EddyHawk's Info List
---
CIPHER
---
INFO SOURCES
---
Bruce Schneier/
 CryptoGram
 TwoFish.PDF
 BlowFish description
---
SECRET KEY:
---
-AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
 .initiated by NIST on 1997
  -3rd public encryption standard
  -to replace DES
 .NIST asked public cryptography community for
  specification, submission & evaluation
 .5 candidates were selected on Round 1:
  -TwoFish, Rijndael, Serpent, MARS, RC6
 .chosen cipher is Rijndael
 .requirement:
  -128 bit data block
  -no weak keys
  -128, 192, 256 bit key
  -suitable as stream cipher, hash function & MAC
  -simple design
  -publicly disclosed, royalty-free, worldwide

-BLOWFISH
 .by Bruce Schneier ('93)
 .proposed as alternative to DES
 .Feistel
 .has weak keys
 .16 round
  -best attack: 4 round
 .four 8x32 bit, 256 entries S-boxes
  repeat its iteration to create S-boxes
 .64-bit block size
 .max 448 bit (56 byte) key length
 .total subkeys 4168 byte
 .operation: XOR & ADD
 .unbroken after 1 year of cryptanalyst sponsored by Dr.Dobb's Journal
 .public domain

-CAST (CArlisle & STafford), CAST-128, CAST-256
 .by Carlisle M. Adams & Stafford E. Tavares of Northern Telecom (Nortel)
 .patented by Nortel, but available for anyone on royalty-free basis
 .128 bit key
 .64 bit data block
 .Feistel
 .designed to specifically resist all known attacks
  -very conservative
  -strongly believed to be immune against linear & differential cryptanalysis
 .no (semi)weak keys
 .used in PGP V5.0+/Philip Zimmerman in 64 bit CFB mode
 .very fast (?)
 .CAST-256 is
  -based on CAST-128 
  -AES submission

-COBRA
 .by Christian Schneider ('96)
 .Blowfish mutation + extending techniques
 .128-bit data block
 .24 round
 .key size 32 byte 
 .used in Markus Hahn's BFA7 (shareware file crypter)

-DES: Data Encryption Standard
 .by: Horst Feistel, Walt Tuchman, Carl Meyer et al/IBM ('70)/USA government
 .chosen by NBS (now is NIST) as 
  USA (Federal?) goverment first encryption standard (1976)
 .not for classified document
 .most well-known & widely used encryption
  -ciphers after DES following its design: Feistel network, S-boxes,
   product cipher, etc: Khufu, BlowFish, etc
 .for hardware implementation
  -excellent on hardware
  -the initial & final permutation is considered cryptographically useless
   (needed to load to hardware registers?)
  -slow on software (5 to 10 times)
 .Feistel
 .originally 128 bit key, reduced by NSA to 56 bit
  the passphrase usually becomes the key
 .64 bit block size
 .16 round
 .simple key schedule
 .8 6x4 bit S-boxes, content changed by NSA
  -content optimized against differential cryptanalysis
  -differential cryptanalysis already found by IBM while creating DES & 
   Lucifer, but NSA classified their research
 .vulnerable to
  -wealthy enemy+brute force (key size is too short)
  -differential cryptanalysis
  -linear cryptanalysis
   .best attack: 2^43 or 64 tera bytes ciphertext/plaintext under 1 key
 .has weak keys
 .not a group
  crypt with 2 key <> crypt with 1 key
 .variant: Triple-DES (3DES)
  -the same data is processed by 3 keys:
   .encrypt with 1st key
   .decrypt with 2nd key
   .encrypt with 3rd key (or 1st key)
  -key length: 168 bit (or 112 bit)
   there's an attack with 2^56 blocks memory that reduces effective key size 
    to 112 bit (or 55 bit)
  -if 2 or 3 keys are the same, equal to crypt with only 1 key
  -no patent
 .export approval is almost impossible, even DES already spread overseas
  but now is exportable due to new regulation & new standard (AES)?
 .can be used in several officially defined modes:
  -ECB: Electronic CodeBook
   .crypt each 64-bit block of plaintext
   .weakest mode
  -CBC: Cipher Block Chaining
   .each 64-bit plaintext block is XORed with the previous ciphertext block 
    before being crypted
   .more secure than ECB, but not against differential cryptanalysis
   .most widely used
  -CFB: Cipher FeedBack (CFB-1, CFB-8?)
   .can crypt block <= 64 bit
   .previous ciphertext bit is also used to produce next ciphertext bit
   .ciphertext error affects current & next ciphertext variables
   .preferred
  -OFB: Output FeedBack
   .can crypt block <= 64 bit
   .the input bit is also used to produce next ciphertext bit
   .no chaining = vulnerable to certain attacks
   .1 bit ciphertext error only affects 1 bit in plaintext
  -PCBC: Propagating Cipher Block Chaining
   .not official mode, used in Kerberos V4
   .single bit error affect the rest of decrypted stream

-DESX or DES-X
 .by Ronald Rivest/RSA
 .DES+whitening
 .whitening is independently invented by Ronald Rivest
 .used in RSA (?) MailSafe & BSafe encryption products
 .RSA holds copyright on its own implementation

-DESV
 .by G. Carter, E. Dawson, L. Nielsen ('95)
 .uses latin square

-NewDES
 .by R. Scott ('85)
 .despite its name, it's neither DES variant nor new algorithm based on DES
 .S-boxes is derived from Declaration of Independence -> weak

-Biham-DES
 .by Eli Biham?
 .generate key-dependent S-boxes from known secure S-boxes & a series of
   strict math rules

-Ladder-DES

-DES-80
 .by Carlisle Adams

-FEAL: Fast data Encipherment ALgorithm (FEAL-4)
 .by A. Shimizu & S. Miyaguchi ('87)
 .proposed as alternative of DES
 .Feistel
 .64 bit block
 .128 bit key
 .broken (by differential cryptanalysis?)
  -updated version proposed
 .variable number of iterations (2^x, x >= 5)
 .FEAL-4: 20 chosen plaintext attack is exist
 .FEAL-32: secure against differential & linear cryptanalysis
 
-GOST (GOST 28147-89)
 .by Soviet government
 .similar to DES
 .Feistel
 .for software implementation
 .variable/no S-boxes, maybe key-dependent
  4x4 bit S-boxes
  S-boxes content aren't defined -> each application defines its own
 .32 bit word length & 64 bit block size
 .max key size 32 byte (256 bit)
 .32 rounds
 .used by Robert K. Jung's ARJ archiver (in CFB mode)

-IDEA: International Data Encryption Algorithm
 .other name IPES
 .successor of PES
 .designers: Xuejia Lai & James L. Massey at ETH in Zurich ('90)
 .patented by Ascom Systec, not available for anyone on royalty-free basis
 .block-cipher
 .SP-network
 .design concept: mixing operations from different algebraic groups
  -combine xor mod 216, add mod 216, mul mod 216+1
 .resists attacks better than FEAL, REDOC-II, LOKI, Khafre, Snefru
  immune to differential cryptanalysis
 .oldest unbroken cipher after DES
 .128 bit key
 .8? round
 .64-bit data block
 .used in PGP/Phillip Zimmerman
 .can use DES modes: CBC & CFB

-KHAFRE
 .by Ralph C. Merkle ('90)
 .name taken from Pharoah
 .to replace DES in software
 .optimized for 32bit register microprocessor
 .designed for bulk encryption of small data
 .Khufu's little brother
 .Feistel
 .product cipher
 .patented by Xerox
 .fixed S-boxes
  value taken from RAND tables, vulnerable to differential cryptanalysis
 .whitening
  XOR text block with key material at beginning & end of the algorithm
  whitening is invented by Ralph C. Merkle
 .differential cryptanalysis + a chosen-plaintext attack using:
  -1500 different encryptions, can break 16 round
  -2^53 different encryptions, can break 24 round

-KHUFU
 .by Ralph C. Merkle ('90)
 .name taken from Pharoah
 .to replace DES in software
 .optimized for 32bit register microprocessor
 .designed for fast bulk encryption of large data
 .Khafre's big brother
 .Feistel
 .64 bit block cipher
 .product cipher
 .patented by Xerox
 .variable number of iterations
  -n*8 round, n=1..8
  -8 round can be broken by several attacks
  -best attack: 16 round
 .256-entry 32 bit wide key-dependent S-boxes
  -constructed specifically to avoid identical entries
  -immune to differential cryptanalysis
 .whitening
  XOR text block with key material at beginning & end of the algorithm
  whitening is invented by Ralph C. Merkle
 .hashed key -> large number of subkeys
 .unbroken

-LOKI (LOKI89, LOKI91, LOKI93, LOKI97)
 .by L. Brown, J. Pieprzyk, J. Seberry ('89)
 .Feistel
 .64 bit block
 .64 bit key
 .16 round
 .LOKI97
  by L. Brown ('98)
  is AES submission

-LUCIFER
 .by Horst Feistel/IBM (1973), who also invented Feistel network
 .Feistel
  -basis of next ciphers:
   FEAL, Khufu, Khafre, GOST, LOKI, CAST-128, Blowfish, RC5
 .128 bit block
 .128 bit key
  -flat keyspace (also followed by next ciphers)
 .16 round
 .2 S-boxes
  LUCIFER is the 1st cipher to use S-boxes

-MARS:
 .by IBM
 .1 of 5 AES finalists
 .heterogeneous structure
 .16 core round
  -amplified boomerang attack  breaks 11 round
 .32 (full?/mixing?) round
 .key size up to 1248 bit
  -but with some equivalent keys

-MMB
 .by John Daemen, R. Govaerts, J. Vande? ('94)
 .32 bit word length, 128 bit block size
 .combine xor mod 232 & mul mod 232-1

-PES
 .predecessor of IDEA
 .product cipher
 .64 bit block
 .128 bit key
 .8 round

-RC: Ronald/Rivest Crypt? (RC2, RC4, RC4-128, RC5, RC6)
 .designer: Ronald L. Rivest/RSA
 .variable key size
 .RC2
  2x faster than DES in software
  is designed for 16bit microprocessor
 .RC4 [1987]
  stream cipher
  10x or more faster than DES in software
  encrypts per byte (1 mb/sec on 33mhz)
  transforms pass phrase into 256 byte internal state or
   permutation vector contains 0..255
 .simplified export approval if the key size limited to 40 bit
  used in NetScape SSL
 .proprietary (by RSA)
  -but disassembling of RC2 & RC4 (Alleged) are published on sci.crypt
 .RC5 [1994/1995]
  1 round = 2 Feistel round
  data-dependent rotation
  56 bit key broken by brute-force attack
  variable number of rounds
 .RC6 is 1 of 5 AES finalists
  -fast in software, slow in hardware
  -algorithm is simple enough to memorize
  -no S-boxes
   data dependent rotation
  -20 round
   .some people recommends 34 round
   .statistical attack on data-dependent rotation breaks 15-17 round
  -max key size is 1248 bit
   .but with some equivalent keys
  -key size, block size, round are fully parameterized

-REDOC II
 .by T. Cusick & M.C. Woods ('90)
 .patented
 .randomly created S-boxes
 .unbroken

-REDOC III
 .256 entry, 32 bit wide S-box

-SAFER (SAFER K-64, SAFER+)
 .by James L. Massey?
 .SP-network
 .first to use PHT?
 .MDS matrices + extensive 8-bit PHT for diffusion
 .SAFER K-64
  -byte-oriented block cipher
  -variable number of rounds
 .SAFER+ is AES submission

-SEAL (Software-optimized Encryption Algorithm)
 .by P. Rodaway & D. Coppersmith ('94)
 .patented by IBM
 .stream cipher
 .designed to be efficient on 32bit microprocessor
  5 machine instructions per byte
 .uses SHA to create key-dependent S-boxes (3kb)

-S-1
 .early version of Skipjack or another military cipher?
 .key schedule is seriously flawed
 .posted on sci.crypt around 9 Aug 1995

-SKIPJACK
 .USA government 2nd encryption standard
 .by NSA
  -the 1st NSA algorithm ever seen
 .part of Capstone Project/Clipper Chip
 .80 bit key length
 .64 bit block size
 .32 round
  -31 round broken by impossible cryptanalysis
 .2x faster than DES in 32bit processor
 .fast on smartcard & efficient in hardware
 .no key setup time
 .classified
  -hi-risk of compromise (NSA is suspected not seriously design it)
 .only available in government-authorized hardware manufacturers
  -the hardware is called Fortezza (PCMCIA card & reader)
   used in classified DMS (Defense Messaging System)
   .incapable to supply enough Fortezza, Skipjack is declassified in 1998
 .unbalanced Feistel network
 .simple, no weird constant
 .small modification can break it

-SP networks
 .product cipher
 .variant of Feistel network
  uniform transformation structures

-OTP (One Time Pad)
 .proposed by Gilbert Vernam at AT&T (1935)
 .the only proven unbreakable encryption
  -analyzed by Shannon
  -no statistical attack able to extract plaintext from (plaintext xor pad)
   if the pad is truly random
 .the key called pad, must be truly random numbers at equal length with the
  plaintext, and only for one plaintext
  -hence the name: one time pad = key that only used once
  -if not truly random, reduce the security to near 0%
  -true random numbers can be obtained by feeding cosmic background
   radiation through strong one-way hash function (example: MD5)
 .pad sent via secure channel (example: face to face on floppy disk)
 .pad used by xor each bit of pad with each bit of (plain/cipher)text
 .after used, pad must be destroyed
 .lose its security if pads used more than one (can't be re-used)

-TSS
 .block cipher?

-TWOFISH
 .by Bruce Schneier, Doug Whiting, John Kelsey, Chris Hall, David Wagner ('98)
 .1 of 5 AES finalists
 .based on Blowfish
 .key-dependent S-boxes
 .accept any key up to 256 bit
 .1 bit rotation
 .Feistel
 .non-algebraic representation
 .MDS matrix & 32 bit PHT (Pseudo-Hadamard Transform) are used for diffusion
 .fast in hardware & software
 .security/performance trade-off modes
 .16 round
  -best attack: 6 round

-RIJNDAEL
 .by John Daemen & Vincent Rijment
 .based on SQUARE cipher
 .chosen as AES
 .fast in hardware & software
  -can take advantage of PII's MMX instruction set
 .straightforward design & conservative choice
 .non-linear S-boxes
 .10/12/14 round for 128/192/256 bit key
  -best attack: 7 round
  -some people recommends 18 round

-WAKE:
 .stream cipher
 .by D. Wheeler ('94)
 .S-boxes are constructed specifically to avoid identical entries
 .key-dependent S-boxes

-TEA: Tiny Encryption Algorithm
 .by D. Wheeler & R. Needham
 .no cryptanalysis published, except for key schedule

-VINO:
 .by A. Di Porto & W. Wolfowicz
 .no cryptanalysis published

-Akelarre:
 .by G. Alvarez, D. De la Guia, F. Montoya, A. Peinado ('96)
 .block cipher
 .severely broken

-Serpent:
 .by Ross Anderson, Eli Biham, Lars Knudsen ('98)
 .1 of 5 AES finalists
  -highest security margin
 .fast in hardware, slow in software
 .32 rounds
  authors doubles rounds than they think is secure
  -amplified boomerang attack breaks 9 round
 .straightforward design & very conservative choice
 .uses DES S-boxes

-BEAR & LION
 .by Ross Anderson & Eli Biham ('96)
 .block cipher
 .unbalanced Feistel

-MacGuffin
 .by M. Blaze & Bruce Schneier
 .unbalanced Feistel

-PANAMA
 .by John Daemen & C. Clapp
 .stream cipher?

-SQUARE
 .by John Daemen, Lars Knudsen, Vincent Rijmen ('97)
 .first to use MDS matrices?
 .PHTs
 .single fixed S-box
 .inspires next ciphers like TwoFish & Rijndael

-3-WAY
 .block cipher

-ICE
 .by M. Kwan

-MISTY
 .by M. Matsui ('97)
 .designed to specifically resist all known attacks

-SNAKE
 .by C.-H. Lee & Y.-T. Cha ('97)
 .Feistel
 .provably secure against differential & linear cryptanalysis
 .successfully broken under interpolation attack

-SHARK
 .by Vincent Rijmen, B. Preneel, A. Bosselaers, E. DeWin
 .SP-network
 .MDS matrices

-CS-Cipher
 .by J. Stern & S. Vaudenay ('98)

-SPEED
 .by Yulian Zheng ('97)
 .variable number of rounds
 .slower than previous existing ciphers

-Manta
 .block cipher
 .unpublished
 .large block size
 .SP-like network
 .DES as S-boxes, MDS matrices for permutation

-CRISP
 .by M. Leech ('96)
 .Feistel

-SOBER
 .by G. Rose ('98)
 .stream cipher
 .designed for 8bit microprocessor

-Zhu-Guo
 .by F. Zhu & B. A. Guo ('97)
 .slower than previous existing ciphers

-Travois
 .by G. Yuval ('97)

-S-WAY

-TIGER
 .by Ross Anderson & Eli Biham
 .8x64 bit S-boxes

-TWOPRIME
 .by C. Ding, V. Niemi, A. Renvall, A. Salomaa ('97)
 .block cipher

-DIAMOND
 .by Michael Paul Johnson
 .block cipher

-SAPPHIRE (SAPPHIRE II)
 .by Michael Paul Johson
 .stream cipher
 .similar with RC4
  -permutation vector contains 0..255 being shuffled

-RUBY
 .by Michael Paul Johnson/ExaByte

-A5
 .GSM encryption algorithm
 .stream cipher
 .effective key length = 5 bytes
---
PUBLIC KEY:
---
invented by Whitfield Diffie & Martin E. Hellman
independently? invented by Ralph C. Merkle
GCHQ, British-NSA like claimed to find public-key cryptography before
 America, but kept the discovery secret:
 -Clifford Cook (a British spook) published (essentially) RSA in 1973
 -M.J. Williamson invented (remarkably similar to) Diffie-Hellman in 1974
NSA sometimes claimed to find public-key cryptography before learning it
 from British or press

-Diffie-Hellman ('70)
 .by Whitfield Diffie & Martin E. Hellman 
 .discrete logarithm problem
 .requires dynamic key exchange for every sender-receiver pair
  -A's public key is combined with B's secret key to produce a session key to
   encrypt plaintext
   The ciphertext can only be decrypted by the sesssion key of 
   B's public key & A's secret key
 .used by PGP V5+

-KEA (Key Exchange Algorithm)
 .by NSA
 .part of Capstone Project/Clipper Chip
 .classified
  -incapable to supply enough Fortezza, it's declassified on 1998
 .straightforward design
 .enhanced Diffie-Hellman
  -(longterm/onetime) (public/secret) keys -> 4 keys for each party
  -A's longterm secret key is combined with B's onetime public key
   A's onetime secret key is combined with B's longterm public key
  -each session creates 2 unique (combinations & keys)
  -2 Diffie-Hellman-generated keys (2 x 80 bits) are hashed to single 80 bits
   which becomes the key

-Knapsack
 .easy to perform, hard to invert

-ElGamal
 .by T. ElGamal
 .discrete logarithm problem

-Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
 .believed to be as secure as RSA with smaller key size
 .all analysis on discrete logarithm problem also applied to it

-Rabin-Williams
 .integer factorization problem

-RSA: (Ronald L.) Rivest, (Adi) Shamir, (Leonard) Adleman
 .developed at MIT, funded by US federal
 .integer factorization problem
 .Rivest: sometimes being used by US government to protect its nuclear weapon
 .cryptanalyzed without success since 1978
 .requires trusted authority to certificate public key
 .verifying is faster than signing
 .used in PGP/Phillip Zimmerman (at least to 2.63?)
 .various attacks has been found
  -side channel/timing attack: private key can be recovered by measuring 
   the relative times cryptographic operations took (1995)
  -implementation attack: on PKCSI #1
  -adaptive chosen plaintext/reaction attack
   .by Daniel Bleichenbacher/Bell Labs
   .can recover a message from 300,000 - 2M related (reaction) messages
    -doesn't recover the key
    -to read another message, require another 300,000 - 2M related messages

-Cramer-Shoup
 .by IBM
 .provable resistance to adaptive chosen ciphertext attack
  -but the proof is based on Diffie-Hellman Decision Problem, which is
   much weaker
 .ciphertext is 4x plaintext
 .2x slower than ElGamal

-Master-Key Cryptosystems
 .by M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, F. T. Leighton ('96)
---
MAC (Message Authentication Code) or
 MDC (Manipulation Detection Code) or
 MD (Message Digest) or
 Strong One-Way Hash Function
---
-Davies-Meyer tandem?
 .use block cipher as hash function

-HAVAL
 .by Yuliang Zheng ('92)
 .larger hash length than SHA
 .variable length of output

-MAC: Message Authentication Code
 .hash calculated from a block of data & a secret key

-MD: Message Digest (MD2, MD4, MD5, MD5a)
 .designer: Ronald L. Rivest/RSA
 .128 bit hash length
 .MD4: 1991
 .MD5: 1992
  is broken by Hans Dobbertin, a German cryptographer (1996)
  not completely broken, but serious weaknesses are discovered

-MDC: Manipulation Detection Code (MDC-1, MDC-2, MDC-4)
 .by Robert R. Jueneman (?)/IBM ('86?)

-RIPEMD
 .used in RIPEM?
 .RIPEMD-160
  -by H. Dobbertin, A. Bosselaers, B. Preneel
  -modified MD for larger hash length?

-SHA: Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-0, SHA-1, SHA-2)
 .USA goverment standard
 .part of Capstone Project/Clipper Chip
 .designed by NSA for NIST ('93)
  -extremely well-designed
  -has design innovations that overcome message digest observed weaknesses
 .160 bit hash length
 .NIST defined longer lengths (256/384/512 bit) for SHA [2000]

-SNEFRU/Xerox Secure Hash Function (Snefru-8?)
 .by Ralph C. Merkle ('90)
 .name taken from Pharoah
 .used by Xerox?
 .public domain
 .Ralph Lemke offering $1000 to anyone who can break Snefru-4?
 .Snefru-4: vulnerable to differential cryptanalysis
 .Snefru-8: 8 round
 .hash > 16 byte
 .2 parameter: number of iterations & hash size
---
DIGITAL SIGNATURE:
---
-DSA: Digital Signature Algorithm
 .USA government standard ('94)
 .discrete logarithm problem
 .based on cryptosystem proposed by C. P. Schnorr's modification of ElGamal
  work
 .no key exchange
 .verifying is slower than signing

-Lucas function?
---
???:
---
-FISH
-N-hash
-Purdy Hash
-RIPE-MAC1
-RIPE-MAC3
-Atjai-Dwork
 .by IBM
 .provably secure
 .3 breaks (which attack the assumption, not the proof)
-Kerberos
 .secret-key authentication protocol
 .uses PCBC mode
 .requires frequent random numbers to challenge user
 .implemented in Windows2000
-GCHQ
 .British NSA-like
---
OLD ENCRYPTION
---
Atbash
 simple substitution cipher over Hebrew alphabet thousand years ago
WWII crypto devices:
 Sigaba
 Russian Espionage Cipher
 German Enigma (rotor?) machine & Japan Purple (machine?)
  cracked by Allies during World War 2 & sold to third world countries
  while keeping the break classified
---
BOOKS
---
The Codebreakers: best book of cryptology history
 David Khan
---
FAMOUS QUOTATIONS
---
-A secure cryptosystem must have several properties
 (ex: long enough key, random-like output)
 but having those properties doesn't mean that the cryptosystem is secure
-A chain is only as strong as its weakest link
-compromise
-block-cipher: crypt per block of data (64/128 bit/etc)
-product-cipher: crypt is iterates weak operations
-Feistel: product-cipher that swaps halves of ciphertext each round
-symmetric: secret-key
-asymmetric: public-key
-s-boxes: substitution boxes
---
ATTACK
---
-Key
 .Known Plaintext
 .Chosen Plaintext
 .Adaptive Chosen Plaintext (Differential Cryptanalysis)
  by Eli Biham & Adi Shamir, 2 Israeli cryptographers (1990)
  -Conditional Differential
   by Ben Aroya & Eli Biham
  -Impossible Differential
   by Eli Biham & Adi Shamir (1998?)
  -Higher Order Differential
   by X. Lai
  -Truncated Differential
   by Lars R. Knudsen
 .Linear
  by M. Matsui
  -Multiple Appromixations
 .Differential-Linear
  by S. Langford & M. Hellman
-Plaintext
 .CipherText Only

-Birthday attack
-Boomerang
 .Amplified
-Interpolation
 by T. Jakobsen & L. Knudsen
-Mod n
-Related Key
 -Rotational Related Key
 -Differential Related Key
-Slide
-Side Channel
 attacks on other than algorithm's input/output
 .Timing
 .Power Consumption
  Differential Power
 .Radiation
 .NMR scanning
 .Electronic emanations (TEMPEST)
-Fault
-Partitioning
 by C. Harpes & J. Massey ('97)
---
Advice:
---
-longer key size than designed is worthless because:
 .it isn't designed that way
  the designer doesn't take account of longer key
 .maybe must change the algorithm, which will be insecure
 .if the cipher is broken by design, 1 million bit key wouldn't protect
  the plaintext anymore, while it already wasting time & space & power for 
  each key initialization & encrypt/decrypt process
-you should only put crypt elements to your cipher which is proved to be
 hard/impossible to break, instead of scrambling it too much further or 
 excessively more complex until it blurred you to trace it anymore & then 
 believe it to be secure
---
Encryption Hall of Fame:
---
Adi Shamir
 israeli cryptographer
 one author of RSA
 one author of differential cryptanalysis

Brian Snow
 NSA senior cryptographer (INFOSEC Technical Director)

Bruce Schneier
 American cryptographer
 designer of BlowFish cipher
 one of designers of TwoFish cipher
 writer of CryptoGram, Applied Cryptography, Secrets and Lies
 introduces encryption knowledge for the masses

Colin Plumb

Eli Biham
 isreali cryptographer
 one author of differential cryptanalysis
 author of impossible cryptanalysis

Fauzan Mirza
 author of TinyIDEA program

IBM
 designers of DES, Mars

James L. Massey
 one designer of IDEA
 designer of SAFER?

Lars Knudssen

Mark Andreas
 optimizer of TinyIDEA program

Matsui
 author of linear cryptanalysis

Michael Paul Johnson
 author of MPJ, Sapphire(II), Diamond & Ruby cipher

NSA
 designers of Skipjack cipher

Philip R. Zimmermann
 American
 author of PGP
 introduces privacy for the masses

Ralph C. Merkle
 author of Khufu, Khafre & Snefru

Robert Rothenburg (Walking-Owl)
 for cryptographic implementations: MD5, NOISE

Ronald Rivest
 one author of RSA
 author of MD2, MD4, MD5, MD5a, RC2, RC4, RC5, RC6 (?)

Ross Anderson
