
Mexico: A Political Prognosis and
Analysis
Or The Once and Future EZLN

By Matt Miscreant and Todd Prane

The "armed" part of the rebellion in
southern Mexico lasted just 10 days, but
the stand off may last much longer.  The
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
needs a legitimate victory in the August
21st elections if they are to continue
on their neo-liberal path; the Zapatista
National Liberation Army (EZLN) could
exploit the political turmoil around the
elections, if they are still a political
force in Mexico at that time. Against
this backdrop, and with the August
elections still wide-open (creating the
possibility of the first new ruling
party in six decades), it seems like a
good time to take a quick look around.

The Negotiations

The EZLN and representatives of the PRI
finally sat down at the Cathedral in San
Crist=F3bal de las Casas on Feb. 21.  The
talks were mediated by Archbishop Samuel
Ruiz Garc=EDa, and the chief negotiators
were Manuel Camacho Sol=EDs for the PRI
and members of the Clandestine
Indigenous Revolutionary Committee--
General Command for the EZLN.  The
Zapatistas' demands were a mixture of
revolution and reform, with some of the
apparently reformist demands actually
requiring revolutionary change.  The
government  declared that it will meet
parts of the demands, mostly in ways
that only look like change This is
consistent with the PRI's history of
seeming to accept radical demands (thus
the Institutional Revolutionary Party)
though in reality co-opting them.  The
government has gone so far as to
characterize the negotiations as
agreements needing only a signature. 
The EZLN responded: "If the supreme
government wants to present the
documents of San Crist=F3bal as
'agreements,' then let's consider the
EZLN's list of demands the 'agreement'
and guarantee democracy in the next
elections with the resignation of the
federal president."  The government's
mis-characterization of the dialogue has
threatened the talks and the chance for
a peaceful solution with the Zapatistas.

Indeed, it is doubtful that a peaceful
solution is possible; the Zapatistas
probably will not agree to any
settlement that does not incorporate
their more revolutionary demands, such
as the resignation of President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari, which would likely
spell the end of the PRI's hegemony and
radically open up political space in
Mexico. It is likely that the EZLN
realizes that the PRI will not meet
their more radical demands and is only
buying time to increase their strength.

Time is on the side of the Zapatistas,
who have been quietly organizing for ten
years, and not to fight for only ten
days.  As Sub-Commander Marcos said in a
letter to the editor of Tiempo:  "Taking
power?  No, something far more
difficult.  A new world."

Time is not on the side of the PRI,
whose power will be at stake in the
August elections.  Should the PRI win
again they will likely be accused of
election fraud yet again, which in the
current political climate could lead to
radical consequences; it is important to
remember the uprisings that happened
after the last elections were stolen
from center-left candidate Cuahut=E9moc
C=E1rdenas.  Also, it is rumored that
other radical-left armed groups will
begin a war on the federal government in
August, possibly providing the
Zapatistas with armed allies in other
parts of the country [see L&R vol. 5.
no. 1].

The Assassination and the August
Elections

The entire negotiation process had the
undesireable effect of increasing
President Salinas' popularity (due to
the perception that he "handled the
situation" well.)  The negotiations also
increased the popularity of Manuel
Camacho Sol=EDs.  Camacho Sol=EDs, once a
PRI presidential hopeful, was passed
over in favor of Luis Donaldo Colosio
Murrieta, but after the negotiations
seemed likely for an independent
candidacy. Such a candidacy would have
floored the PRI by drawing away large
amounts of their most solid support. 
Camacho, however coincidentally,
announced that he would not seek
national office the day before Colosio
was shot.

Colosio was assassinated on March 23,
1994, in Tijuana by Mario Aburto
Mart=EDnez, a 23-year old Tijuana
resident. This was big news, even in the
US, for two reasons: the first is that
no prominent Mexican politician had been
assassinated since 1928 when President-
elect General Alvaro Obreg=F3n was killed; 
the second is that Colosio's death
throws an already uncertain election
into complete disarray and raises all
kinds of questions about the killer and
his motivations.  Both of those factors,
in the context of the ongoing situation
in Chiapas, add up to a fear on the part
of American investors that Mexico is
unable to maintain a capitalist
democracy and will fall prey to the same
difficulties as Guatemala, El Salvador,
Per=FA, and so many other Latin American
countries.  The assassination gives more
substance to a joke that was already
circulating in Mexico:  President Carlos
Salinas went to sleep on New Year's Eve
thinking that he would wake up in the
First World and woke up on New Year's
Day in the Third.

However, with the assassination of
Colosio, the PRI had an opportunity to
change the political climate and
nominate a new, more popular candidate. 
Instead, they have shown their
commitment to business as usual, which
means neo-liberal economics/class war on
Mexico's poor, by selecting another
faceless technocrat, Ernesto Zedillo
Ponce de Le=F3n, to run in Colosio's
place.  The line of faceless bureaucrats
is long and the assassination of Colosio
has not resulted in a real change in the
PRI. What it has done, however, is two
things:  1) At the same time reaffirm
the PRI's committment to avoiding
internal democracy (within the party)
and further destabilize the PRI's
position, increasing the chance for the
need to steal the elections; 2) Raise
all sorts of questions about who would
have motives to shoot Colosio with
speculations about everyone from the PRI
to the Pope.

All of this gets back to the question of
the negotiations and how, exactly they
shifted the political balance in Mexico.
The EZLN quickly denied any involvement
in the assassination, though it appeared
they might be subject to an assault by
the Federal Army in the wake of the
killing.  Immediately following the act,
Federal Army troops appeared to be
massing to attack, and government planes
made aerial attacks near the highway
between Comit=E1n and Altamirano.

Although this signaled that the PRI
might try to blame the assassination on
the EZLN, the PRI has changed tactics. 
Now the PRI is not blaming the EZLN at
all, but is using the assassination to
build support for themselves in the
elections, using rhetoric which
identifies the PRI with Mexico, claiming
that the assassin killed Mexico itself
when he shot Colosio. Reports published
in the capitalist press services just
prior to L&R going to press indicate
that a right-wing faction within the PRI
may have been responsible for the
assassination. This does not come as
much of a surprise, but it does threaten
the PRI's strategy of turning the
assassination into an assault on all of
Mexico into little more than the usual
internal PRI maneuvering, stepped up a
level. All of this raises questions
about the viability of the PRI in the
next elections.


Solidarity with the EZLN
Even as the EZLN faces questions of its
long-term survival, North American
solidarity groups face the difficult
transition from the excitement- and
communique-filled days of January to
protracted, dependable activity. Most of
the small groupings and even some of the
larger coalitions will quickly fade as
the communiques come more slowly and the
standoff continues. Of central
importance, though, is whether these
groupings will be around in August for
the elections.

Solidarity work in Mexico has been
frenetic.  Demonstrations have been
large and frequent, with activities
building to a huge day of protest to be
held April 10, the 75th anniversary of
the assassination of Emiliano Zapata.
Marchers from most states of the
Republic, notably from Guerrero, have
travelled by foot to the Capitol,
shouting their support for the EZLN (and
fetishizing Subcomandante Marcos) the
whole way. The last leg of the march--
from the state of Mexico into the
Federal District (from the outskirts
into the city)--and the demonstration
will be a good way to gauge ongoing
Mexican public interest in and support
for the EZLN.

At the moment, North American solidarity
work is concentrated around information-
sharing, although material aid caravans
are already being launched, notably by
the Pomo Indians in Northern California,
with the assistance of a broad-based
coalition in the San Francisco Bay Area. 
If activists in North America are to be
of more substantial aid to the Zapatista
revolutionary movement, we need to
expand our activities.  We need to
resist North American intervention--the
US has already sent troops to Guatemala,
just across the border from Chiapas, in
a covert military operation--while
protesting the already-enormous Mexican
Army presence in the state.  Our ability
to stop the capitalist war machine from
crushing the Mexican insurgency may be
crucial to whether the movement brings
about revolutionary change or is
smashed.  Resistance must be coordinated
and groups working in solidarity with
the Zapatistas must be in contact with
each other and work together in a
principled manner--across the border. 
We must be in contact with those we are
in solidarity with and help them in
achieving their liberation, including
giving material aid.  Their liberation
and ours are inextricably linked. 
Freedom cannot exist within the confines
of one country; we cannot separate the
liberation of the Chiapanecos from our
own.

______________________________________
Matt Miscreant is a member of Santa
Cruz-based Zapatista Action Project. 
Todd Prane is a member of New York City-
based Zapatista Solidarity Committee. 
Both are members of Love and Rage
Revolutionary Anarchist Federation.

sources include:  Nicanet Weekly News
Update/339Lafayette St./NY, NY 10012;
New York Transfer News
Service/nyt@blythe.org/(212)675-9690;
Equipo Pueblo/pueblo@laneta.apc.org [add
phone]

Communique Packet #1 of the ZSC:  Dec
31, 1993 through Feb 2, 1994
Info-Bulletin #2 of the ZSC: late Jan,
1993 - March 17, 1994
$1 and three stamps each to Love and
Rage/NYC.

_______________________________________
Fromthe Love and Rage New York News
Bureau Love and Rage is a Revolutionary
Anarchist Federation in Canada, the US
and Mexico.  For more information
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