********** Sinn FŽin and the 'Peace Process' ***********
      ARRIVING AT THE END OF THE ROAD TO NOWHERE

Since the ending of the 'Cold War', many national 
liberation struggles throughout the world have been 
'settled'.  In places as far apart as South Africa, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua and Palestine these national 
liberation struggles were led by groupings which were 
often seen as having left leanings.  However in all of 
these cases the 'settlement' was far from socialist.  
The current 'Irish peace process' is following exactly 
the same lines and has nothing to offer the Irish 
working class North or South

The announcement of the Provisional IRA cease-fire on 
August 31st 1994 was almost universally welcomed.  In a 
statement, the Workers Solidarity Movement (WSM) stated:

"We welcome the IRA cease-fire.  Over the last 25 years 
over 3,000 people have been killed and 40,000 injured.  
Thousands have been through or are still in prison.  The 
primary blame for these deaths and all the associated 
suffering belongs with the British state..."  (1)

Our welcome for the cease-fire was based on our 
recognition of the fact that the armed struggle was a 
flawed tactic, one

"...incapable of achieving a solution as it is incapable 
of delivering a military victory and defeating the 
British army..." and one which "...relies on the actions 
of a few with the masses left in either a totally 
passive role, or one limited to providing intelligence 
and shelter to the few..."  (2)

However, while welcoming the cease-fire, we drew a very 
clear distinction between this and the "peace process" - 
a process which we saw as being inherently flawed

"The 'peace process' as it is called, will not deliver a 
united socialist Ireland, or significant improvements 
apart from those associated with 'de-militarisation'.  
In addition it represents a hardening of traditional 
nationalism, and the goal of getting an alliance of all 
the nationalists - Fianna Fail, SDLP, Sinn Fein and the 
Catholic Church."  (3)

Sound of silence

Over twelve months later, the cease-fire holds firm, the 
people of the 6-Counties have enjoyed the 'sound of 
silence' of the guns for over a year and a semblance of 
normality has returned to the area after 25 years of 
war.

But, as the British government continues to drag its 
heels even on the simple concessions which normally 
follow the ending of conflict such as prisoner release 
and round-table inclusive talks, and as the Sinn FŽin 
leadership appears to have totally capitulated on its 
ultimate objective of a 32-County Socialist Republic and 
subsumed itself into the Pan-Nationalist Alliance of 
SDLP/Dublin and 'Irish-America', many republican 
supporters are left floundering and asking themselves 
exactly what is going on.

Less than two short years ago Gerry Adams, Martin 
McGuinness et al - as far as the media and mainstream 
politicians were concerned - were "godfathers of 
violence" for whom the English language did not contain 
sufficient condemnatory terms.  Now they are feted by 
Bill Clinton in the White House, wined and dined at 
$1,000-a-plate dinners and rub shoulders with captains 
of industry.  How has this come about?  And, more 
importantly, how does it square with their professed aim 
of a Socialist Republic?  How must those who believed in 
the republicans' 'left turn' in the 1980s feel now?

In order to answer these questions or even to begin to 
understand the logic of the current republican position, 
it is necessary to look back at the origins of the 
Provisional movement and to study the politics on which 
it was founded.

Following the disastrous border campaign of 1956 - 1962, 
the IRA was practically non-existent, retaining only a 
handful of members and being regarded by most working-
class nationalists as a thing of the past.  Meantime, 
the nationalist middle-class had given up waiting for a 
united Ireland and had instead begun to look for 
equality of opportunity within the 6-County State.  It 
was from this layer that the Northern Ireland Civil 
Rights Association (NICRA) was formed in 1967 with a 
very moderate (in any state that even pretends to be 
democratic) list of demands - one man (sic), one vote; 
allocation of housing on a points system; redrawing of 
gerrymandered electoral boundaries; repeal of the 
Special Powers Act; abolition of the notorious B-
Specials; laws against discrimination in local 
government.  The issue of the border was not even 
raised.

However, because the Northern State had been founded on 
discrimination, even these moderate demands could not be 
acceded to.  Nor could the bigots who controlled the 
State allow dissension in the form of public protest.  
When the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) attacked the 
second Civil Rights march on October 5th 1968 in Derry, 
the die was cast.

The Peoples Democracy (PD) organised march from Belfast 
to Derry in January 1969 was to be a key turning point.  
When the 100 marchers were attacked by about 350 
loyalists throwing rocks and stones at Burntollet 
Bridge, the RUC stood by and watched.

The naked sectarianism and irreformability of the Orange 
State had been dramatically exposed.  Just seven months 
later the British army were back on the streets when the 
RUC found themselves incapable of restoring order 
following what became known as the "Siege of Derry".

British Guns

Up to this stage the IRA were non-existent in terms of 
military activity.  The gun had been re-introduced to 
Northern politics, not by a highly organised republican 
movement determined to wreak havoc, but by the forces of 
the British State.  It is interesting to note that the 
first death, the first dead soldier, the first dead 
policeman, the first dead child and the first bombing 
were all at the hands of British or Loyalist forces.  
The lesson appeared clear - if even the modest demands 
of the Civil Rights Movement were met with such massive 
repression by the State, there was no alternative but to 
meet force with force.  Unfortunately the left at the 
time failed to offer a coherent alternative and so 25 
painful years of war and bloodshed had begun.

The Provisional movement was formed following a split in 
the Republican movement in January 1970.  When the Sinn 
FŽin Ard Fheis (Conference) of that month voted to end 
the traditional policy of abstentionism from Stormont, 
the Dail and Westminster, the dissidents walked out.  
They established a provisional army council of the IRA 
and a caretaker Sinn FŽin executive.

Their first public statements strongly attacked the 
leftward trend in the organisation and were vehemently 
anti-communist.  In its Easter statement of 1970 the 
Provisional IRA army council stated:

"Irish freedom will not be won by involvement with an 
international movement of extreme socialism."  (4)

But it would be wrong to see the split as simply being 
along left-right lines.  Many of the Officials (as the 
other wing became known) had become reformists and were 
in favour of a strategy of working through parliament to 
effect change - even being willing to take their seats 
in Stormont - the notorious symbol of oppression - if 
elected.

Because of the reformist nature of the Officials many of 
the younger militants - especially in the North - joined 
the Provisionals despite the fact that at the time they 
were controlled by right-wing traditional nationalists 
who wanted no truck with socialism.

Throughout the early 1970s, the Provos engaged the 
British in a hugely intensive war of attrition.  Events 
such as Bloody Sunday in Derry (when 13 civilians were 
killed by the Parachute Regiment during a Civil Rights 
March on Sunday 30th January 1972) brought floods of 
recruits.  When the British sent heavily-armed troops 
into IRA no-go areas in Belfast and Derry in July 1972, 
there were 95 deaths.  In the previous four months there 
had been 5,500 shooting incidents and hundreds of car 
bombs had devastated the centres of many Northern towns.  
(5)

Throughout this time, the IRA remained heavily dependant 
on the conservative American Noraid network for funding.  
Joe Cahill had on the IRA's behalf promised Noraid that 
they would deliver"...a republic without socialist or 
communist ideas..."  (6).  General Army Order No. 8 
banned military activity in the 26-Counties and 
political work in the South was confined to support for 
the Northern IRA.

Following a brief cease-fire in 1972 during which six 
Provo leaders - including Gerry Adams and Martin 
McGuinness - were flown to London for talks with British 
government ministers, the IRA campaign resumed.  At this 
time too Loyalist paramilitary groups wreaked havoc with 
a particularly vicious sectarian campaign of terror 
aimed at the Catholic population.

Flawed Strategy

It was the Provisionals' cease-fire of 1974-1975 however 
which was to show up for the first time one of the flaws 
in a strategy which relied solely on a military campaign 
- especially one with a purely nationalist base.  
Speaking of this period 10 years later, in 1985, Gerry 
Adams was to say

"When the struggle was limited to armed struggle, the 
prolongation of the truce meant that there was no 
struggle at all.  There was nothing but confusion, 
frustration and demoralisation, arising directly from 
what I call spectator politics"  (7)

By the 1978, Sinn Fein Ard Fheis disaffection with the 
leadership's handling of the 1975 truce had begun to 
assert itself and Adams was elected to the position of 
Vice-President.  A new leadership began to emerge based 
around Adams, Tom Hartley, Joe Austin and Danny 
Morrison.  There was much talk - especially among the 
prisoners - of socialism and of replacing the 
reactionary nationalist outlook of the past.  A new type 
of community politics began to emerge with Republicans 
being encouraged to involve themselves in community 
groups, trade unions and cultural groups.

It was the beginning of the 'blanket protest' following 
the removal of the prisoners' 'special category status' 
in March 1976 which was to lead eventually to the hunger 
strikes of 1980 and 1981 and the highpoint of support 
for the Republican cause throughout the 32-Counties.  By 
1980, with Margaret Thatcher in power, there were 380 
prisoners taking part in the 'no wash' protest and 
preparations for a hunger strike were well under way.

When the prison protests began in 1976, Sinn FŽin as an 
organisation seemed incapable of the sort of political 
agitation necessary to highlight the prisoners' plight.  
When a conference was held in Coalisland, Co. Tyrone in 
January 1978 to discuss the building of a broad anti-
Unionist front which would campaign on the prisons 
issue, Sinn FŽin criticised the naivety of the 
organisers and basically put forward the proposition 
that only those who offered uncritical support for the 
IRA's campaign were entitled to get involved.  However 
by October 1979 when a further Conference was held in 
the Green Briar Hall in Andersonstown, the Sinn FŽin 
line had changed dramatically and Gerry Adams proposed 
to the conference a list of 5 demands around which a 
"Smash H-Block" campaign could be built.  These demands 
were:

(1) To be exempt from wearing prison clothes.

(2) To be exempt from prison work.

(3) To have freedom of association with fellow political 
prisoners.

(4) The right to organise educational and recreational 
facilities, to have one weekly visit, to receive and 
send out one letter per week and to receive one parcel 
per week.

(5) Entitlement to full remission of sentence

These demands were agreed by the Conference and became 
the central plank of the National H- Block/Armagh 
Committee.  While this Committee worked to raise public 
awareness and bring pressure on the British government 
on the issue, Sinn FŽin was involved in secret 
negotiations with, among others, Cardinal Tom‡s O'Fiach 
- the head of the Irish Catholic Church - to try and 
persuade him to intervene with the British on the 
prisoners' behalf.

Meanwhile pressure from inside the prisons was growing 
and Sinn Fein began to come to the realisation that they 
had to organise politically - especially in the 26-
Counties - if they were to make progress.

Hunger Strike

In October 1980, the prisoners in the H-Blocks decided 
that their only hope of pressing home the issue of 
prison status was to go on hunger strike.  In a 
communication sent in to Bobby Sands, Gerry Adams stated 
that the leadership of the republican movement 
was"...tactically, strategically, physically and morally 
opposed to a hunger strike."  (8)

The prisoners however, were determined to press ahead 
with their plans.  The first hunger strike lasted for 53 
days and involved nearly 40 prisoners in the H-Blocks 
and Armagh.  There were pickets, marches and riots 
throughout the 6-Counties.  In Dublin, 12,000 people 
marched in support of the prisoners in late October and 
a further 2,000 picketed a summit meeting between 
Thatcher and Taoiseach Charles Haughey on 8th December.  
Republican strategists began to realise that political 
agitation could be a strong weapon in their arsenal.

On 18th December - with one of the hunger strikers, Se‡n 
McKenna, fast approaching death - the British government 
indicated that if the fast was called off some of their 
demands would be met.  The prisoners decided to end the 
protest but discovered very quickly that the document 
presented to them by the British fell far short of 
meeting their demands.  Almost immediately, preparations 
began for another hunger strike.

Again the Sinn FŽin leadership attempted to dissuade the 
prisoners from their proposed course of action

"...in terms of the political priorities of the moment, 
we did not want the hunger strike.  We were just 
beginning our attempts to remedy the political 
underdevelopment of the movement, trying to develop the 
organisation, engaging in a gradual build-up of new 
forms of struggle and, in particular, we were working 
out our strategy in relation to elections.  We were well 
aware that a hunger strike such as was proposed would 
demand exclusive attention, would, in effect, hijack the 
struggle, and this conflicted with our sense of the 
political priorities of the moment."  (9)

Bobby Sands

But the prisoners were determined.  They felt they had 
no alternative and plans went ahead.  On 1st March 1981 
Bobby Sands was the first to refuse food.  Over the 
course of the next seven months, ten republican 
prisoners - members of both the IRA and the INLA (Irish 
National Liberation Army) - were to die on hunger 
strike.  The National H-Block/Armagh Committee - set up 
on a humanitarian/ pan-nationalist axis - was to 
organise protests, pickets, marches, riots and even some 
strike action throughout the 32-Counties.  It was a 
period of mass action but also one of missed 
opportunity.  It was a period also which was to have 
long-term effects on the direction of Sinn Fein's 
developing political strategy:

"The hunger strike did away with spectator politics.  
When the only form of struggle being waged was armed 
struggle, it only needed a small number of people to 
engage in it.  But, with the hunger strike, people could 
play an active role which could be as limited or as 
important as billposting, writing letters, or taking 
part in numerous forms of protest."  (10)

The mass action was indeed impressive.  In the week of 
Bobby Sands' funeral, for example, over 10,000 marched 
in Dublin, 5,000 in Limerick, 4,000 in Cork.  There were 
big marches in Waterford, Tralee, Killarney, Wexford, 
Bray, Meath, Monaghan, Donegal and many other places.  
In Belfast over 100,000 people attended the funeral.  
There were work stoppages - some organised, some 
spontaneous - all over the country, including Dublin 
Corporation maintenance depots, Alcan's construction 
site in Limerick (2,500 workers), Arigna mines in Co. 
Leitrim, building sites in Dublin, factories and shops 
in Limerick, Cork, Cobh, Tralee, Wexford, Bray, Sligo, 
Donegal, Leitrim, Monaghan.  Trades Councils in places 
such as Waterford, Dungarvan, Meath, Dundalk and 
Drogheda called successful stoppages.  (11)  There were 
daily pickets and protests in almost every town in 
Ireland.

While this was in many ways people power at its best, 
the necessity to maintain friendly relations with the 
'broad nationalist family' which included Southern 
political parties, the Catholic Church and the GAA meant 
that it had to be controlled.  Thus the 100,000 people 
who attended Sands' funeral were told to go home and 
wait for the Republican movement to take its revenge.  
Thus also the failure to make workplace and community 
struggle the spearhead of the campaign.  Ultimately the 
period was to prove the acid test of Sinn FŽin's 
'socialism' - a test they were to fail miserably.

The real lesson that Sinn FŽin took from the H-Block 
Campaign happened almost by chance.  The sudden death of 
Frank Maguire, independent MP for Fermanagh/South Tyrone 
raised the possibility of a prisoner candidate standing 
in the bye-election.  Bobby Sands was duly nominated and 
elected with 30,492 votes.  Sands' election literature 
sought to "borrow" the votes of the electorate.  Voters 
were told that by lending their votes they could help 
save Sands' life.  In the following election they could 
go back to supporting their usual candidates.  
Apparently it would have been expecting too much to hope 
that people would vote for an IRA man because they 
supported what the Republican Movement stood for.

When Charles Haughey called a general election in the 
26-Counties for 11th June, Republican prisoners stood as 
candidates in 9 constituencies.  Paddy Agnew (Louth) and 
Kieran Doherty (Cavan/Monaghan) were elected.  Kevin 
Lynch missed a seat in Waterford by just 300 votes.  The 
electoral successes were to have two effects.  Firstly, 
the Dublin and London governments moved to marginalise 
the Republican Movement through a process of extended 
collaboration that lead to the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 
1985 and the extradition legislation of 1987.  For Sinn 
FŽin, the message they took from the period was that"Our 
tentative moves towards adopting an electoral strategy 
were rapidly concluded with the electoral success of 
that year.  The centrality of mass popular struggle 
eventually found its place alongside the armed 
struggle."  (12)

Buoyed by the prisoners' electoral successes many 
Republicans began to believe that not only should an 
electoral strategy become more central to the overall 
struggle but that it was only a matter of putting up 
candidates and winning seats.  Thus the "armalite and 
ballot box" tactic was developed and indeed it appeared 
to meet with considerable success in the 6-County area.  
In the 1982 elections to the newly-established "Northern 
Assembly" Sinn FŽin candidates got 64,191 first 
preference votes and Adams (West Belfast), Jim McAlister 
(Armagh), Martin McGuinness (Derry), Danny Morrison 
(Mid-Ulster) and Owen Carron (Fermanagh/South Tyrone) 
were all elected.  In elections to Westminster in June 
1983 the Sinn Fein vote increased to 13.4% and Gerry 
Adams was elected MP for West Belfast.

'Left Turn'?

The first cracks began to appear in the traditional 
policy of abstentionism at the 1983 Ard Fheis when a 
decision was taken to contest the upcoming elections to 
the European Parliament and to take seats if elected.  
But it was the decision of this Ard Fheis to replace the 
movement's commitment to "Christian principles" to 
"Irish Republican Socialist principles" which was to 
lead many to believe, over the subsequent decade, that 
Sinn FŽin had taken a 'left turn'.  Ruairi O'Br‡daigh 
resigned as President and Adams was elected to the 
position.

When the Euro elections were held, the Sinn FŽin vote in 
the 6-Counties was down slightly to 13.3%.  In the South 
- where in the 1982 general election the SF vote in the 
key constituencies of Louth and Cavan/Monaghan had 
halved since the hunger strike election - their total 
vote was only 2%.  In the 1985 Northern local elections, 
the Sinn FŽin vote slipped further, to under 12% but 
they had 59 Councillors elected.

In the South the electoral breakthrough never came.  As 
one Sinn FŽin activist put it:

"...we were not going to get votes in Ballymun because 
the Brits were battering down doors in Ballymurphy"  
(13)

The need to 'become relevant' to 26-County voters meant 
that Sinn FŽin activists were encouraged to become 
involved in community and trade union activities.  Much 
good work was done by SF activists on the drugs issue in 
Dublin, for example, over the next couple of years.  
However, there was a glaring dichotomy.  The strategy 
being formulated by the leadership - that of developing 
a 'Pan-Nationalist Alliance', an "...Irish Ireland 
movement to offset, especially in the 26-Counties, the 
neo-colonial and anti-national mentality that exists 
there"  (14), meant that direct conflict with the 26-
County government had to be avoided.  Instead of 
realising that the failure to make 'an electoral 
breakthrough' in the 26-Counties was directly 
attributable to the failure to offer a radical socialist 
alternative, the leadership decided instead that the 
problem was abstentionism.  At the 1986 Ard-Fheis the 
decision was taken to enter Leinster House if elected 
and many of the "old guard" left to form Republican Sinn 
FŽin.

Anarchists would of course argue that the decision to 
use the tactic of participation in elections in the 
first place would inevitably lead to reformism.  The 
decision to drop abstentionism was just one more step in 
that process.  True socialism cannot be achieved through 
the parliamentary process.  Participation in elections 
has the dual effect of maintaining illusions in the 
State apparatus and of taking away all possibility of 
self-activity among the working-class and replacing it 
with a reliance on voting for 'good representatives' 
every couple of years.

While Sinn FŽin continued - and still continues - to 
call itself a socialist party, the central policy became 
one of creating the much talked about "Pan Nationalist 
Alliance".  Much of the leadership's thinking on this 
issue was included in a document entitled "A Strategy 
For Peace" given by Sinn FŽin to the SDLP during a 
series of meetings between the two parties in 1988.  
These meetings had come about as a result of an 
extensive series of contacts between Sinn FŽin, 
representatives of the Catholic Church and indirect 
contact with Taoiseach Charles Haughey.  In the 
document, Sinn FŽin called for a date for British 
withdrawal, saying that, "Within the new situation 
created by these measures [withdrawal], it is then a 
matter of business-like negotiations between the 
representatives of all the Irish parties, and this 
includes those who represent today's loyalist voter, to 
set the constitutional, economic, social and political 
arrangements for a new Irish state.... the British 
government needs to be met with a firm united and 
unambiguous demand from all Irish Nationalist parties 
for an end to the Unionist veto and a declaration of a 
date for withdrawal...."

One of the aims of the SF/SDLP talks was, according to 
the document,"That Sinn FŽin and the SDLP join forces to 
impress on the Dublin government the need to launch an 
international and diplomatic offensive to secure 
national self-determination."

It must be remembered that this proposal was made at a 
time of unprecedented co-operation between the Dublin 
and London governments in an attempt to marginalise and 
smash the Republican Movement.  The Anglo-Irish 
Agreement of 1985, which Gerry Adams himself describes 
as "...a coming together of the various British 
strategies on an all-Ireland basis, with the Dublin 
government acting as the new guarantor of partition"  
(15) was already two years in place.  Haughey was in the 
process of extraditing republicans and tightening up 
security co-operation with the British forces.  And 
workers and the unemployed in the 26-Counties were 
facing a severe economic onslaught under the terms of 
the government-union-employer deal, the "Programme for 
National Recovery " (PNR).

Socialism?

So what of the 'left turn'?  Adams still described 
himself as a socialist so he must have seen some role 
for socialists in the "Irish Ireland movement".  And 
indeed he did:

"The true socialist will be an active supporter of the 
republican character of the national independence 
movement.  She or he will realise that, unless this 
character is maintained and unless the most radical 
forces are in the leadership of the independence 
struggle, then inevitably it must fail or compromise.  
This classical view of the matter contrasts with the 
ultra-left view, which counterpoises republicanism and 
socialism and which breaks up the unity of the national 
independence movement by putting forward 'socialist' 
demands that have no possibility of being achieved until 
real independence is won. " (16) [my emphasis]. 

In essence, it's the classic stages theory - national 
independence first, then we can think about socialism.  
A significant section of the 'nationalist' ruling class 
- so the theory goes - can be drawn into the fight for a 
united Ireland, if we don't frighten them off by 
screaming too loudly about poverty, unemployment or the 
ills of capitalism!

This 'tread very carefully' philosophy was seen clearly 
during the Anti-Extradition Campaign of the late 1980s.  
Appeal after appeal was made to the 'grassroots' of 
Fianna Fail (FF) and attempts were made, to quote from a 
motion from the National Committee to one of its first 
conferences,"...to play on the inherent contradictions 
within the party [FF] between the old Dev'ites and the 
newer monetarists.."

At another Conference, a National Committee document 
stated"A primary means of pressurising Fianna Fail is 
through their own party structures."

Because this remained a key focus of the campaign, event 
after event was scaled down or cancelled entirely for 
fear of alienating the couple of backbench TDs who it 
was hoped would issue a statement against extradition.  
Thus when the January 1988 Conference of the Irish Anti-
Extradition Committee (IAEC) took a decision to stage a 
large demonstration outside the Fianna Fail Ard Fheis, 
this decision was countermanded by Sinn FŽin and only a 
small picket took place.

Indeed this situation reached farcical heights following 
the extradition of Robert Russell in August, 1988.  At 
the first National Committee meeting of the IAEC 
following Russell's extradition, Norah Comiskey, Richard 
Greene and Jim Doyle (all FF members) with the support 
of SF were still talking about organising meetings of FF 
members against extradition and even seriously discussed 
holding a press conference to call for the removal of 
Haughey as leader of FF and his replacement by a "true 
republican".

The lessons of that period should have been clear.  The 
complete failure of the anti-extradition campaign to 
make an impact should have taught Sinn FŽin that any 
alliance with bosses - even if in this case the alliance 
was more illusory than real - is one dominated 
politically by bosses.  Instead, however, the drive to 
create the "Pan-Nationalist Alliance" was intensified.

By the early 1990s the "Irish Peace Process" (as Sinn 
Fein was labelling it) was well under way and Sinn FŽin 
and the British government were in regular secret 
contact.  Northern Secretary Peter Brooke had publicly 
acknowledged that he found it "...difficult to envisage 
a military defeat of the IRA."  (17)  On the other side 
of the coin, Republicans had realised that a military 
victory for the IRA was not a possibility.  

The British were saying that they had no selfish 
interest in staying in the 6-Counties, and Brooke was 
involved in a series of 'talks about talks' with 
Unionist parties and the SDLP.  At Sinn Fein's Wolfe 
Tone commemoration in June 1991, Adams stated

"While Dublin and the SDLP refuse to stand up to the 
British government it will continue to think it can do 
exactly what it wants in Ireland......Dublin should seek 
a change in Britain's current policy of maintaining the 
union to one of ending it and handing over sovereignty 
to an all-Ireland government, democratically elected and 
accountable to the Irish nation.  Dublin should use the 
opportunity of these talks [Brooke talks] to persuade 
the unionists that their future lies in this context and 
to persuade the British to accept that they have a 
responsibility to influence the unionist position.  To 
secure a national and international consensus on this 
the Dublin government needs a strategy for unity and 
independence.  Such a strategy would involve winning 
international support for the demand for Irish 
independence and would require the full use of Irish 
diplomatic skills and resources."  (18)

Nobody ever explained how a government which was 
presiding over massive unemployment and poverty, which 
had - over the previous 5 years - imposed severe 
restrictions on the living standards of workers and the 
unemployed through "National Programmes" 
(government/employer/union deals) and which was quite 
efficiently fulfilling its role as a junior partner in 
the western capitalist system was likely to persuade the 
unionists that life in a 32-County State was going to be 
any better for them.  The realpolitik of the Pan-
Nationalist Alliance meant that the need to smash both 
states on the island and replace them with a Socialist 
Republic was quietly shelved.  Instead it was more 
important to play footsie with Dublin and 'Irish-
America'.  Such a policy was never likely to win 
working-class Unionists over from the Orange bigots.  

Persuaders for Unity!

Not alone did Sinn FŽin now call on the Dublin 
government to take up the banner of "Irish 
Independence", but the call also went out to the British 
government to"...join the ranks of the persuaders in 
seeking to obtain the consent of all sections to the 
constitutional, political and financial arrangements 
needed to establish a united Ireland."  (19)

With the publication of the Sinn FŽin document "Towards 
a Lasting Peace in Ireland" in 1992, the strategy was 
fully in place.  The central thrust of the document was 
that Britain must "join the persuaders" and Dublin must 
"...persuade the British that partition has 
failed,...persuade the unionists of the benefits of 
Irish reunification, and....persuade the international 
community that it should support a real peace process in 
Ireland."  (20)

The first steps were now being taken to establish the 
'Irish American' arm of the axis.  "Americans for a New 
Irish Agenda" was set up by, among others, a former U.S. 
Congressman, Bruce Morrison.  Adams and Hume went public 
on the results of their discussions in April 1993.  In 
June - amidst great controversy - Mary Robinson, the 26-
County President, visited Belfast and shook hands with 
Gerry Adams.  It was to be the first of many famous 
handshakes and the first public acknowledgement of Adams 
the peace-maker.

The Warrington bombing of March 1993 in which two 
children were killed brought intense criticism of the 
armed campaign from both inside and outside the 
Republican Movement.  The massive car bomb which was 
exploded in the City of London in April, causing 
millions of pounds worth of damage, reminded the British 
government that the IRA was still a force to be reckoned 
with.

Realising that the initiative could not be left in the 
hands of Sinn FŽin, Dublin and London had meanwhile been 
involved in drawing up their own set of proposals.  The 
Downing Street Declaration - launched in December - was 
a classic fudge.  In the House of Commons Prime Minister 
John Major said that the Declaration did not contain 
"...any suggestion that the British government should 
join the ranks of the persuaders of the value or 
legitimacy of a united Ireland...".  Meantime in the 
D‡il Taoiseach Albert Reynolds was saying that "...for 
the first time ever, the right to self-determination of 
the people of Ireland is acknowledged...".

Despite the fact that Downing St. contained nothing that 
had not been in the Anglo-Irish Agreement, Sinn FŽin 
felt that its strategy was in place and that it was in a 
stronger position than in 1985.  Therefore, despite 
nearly eight months of procrastination, it was only 
going to be a matter of time until the IRA cease-fire 
was declared.  The rapidity with which the Sinn Fein 
leadership was accepted into the arms of 
'respectability' caught many by surprise.  For Adams, 
McGuinness et al it was, however, simply the culmination 
of a strategy built up over many years.

Sinn FŽin now declares as its priority:

"...to move the peace process forward...to build on the 
gains which have been made and to move speedily forward 
into all-party talks led by both the British and Irish 
governments...to bring about an inclusive and negotiated 
end to British jurisdiction in Ireland.  We seek to 
replace it with an agreed Irish jurisdiction."(21)

If socialism had to wait throughout the seventies and 
eighties, the realpolitik of the nineties means that the 
word should not even be mentioned for fear of upsetting 
John Bruton, John Hume or Bill Clinton.  Republicans 
might well be justified in asking if this is what Bobby 
Sands died for.

Multinationals

Meanwhile, Sinn FŽin has no difficulty in attending Bill 
Clinton's "Investing in Ireland" Conference (Washington 
24/5/95), attended by the chief executives of some of 
the biggest multinationals in the world all looking to 
see if Ireland can provide them with tax breaks and low 
wages to extract even more profits.  Their Northern 
Chairperson Gear—id O'Hara calls on the anti-union 
multinational Seagate not to cease their exploitation of 
Irish workers but to offer training schemes to 
"...afford the youth of Derry the chance to become the 
direction and decision-makers of industry in their own 
country..."  (22).  In the course of a debate in the 
U.S., the same Mr. O'Hara can declare that Sinn FŽin 
"...have no problem with capitalism."  (23)

The only surprising thing is that anybody should be 
surprised.  This is simply the logical consequence of 
the type of 'nation-state' politics pursued by Sinn FŽin 
over the years.  If "labour must wait" then labour will 
always be left behind.  This is not a uniquely Irish 
phenomenon.  It has happened and is happening throughout 
the world, the most notable recent examples being the 
ANC in South Africa and the PLO in Palestine.  Because 
the driving political force has been nationalist rather 
than socialist in nature, compromise with and the 
eventual acceptance of capitalism is inevitable even for 
those who continue to call themselves socialists.

This is not because - as some might claim - the SF 
leadership have "sold out" on their socialism.  The 
entire direction of the 'Peace Process' shows instead 
the bankruptcy of nationalist politics and the fact that 
nationalist alliances have nothing of consequence to 
offer the working-class.  'Socialism' is useful to the 
Republicans at times as a slogan to show why they are 
different, to mark them out from other members of the 
"nationalist family".  However the most important aim is 
to develop and maintain unity among that nationalist 
family.  In order to do this the socialist slogans must 
be left on the backburner, to be resurrected now and 
again, usually at election time, when they are useful.  
With time, the slogans become less and less useful and 
will eventually be disposed of entirely.  Nationalists 
see their rightful role as being that of governing 
"their" States and will do deals with almost anybody to 
be allowed to fulfil that role. 

The question which remains is to ask what future there 
is for Sinn FŽin.  In the absence of the military 
campaign (which is extremely unlikely to re-commence 
under the present leadership for a variety of reasons), 
is there any real space for Sinn FŽin's politics?  One 
thing is clear - Sinn FŽin may describe itself as 
"socialist", it may have as its objective a 32-County 
Socialist Republic but it does not have the policies or 
the ability to deliver on that objective.  Already one 
Sinn FŽin activist has been quoted in a national Sunday 
newspaper as saying that Sinn FŽin could well be part of 
the next government in the 26-Counties (if of course 
they manage to get anyone elected!).  As a nationalist 
party, Sinn FŽin has actually achieved one of its main 
objectives of the last decade - the Pan-Nationalist 
Alliance is firmly in place, even if the British 
government is hardly shaking in its shoes at the sight 
of it.  With the demand for immediate unconditional 
British withdrawal having been replaced by a plea for 
"inclusive all-party talks", Sinn FŽin look set to 
become yet another moderate 'party of the centre'.  
Without an armed campaign to support, their politics 
differ little from those of the other mainstream Irish 
political parties.  Genuine socialists who are members 
of Sinn FŽin should be asking themselves why. 


REFERENCES
(1) WORKERS SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT (WSM) statement 7/9/1994
(2) WSM Position Paper: The National Question (adopted 
January 1991)
(3) WSM statement 7/9/1994
(4) AN PHOBLACHT Vol. 1, No. 3: quoted in FARRELL, 
MICHAEL: Northern Ireland; The Orange State. Page 270
(5) source: BOWYER BELL, J.: IRA Tactics and Targets. 
Page 18
(6) CLARKE, LIAM: Broadening the Battlefield; The H-
Blocks and the Rise of Sinn Fein. Page 13
(7) Bobby Sands Memorial Lecture, 5/5/1985; quoted in 
CLARKE, LIAM op. cit. Page 29
(8) quoted in ibid. Page 121
(9) ADAMS, GERRY: Free Ireland; Towards a Lasting Peace. 
Page 79
(10) ibid. Page 86
(11) AN PHOBLACHT/REPUBLICAN NEWS (AP/RN) Sat. 9/5/1981
(12) GIBNEY, JIM speaking on 10th anniversary of hunger 
strikes, quoted in AP/RN 22/11/90
(13) CLARKE, LIAM op. cit. Page 226
(14) ADAMS, GERRY op.cit. Page 135
(15) ibid. Page 108
(16) ibid. Page 133
(17) quoted in ibid. Page 199
(18) AP/RN 27/6/91
(19) ADAMS, GERRY op.cit. Page 203
(20) ibid. Page 209
(21) ADAMS, GERRY speaking to United Nations 
Correspondents Association 5/5/95
(22) DERRY JOURNAL 24/5/95
(23) IRISH TIMES 10/5/95

