

SOCIAL ECOLOGY  -  SOME  CONCERNS               -by  Philip  Winn
------------------------------

Murray Bookchin is unquestionably one  of  the  most  interesting
anarchist  theoreticians  to  emerge  in  recent  decades.  It is
impossible in the space  given  to  produce  as  comprehensive  a
critique  as  is  required  to  do  justice  both to the scope of
Bookchin's work and to its inherent problems. I will  touch  here
on only a few concerns.

There's not much new about a person in the West taking  as  their
task  the discovery of the ordering principles of history, within
culture, within reality itself. Just look at Hegel or  Marx.  The
problem arises in the claims these folks make to universal truth.
The construction of Truth always represents a  massive  grab  for
power  -  the power of framing, the power of naming, the power of
valuing. Marxism is a case in point, surely the greatest  act  of
political  chutzpah  the  world has ever seen. At a time when the
very act  of  creating  such  similarly  ambitious  projects  are
finally  being  questioned  and challenged, Bookchin emerges as a
self-described defender of the Western right to present the Grand
Truth.  His particular version is (politically) Social Ecology or
(philosophically) Dialectical Naturalism.

So what are the realms of power present in social  ecology,  what
is  its  particular  regime of inclusions and exclusions?  Again,
there isn't space to deal with them all, but a crucial  exclusion
is   contained  in  its  developmental  view  of  evolution,  the
"directedness"   and   "becoming"   reflected   in    dialectical
naturalism.  Although  Bookchin  tends  to play this aspect down,
other social ecologists accept that  such  a  perspective  places
them  firmly  in  the teleological tradition of Western thinking.
What this implies is that evolution has an inherent  purpose  and
direction,  it moves towards a predetermined goal. Bookchin views
this dynamic as applicable both to the biological  world  and  to
the human social world, creating a perspective that lends support
to theories of cultural evolution - the idea that  human  culture
moves  through  stages, from the most basic (often referred to as
primitive, or simple) through to the most advanced.

It's not surprising to find that the folks who construct  schemes
which  depict  culture  evolving  as a rule tend to put their own
towards the advanced end of any sequence.  For  Bookchin,  it  is
indeed  Western  culture, its modes of knowledge and world views,
its intellectual history  which  is  seen  as  holding  the  most
promise  for  fulfilling the purpose of evolution. The vast array
of indigenous peoples, their knowledges and  world  views,  their
lifeways  and  struggles do not feature in Bookchin's work except
when  relegated  to  the  past,  as  early  "organic   societies"
illustrating  past  events  or  previous  stages in the course of
human history and development. They are universally described  as
"preliterate"  or  "primordial",  and  unfortunately, "flawed" in
numerous ways, most notably in possessing  features  of  "nascent
hierarchy"  -  what  Bookchin  interprets  as  inequalities based
around age and gender, and which  eventually  give  rise  to  the
fully blown hierarchies we are all familiar with.

The ethnocentricity and cultural arrogance of such a position  is
breathtaking   but   again   not   particularly   new   for   the
universalising   Western   intellectual.   Interestingly,   while
challenging   Marx's   theoretical   elevation  of  questions  of
production and economic exploitation  and  replacing  these  with
notions  of  hierarchy and domination, Bookchin ultimately simply
reproducers the classical Marxist depiction of indigenous peoples
and their static culture left behind in the process of historical
advance.

Bookchin is unable however to explain  in  any  meaningful  sense
just  how  these  original  inequalities  and nascent hierarchies
emerged, given the evolutionary impetus  (as  he  interprets  it)
towards  non-hierarchical social and ecological forms inherent in
the Purpose Of Nature.  Simply  saying  that  things  happened  a
certain  way  does not make them so, but this is a common problem
within  Bookchin's  work.  Additionally,  Bookchin  draws  on  an
extremely  limited  range  of material for information to support
his generalising about indigenous cultures, and exhibits a  total
lack  of  appreciation of the current controversies raging in the
anthropological  world  around  issues  of  the   authority   and
legitimacy  of  past and present ethnographic representation. Not
the least of  these  is  the  claim  that  sexism  within  early,
frequently  colonial, accounts led to a widespread neglect of the
role of women in indigenous societies,  problematising  the  easy
accusations   of  inequality  or  injustice  that  are  aimed  at
indigenous people and which continue to be used  to  justify  the
destruction  of  their  lifeways  and  knowledges  by  those  who
consider their own morality,  ethics  civilisation  or  political
purpose as superior.

There is a major contradiction at the heart  of  social  ecology.
It  is  committed  to  diversity  as an expression of dialectical
naturalism but fails to take serious theoretical account  of  one
of  the  most  evident  diverse  productions  of  human  beings -
culture.  If  there  is  inherent,  objective  value  in  natural
diversity,  then  the  multiplicity  of  forms  of human cultural
expression must surely also  contain  value,  must  also  reflect
evolutionary  teleos,  purpose.  If  indeed Nature is to find its
voice through humans, must this voice take only one form, that of
the  Western  cultural  tradition,  rather  than  continuing  its
dialectic movement towards diversity and  complexity  through  an
abundance of human voices?

The reality is that those areas of the world  with  the  greatest
enduring  biological  diversity  are  the  remaining homelands of
(living,  breathing,  present-time)  indigenous  people   -   the
ecological   credentials   of  their  systems  of  knowledge  are
therefore self-evident. Are Bookchin's? At the same time many  of
these  peoples  are actively resisting their forced incorporation
into the world  economy  and  its  client  states  -  surely  any
contemporary  liberatory  social  theorist must approach ideas of
the global with a great deal of cultural humility.

Finally I'd like to pose a more general question:  which  of  the
following  seems  the  more  anarchic approach, which orientation
seems to lend itself to a greater fostering of self determination
and  genuinely  participatory  democracy?  To attempt to sell the
masses yet another 'New  Improved'  version  of  universal  Truth
fresh  from  the  oven of Western Enlightenment ("forget Marxism,
Anarchism or Feminism, lets do the Dialectical Naturalism.) Or to
develop  instead  a  thorough  understanding of the ways in which
elements of power and hierarchy operate through the creation  and
validation  of  all  truth and knowledge claims, and to reach for
social  visions  and  practices  based  on  an  affirmation   and
politicisation  of  difference,  multiplicity and diversity? I'll
leave it to you.

END NOTE - It seems to need repeating as often as  possible  that
the  outcome  of  a  position  that affirms the partiality of all
knowledge claims is not necessarily  the  embracing  of  absolute
relativity.  This  accusation is as easy to make as the one about
all  anarchists  wanting  chaos,  and  just  as  flippantly  ill-
informed.  Creating  the  discursive space for radical plurality,
for the radical democratising of any emancipatory project, is not
the same thing as the total absence of any basis for constructing
personal or community values. For those who continue to think  it
is,  and for anyone interested in exploring in greater depth some
of the ideas underpinning this article, the  works  of  Elizabeth
Grosz  and/or Anna Yeatman are a good instruction; both women are
writing  in  Australia  now  and  both  provide  accessible   and
stimulating  accounts  of  the  relation of the postmodern to the
political (and feminist).


