)
 
 
[PAUSE]        jjd: Yes, the whole issue of subjectivism vs. objectivism is EXTREMELY
 abstract, and takes a long time to properly understand.  One thing that
 I've seen confuse a lot of people is that they have absolutely no idea
 what philosophy is: they try to incorporate or justify philosophic
 abstractions on the basis of less fundamental things.  An excellent 
 example of this is what Les said about philosophers not being qualified
 to say much about these things, due to a lack of knowledge of information
 processing and body chemistry.  If you think carefully about what this means,
 though, you'll see what a wild self-contradiction it is: it means that such
 things as whether or not there is an objective reality, whether or not man
 can ever have knowledge, is to be proven on the basis of observations of
 and generalizations from the brain.  But if the brain doesn't exist, or if
 your senses don't give you a true picture of reality, then how do
 observations of the brain prove anything?  The error here is the failure to
 understand that there are NO wider abstractionn{ than those of philosophy,
 and NO more fundamental principles.  Philosophy provides the foundation of
 human knowledge, and without it, the totality of human knowledge crumbles.
 (Also, philosophic abstractions cannot be proven on the basis of things
 which are derived from them.)
 
 Now, regarding what you said about some perceptions not being true, and
 there being more and less true perceptions.  Could you give an example of
 this?  What is a "less true" perception?
 
[PAUSE]        I don't think you understood that concept of "form" I was trying to 
 explain, because it totally contradicts the idea that perceptions are
 either true or false.  Propositions are true or false, but not perceptions;
 perceptions just are.    Perceptions provide the form in which you are
 aware of reality; there is no lower or more fundamental kind of awareness
 into which you can analyze your perceptions.  All higher-level knowledge,
 including all abstractions, has its roots in perception; all of it consists
 in seeing differences and similarities between perceptions and extrapolating
 from perceptions.  It is possible to make an error when connecting different
 perceptions to form a generalization, and it is possible to make an error
 when applying a generalization to a new perception, but the perceptions in
 and of themselves cannot be "in error".
 
 A typical example of a "false" perception is an optical illusion: for 
 example, some illusion where two lines which are really the same length
 appear to have different lengths.  But in calling that perception "false",
 you can only do it by reference to some standard of "truth"--and what is
 the "true" perception in this case?  How would the lines look if your brain
 was constituted in some completely different way, where the optical doesn't
 happen?  You;'ll never know!  The lines look to you the way they look to
 you, because of *both* the nature of your brain and the nature of the lines.
 The perception is the automatic effect of the way reality really is; to
 say that the perception would only be "true" if the lines looked another
 way, is to say that REALITY would only be "true" if the lines looked another
[PAUSE]        way.  
 
 It might be objected that the perception is still wrong, because the
 perception is telling you that the lines are different lengths, whereas in
 reality they are the same length.  The error here is in equating the
 perception of the lines with the concept of length.  Your concept of
 length was formed by identifying a quantitative relationship between a
 certain attribute of objects you've perceived in the past (specifically,
 their lengths).  Your perception isn't "telling" you that the lines are
 different lengths; it is simply giving you an awareness of the lines.  What
 make the perception an optical illusion is that it is so similar to other
 percepotions of lines differing in length, that it is easy to misapply your
 concept of length and form a false judgment on the basis of the perception.
 (And, the concept of "length" is so basic and close to the perceptual level,
 that it is easy to equate it with perception itself.)  So, to summarize:
 the perception in and of itself doesn't "tell" you that the lines are 
 different; that is a judgment you may or may not make ON THE BASIS of the
 perception.
 
 Also, the mere fact that we have identified that the lines are in fact 
 different lengths is proof that it is not the perceptions which are mistaken,
 but the conclusion we may or may not draw from them.  Otherwise, how could
 we ever have found out that the lines are the same length?  Perception,
 ultimately, is our only means of knowledge; we could only have found out
[PAUSE]        by using our perceptions of the lines.
 
 
 Wow.  I've cranked out a lot of text these past few days.

-------------------------
22.27 Sat Oct  8 00:05:21 1988   Ben Kovitz (kiwi) 
 ...and I'm still not done.
 
 One other comment, about your summary of my summary of the subjectivist
 argument.  The idea that the senses "filter" or "distort" reality, and
 that a "true" perception would be one perceived without any senses, were not
 the crux of my argument.  Essentially, the subjectist argument goes like
 this: because consciousness perceives by some definite MEANS, and not by
 magic, is proof that there is no such thing as consciousness (i.e., no
 true awareness of reality).  Ayn Rand had a very good way of putting this:
 
 "...man is blind, because he has eyes--deaf, because he has ears--deluded,
 because he has a mind--and the things he perceives do not exist, *because*
 he perceives them."
 
 A word about the Flatland example: the fact that you don't know everything,
 is not proof that you don't know anything.  The residents of Flatland knew
 what they knew: they knew about Flatland.  When A. Square (the hero of the
[PAUSE]        story) found out about 'up', he had simply learned something new, IN 
 ADDITION to what he already had known.  To say that A. Square's discovery
 "proved" the other Flatlander's beliefs about reality wrong, is to say that
 new discoveries DESTROY knowledge, rather than augment it.

-------------------------
22.28 Sat Oct  8 00:50:05 1988   Leslie Mikesell (les) 
 But the fact that you don't know everything means that you don't know
 how much you don't know.  Are we heading towards a mind-body duality
 now, Ben?  If you want to assert that philosophers are not constrained
 by physics, please explain the nature of the consciousness that is
 not limited to the mechanisms that you don't want to bother understanding.

-------------------------
22.29 Sat Oct  8 09:19:01 1988   tom chapin (tjc) 
 Ben, I'm not sure what you are asking about my statement on consensus.
 If you are asking why I feel consensus would be valuable, it's because
 we would have less need for confidence in attaining true reality if we
 could at least have a workable reality.  If you are asking why we cannot
 attain it, I am not saying we can't, just that we obviously haven't and
 I see no likelihood we will any time soon.  I would think lack of
 consensus would support subjectivism--if we could attain the consciousness
 of true reality, then why do we disagree on it?
 
[PAUSE]        About philosophy as the the foundation of human knowledge, it is quite 
 possible that our philosophy is dependent on our physiology.  The
 physiology of our senses could prevent us from perceiving any but the
 most limited area of reality, and the physiology of our brain could
 determine the interpretation of our perceptions, for example, imposing
 a dualism which may not be present in true reality.  Our philosophy
 could be, not only incomplete, but a falsification of reality.

-------------------------
22.30 Sat Oct  8 12:58:50 1988   Ben Kovitz (kiwi) 
 tjc: What is "the physiology of the brain"?  Is it real?  Are you aware of
it?
 How did you find out about it?  If it's not real, then none of what you
 concluded from it makes any difference.  If it is real, and you are aware
 of it, then you are operating on the premise that reality is real and that
 you can know about it.
 
 You said that "it is quite possible that our philosophy is dependent on our
 physiology".  I have two points to make about that: (1) do you have any
 evidence to support this claim?  If you don't, then there's no reason to
 take it seriously.  If you do, then you are saying that the evidence is real
 and that you know it.  (2) OF COURSE the nature of knowledge and how we
 acquire it are dependent on the nature of the brain!  What do you think I've
 been talking about all this time?  I've been saying that any perception is
[PAUSE]        the effect of *both* the nature of the perceiver and the nature of what he
 perceives.  (I think that's now the third time I've said almost that exact
 same sentence.)  If we had no physiology, no means of consciousness, then
 we certainly could not discover anything, even the law of causality.
 
 I wasn't asking why you feel consensus is valuable, but why you think it's
 so important.  But, regarding what you said about the fact that people
 disagree is proof that we can't know the true reality, there are plenty of
 reasons why people disagree that involve no such premise: (1) man is not
 infallible; he can make errors in judgment.{ (2) Different people have
 different amounts of knowledge, and they know about different things.  (This
 isn't so much a reason why people disagree, but a reason why the content of
 their minds is not exactly identical, despite their having access to the same
 reality.)  (3) Reasoning is a volitional act; nature does not force you to
 properly integrate the knowledge you have.  For example, I know of some
 people who talk about their knowledge of the physiology of the brain, in
 order to support the contention that they can't know anything.  And of
 course there are all the things I{was talking about in the free HW
‹
rÚºY[©Hø (4) Man is not omniscient; he has only a limited amount of knowledge.  For
 example, suppose that someone is playing a practical joke on Mr. A: say,
 they've balanced a bucket of water above a door so when Mr. A. comes through
 it, it empties on his head.  Mr. A, not being omniscient, doesn't know about
 this, and walks through the door not expecting to get wet.  But big deal!
 This certainly doesn't prove that man is unable to know "the true reality";
[PAUSE]        Mr. A knows what he knows, and when he gets wet, he knows that, too.
 
 Les: I don't see any connection at all between the three sentences of your
 previous response.  Could you explain what you are trying to say in more
 detail?

-------------------------
22.31 Sat Oct  8 14:38:02 1988   Leslie Mikesell (les) 
 Ben: I am trying to get a better idea of what you consider knowledge and
 more specifically what the entity is that has or creates this knowledge.
 I don't object at all to a mind-body duality but I place the knowledge
 derived from the senses firmly in the body and can't say much at all
 about the mind part (i.e. I do not limit the activity of consciousness to
 the brain).  You seem to be saying something more concrete - that thought
 is proof of itself, but I can't quite follow it.
 Suppose we put a microphone, speaker and amplifier in the same room and
 turn up the power.  Your argument that thought exists because of the
 existence of a thinker seems like the fact that sound exists because of
 the feedback effect.  I'm looking for what was there before the amplifier
 was turned on.

-------------------------
22.32 Sat Oct  8 18:01:41 1988   tom chapin (tjc) 
 We seem to be arguing about how we can or cannot feel confident that
[PAUSE]        we are conscious of true reality.  As I understand your argument about
 physiology, if we accept that perception is what gives us information
 about physiology, then we have already accepted perception as giving
 true reality.  I would say that we only accepted it provisionally to see
 where it would take us.  When we did, we found that our perceptions show
 that our consciousness is limited and fallible.  We are left with a
 paradox.  The more information we get, the more we can see the
 limitations of our perceptions.  For me, a paradox is as good as a
 contradiction at casting doubt on our grasp of reality.
 
 And, for me, lack of consensus casts further doubt on our grasp of
 reality.  Your reasons for lack of consensus are good, but they don't
 help.  Fallibility, differing amounts of knowledge, lack of integration
 of knowledge, not being omniscient...how can I claim that I am the one
 among all the competing views of reality who is correct?  Only through
 arrogance can I claim that it has to be the others who are more
 fallible, have less knowledge, haven't integrated their knowledge.
 There is no unyielding criterion by which to judge.

-------------------------
22.33 Sat Oct  8 19:37:07 1988   Joe Durnavich (jjd) 
 Let's see if I'm understanding any of this so far:
 
 tjc:  When you say "we only accepted it provisionally to see where
[PAUSE]        it would take us" aren't you saying you did acquire some knowledge?
 And then after you acquired some knowledge you say you can't?  If
 I'm understanding Ben correctly, then what you learned was that we
 are prone to make erroneous judgements once in a while.  But how
 can we know we made incorrect judgements unless we made some
 correct ones also?  From that argument is seems like we are
 learning some truthful things about reality.
 
 And if I am understanding the subjective viewpoint correctly, they
 appear concerned over all the incorrect judgements we make (e.g.,
 the world is flat).  How can we be certain a judgement of ours is
 correct?  To know reality correctly, must we know all of reality
 correctly (omniscience)?  Is not the restriction of having to
 take time to learn reality a limit on our grasp of reality?
 
 les:  Are you saying you don't like the idea of thinking about
 thinking?
 
 kiwi:  Regarding my response that contained the phrase "more
 or less true perceptions":  the more or less referred to a
 quantity of true perceptions.  With your correction that should
 read, "more or less number of true propositions".
 
 If you asked me about a "false" perception I would have said
[PAUSE]        someone who is color blind looking at a light which changes
 from red to green and can't see the difference (assuming the
 color blindness is a defect in the eye and not a mental problem).
 
 Also, did you mean to say "we have identified the lines are in fact 
 the *same* length" in the first sentence of the last paragraph of
 one of your responses?   You said "different lengths" which then, I
 don't understand.
 
 Finally, Ben, so I know what you are talking about, what is your
 definition of knowledge.  Is there true knowledge and false
 knowledge?

-------------------------
22.34 Sat Oct  8 21:34:34 1988   tom chapin (tjc) 
 Joe, we just go up a metalevel on the road to infinite regress.
 What we learn is that we are fallible and make mistakes.  We do
 not learn how to prove which of our knowledge is true and which is 
 merely the product of our falliblilty.  If we can't prove which of our
 beliefs are true and which are false, it does us no good to say that
 some are true.

-------------------------
22.35 Sat Oct  8 23:44:16 1988   Leslie Mikesell (les) 
[PAUSE]        Joe:  I didn't realize I was saying that, but yes, thinking about thinking
 is about as useful as thinking about swimming.
 Tom:  Perfect consensus would probably not be desirable - we would no longer
 have anything to talk about.  Besides, the evolution of ideas is hopelessly
 intertwined with the evolution of living things and the diversity serves
 its purpose.

-------------------------
22.36 Sun Oct  9 00:19:42 1988   Ben Kovitz (kiwi) 
 Les (and jjd): My definition of knowledge is: a mental grasp of reality,
 arrived at by a process of observation and reasoning from observation.
 The next question, of course, is to ask what is my definition of "mental
 grasp of reality".  But here we come right up to the self-evident, perceptual
 level; this (i.e., being conscious of something) cannot be broken down into
 more fundamental, closer-to-perception terms.  Asking for a definition of
 consciousness is like asking for an explanation of what it's like to have
 the sensation of red.  You can define other, less fundamental concepts in
 terms of these things, but you can't define these things in terms of
 concepts which are derived from them.  
 
 Regarding whether or not there is such a thing as false knowledge: "false
 knowledge" is a contradiction in terms; "true knowledge" is a redundancy.
 
 Les: I don't understand your analogy of the amplifier: it sounds like you
[PAUSE]        are asking what thoughts one had before one had any thoughts.  Maybe the
 following is what you were trying to get out of me: every thought is a
 thought ABOUT SOMETHING.  There is no such thing as a thought totally
 devoid of any existential content.  You can think about bus schedules,
 the cost of hamburger, the structure of the atom, the number of lines on
 a page, but you've got to be thinking about SOMETHING in order to be
 thinking.  And the only way to think about thinking is to reflect,
ultimately,
 on thoughts you've had which were not thoughts about thinking.
 
 Speaking of which, it's time for this conversation to return to reality.
 I have the impression that when most of you read, write, and think about
 these things, they're just a bunch of big words to you, rather than something
 you can see, touch, or feel.  It is *very* important, in understanding 
 anything (not just philosophic abstractions) to have a good, solid, concrete
 idea of what you're talking about.  It is crucial that you be able to have
 some concrete examples of what you're talking about spring to mind very
 easily, if you don't want to wander off into some never-never land of 
 ivory-tower pseudo-intellectualism.  For example, does anyone here have
 any definite idea of the meaning of the statement, "your senses 'filter'
 reality and thus fail to give you a true picture of reality"?  That means
 that the thing you call a toaster is not "really" a toaster, the keyboard
 you type on is not "really" a keyboard, the thing you drive to work is not
 "really" a car--or, at least, that you can't be sure of those things.  Your
[PAUSE]        blue jeans aren't "really" blue, they're "really" some non-color which you
 can't perceive, because your senses are "limited".  What would you say if
 a person actually came up to you and asserted those things in perfect
 seriousness?  You'd say (I hope), "this guy is totally irrational" and
 wouldn't take any of his absurd claims seriously.  But, state those same
 exact things using highly abstract language, and suddenly they're no less
 "arbitrary" than the belief that there is a reality outside of your H[‹VHø and the job of your mind is to perceive it.
 
 Most people wouldn't dream of approaching any other subject in so anti-
 intellectual and anti-rational a fashion; in any other subject, most people
 would try to grasp the facts to the best of their ability.  If you were
 learning to play piano, you wouldn't whine that you aren't sure if the keys
 are real, or say that because you can't hear sounds over 20,000 Hz, you
 don't know what the piano "really" sounds like.  I've noticed that Les'
 messages about Unix in other conferences are very detailed, precise, and
 factual: he tries to apply the entirety of his *knowledge* of Unix to
 real-world problems.
 
 But how would you actually live your life, tjc and Les, if you actually lived
 by the ideas you've espoused in this conference?  "Oh, somebody at work
 today disagreed with me about whether the gets() function leaves the newline
 at the end of a string--now there's no consensus, and I can't be sure!  After
 all, it would be 'arrogant' to suppose that *my* picture of reality is the
[PAUSE]        one, true one, what with all these competing views running around!"
 
 In closing, I recommend that you read the quotation that is displayed
 when you enter this conference before you write your reply.

-------------------------
22.37 Sun Oct  9 13:19:02 1988   Bronis Vidugiris (bhv) 
 I believe there is such a thing as "false knowledge".  The previously
 mentioned 'the world is flat' is a good example.  It is knowledge, based on
 a limited experience, that seems to be true.  However, when more experience
 is obtained, it turns out to be false.
 
 Color (are my purple jeans purple) is a very good example of the way that our
 senses filter the world.  Purple and violet are two different colors that
 appear to be the same to unaided human vision.
 The difference between purple and violet is that one consists of a single
 frequency of light (violet), where the other conisists of a mixture of red
and blue light.  This can be confirmed by
 closer observation with color filters.
 
 Ben does have one good point, though.  Most of the people who *really* have
 no conception of what reality is are locked away somewhere, in padded cells
so
 they can't hurt themselves.
[PAUSE]       
-------------------------
22.38 Sun Oct  9 14:37:27 1988   Leslie Mikesell (les) 
 Ben: I understand unix because I have read the manual. More specifically,
 because it is a deterministic system with known inputs.  When a computer
 acts in a way that I perceive to be non-deterministic, I call the repairman.
 I have no problem dealing with reality on a level where I act as though
 everything were deterministic or at least predictable on a statistical
 model.  However, I do not believe that is the case when dealing with
 consciousness since that would deny the existance of free will, nor do I
 believe that our universe is a closed system.  Since you also seem unable to
 define consciousness, our views may not be that far apart - I am just trying
 to avoid having to accept anything as "self-evident". That is, things that
 are evident to me are evident for a reason and I am willing to admit that not
 everything is evident to me.
 The microphone/speaker example alluded to the power of words to become
 their own meaning.  Once we learn to speak and think in words, it becomes
 impossible to think otherwise.  I was not asking for thoughts before thought,
 but rather (zen-like) thought before words.  It is, of course, impossible to
 answer such a question but not because there is no answer.

-------------------------
22.39 Sun Oct  9 19:16:54 1988   tom chapin (tjc) 
 Senses "filter" reality:  The spectrum which we can see is a tiny part
[PAUSE]        of the whole.  The spectrum which we can hear is a tiny part of the
 whole.  We don't have any idea how many other spectra may exist which
 we, due to our human limitations, may have no access to.  But the 
 smallness of the percentage we can see and hear suggests (no, not entails)
 the immensity of that we have no access to.  Because we are so limited, our
 knowledge is provisional and thus cannot be called knowledge of reality as
 it exists in itself.

-------------------------
22.40 Mon Oct 10 00:40:27 1988   Ben Kovitz (kiwi) 
 All right, you guys, I've been answering questions and trying to explain
 my views and give my definitions--now it's your turn:
 
 WHAT are you referring to when you speak of "knowledge of reality as it
 exists in itself"?  If you can come up with a definition for this, that would
 be best of all.  And, in trying to explain why we can't have "knowledge of 
 reality as it exists in itself", please be sure to illustrate this with some
 concrete examples (this was the "message" of my previous message).  Do you
 guys really believe that you have absolutely no knowledge of your toaster?

-------------------------
22.41 Mon Oct 10 11:30:07 1988   tom chapin (tjc) 
 I love this demand:  Tell me exactly what it is that you don't know.
 Right....
[PAUSE]        
 If we knew what reality really was, we would have no difficulty in
 defining 

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Time Left - 09:06:07
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